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Abstract
The three chapters in this thesis consider the role macroprudential policy can play in economic
booms and busts. The rst two chapters concern the recent housing boom in the United States.
Whilst it is popularly thought that a signicant easing of credit standards caused the boom, the
econometric attempts to establish this are largely inconclusive. The fall in real interest rates also
fail to account for the magnitude of the boom, suggesting buyersirrational exuberance. I approach
this problem in a new way using tiered housing data that separately covers the price movements
of cheap and expensive houses. During the US boom, the cheapest houses had the largest relative
price gains in 51 of 52 metro areas studied. In the rst chapter I use a simple model to show that
this pattern could not have occurred without an easing of credit standards: without this, buyer
exuberance or a fall in interest rates would produce the opposite pattern.
Chapter two examines alternative explanations for the tiered pattern, including changes in
housing supply, speculation and di¤erential income growth. I show that these variables are not
responsible for the pattern, but that, in keeping the theory, there is a statistically and economically
signicant relationship between credit easing and the relative performance of low and high tier house
prices. Taken together, the two chapters conclude that the housing boom would have signicantly
smaller if policy had prevented credit standards from easing.
The third chapter considers credit traps; a situation in which a severe nancial crisis gives rise
to a prolonged period of low lending to, and stagnation of, the real economy. We introduce a model
in which credit traps are possible, then consider what macroprudential policy can do to help the
economy escape from a trap, and to reduce the chances of falling into one.
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Preface
Following the recent global nancial crisis, there has been widespread recognition that gov-
ernments and central banks should play a more active role in regulating nancial markets. Many
central banks are set to be granted macroprudential policy tools, though as their prior use has
been highly limited, there is much uncertainty about how e¤ective they would be. A crucial com-
ponent of this is understanding what caused the crisis in the rst place, and what, if anything,
macroprudential policy could have done about it. The three chapters in this PhD thesis are all
concerned with this issue, with the rst two examining the causes of the boom and bust in the US
housing market. The third considers theoretically what macroprudential policy can do to reduce
the chances of a nancial crisis occurring, and further what can be done to resurrect the economy
after a severe crisis has occurred.
The global nancial crisis began with the collapse of the US housing market, yet the causes of
this dramatic boom and bust are still not well understood. In the words of two leading housing
economists, writing in 2011:
The United States recently experienced house price growth of unprecedented scale...many
researchers have tried to understand whether the most recent cycle was a bubble, or if
rational theories can account for the variation in prices and quantities at the national
level and across metropolitan areas (MSAs). Despite this work and the fact that we
are now several years into the current housing crisis, researchers and policy makers still
have conicting views and limited knowledge about the causes of that extraordinary
rise and decline in house prices.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2011)
Despite the widespread popular belief that easy credit caused the housing boom, researchers
have not been able to show empirically that the extent of credit easing can account for the rise in
prices. Another common explanation, the fall in real interest rates, also fails to account for the
majority of the rise in prices. There could be a temptation to attribute the remainder of the boom
to home buyersirrational exuberance, however it is very hard to test this empirically as there is
scant data on house price expectations during the boom. With the cause of the boom uncertain,
there is thus great uncertainty about the e¢ cacy of regulation in attenuating future housing cycles.
11
The rst two chapters address this issue with a novel approach. A new dataset is introduced
with separate house price indices for cheap (low-tier) and expensive (high-tier) houses for 52
US metro areas. I document a remarkable pattern: in 51 of the 52 cities, the cheapest houses had
greater price growth during the boom. This pattern is used to the infer the underlying causes of
the US housing boom. In Chapter 1, a theoretical model featuring two housing tiers is used to
evaluate the three main proposed causes: a fall in interest rates, an easing of credit standards, and
irrational exuberance on the part of homebuyers. This model is used to perform counterfactual
analysis of what a fall in interest rates or irrational exuberance would look like if credit standards
were not eased. In both cases, the model predicts that high tier houses prices would have greater
growth, the opposite of what we see in the data. By contrast, with an easing of credit standards,
low tier prices grow more, consistent with the recent US experience.
Chapter 2 tackles this issue empirically. First, the new dataset is used to introduce several new
facts about the boom, the bust and the link between them. These facts can be accounted for in a
parsimonious way using the theoretical prediction of Chapter 1 that an easing of non-price credit
terms will have a relatively greater impact on low tier prices. Using this data I test this implication
of the theory, nding statistically and economically signicant relationships between two separate
measures of credit easing, and relative changes in low and high tier prices, both during the boom
and bust. Further, I augment the analysis of Chapter 1 by examining alternative explanations for
the tiered pattern beyond the three considered, including changes in housing supply, speculators
and di¤erential income growth for low and high tier buyers. I show that these variables are not
responsible for the pattern.
Taken together, the two chapters provide a strong case that there must have been a signicant
easing of non-price credit terms during the boom. Without this, we would not have observed the
remarkable tiered pattern that we did. The implication for policy is that product regulation in the
mortgage market could have signicantly reduced the extent of the boom and bust in US housing.
A back of the envelope calculation suggests that if non-price credit terms had been prevented from
easing, the cheapest third of houses would have grown at least 55 percentage points less in nominal
terms during the housing boom in the average city.
Chapter 3 moves away from the housing market and considers the link between the nancial
sector and the real economy. Motivated by post-crisis economic stagnation in the UK and a de-
pressed banking sector, we consider the possibility of a credit trap: a steady state of the economy
featuring permanently low output, bank lending, and nancial sector net worth. We develop a
simple overlapping generations model to perform counterfactual analysis regarding the appropriate
policy actions if the economy is indeed stuck in a credit trap. We show that countercyclical leverage
policy will be ine¤ective in a credit trap (in contrast to a normalrecession), and consider instead
three unconventional credit policies, obtaining clear predictions about the relative e¢ cacy of each.
We also consider what policy can do to reduce the fall-out from a nancial crisis, showing that
a regulatory leverage ratio can increase the resilience of the economy, reducing the chances of it
falling into a credit trap.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Credit in the US
Housing Boom
Whilst it is commonly believed that a major easing of credit standards caused the US housing boom,
econometric attempts to show this have been largely inconclusive, as have attempts to explain the
boom in terms of falling real interest rates. This has led some authors to speculate that the major
cause was homebuyersirrational exuberance. This paper introduces a novel way of distinguishing
between these three proposed explanations of the boom by analysing the pattern of relative capital
gains across di¤erent tiers of housing, sorted by value. In contrast to previous US housing booms,
the cheaper houses within cities had signicantly higher relative gains than more expensive houses.
By using an Overlapping Generations model with a housing ladder, I show that this pattern could
not have arisen through a fall in interest rates or buyer optimism without signicant credit easing,
establishing the necessity of credit easing. The results suggest that macroprudential tools that can
prevent credit easing from occurring, such as a cap on maximum loan-to-value and loan-to-income
ratios, could have reduced the nominal growth of the cheapest third of houses over the boom by
at least 55 percent points. Chapter 2 tests this prediction empirically and examines alternative
explanations for the tiered pattern beyond the three considered theoretically here.
1.1 Introduction
A major housing boom and bust occurred in the United States during the rst decade of the
twenty-rst century (Figure 1.1). From the trough at the end of 1996 to the peak at the start of
2006, the Case-Shiller national house price index grew 86% in real terms. It then fell signicantly
to the end of 2011 with average prices only 10% higher than they were in 1996, putting them at
the same level as those in 1987. The common explanation for this is a substantial relaxation of
non-price credit terms such as the Loan-to-Value (LTV) and Loan-to-Income (LTI) ratios, with the
growth in average LTV ratios shown in Figure 1.2. However, econometric attempts to establish
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the link between credit easing and the boom have been largely inconclusive. Glaeser et al (2010)
and Coleman IV et al (2008) do not nd a signicant relationship between changes in LTV and
house prices during the boom. A limitation of both papers is that they do not tackle the likely
endogeneity between credit standards and house prices. This may arise for, on the one hand, an
easing of mortgage credit can increase housing demand, thereby driving up prices. However, bubble
conditions in the housing market could reduce the default concerns lenders have, thus increasing
their desire to provide loans to risky borrowers.1 Thus, rising prices could also lead to relaxed
credit standards. Adelino et al (2012) and Favara and Imbs (2011) provide instruments to tackle
this problem, based on changes in conforming loan limits and branching regulation, respectively.
They nd statistically signicant relationships between changes in credit conditions and house
prices during the boom, though the economic magnitudes are very small and explain less than 3
percentage points of house price growth over the period.
Attempts to explain the boom in terms of a fall in real interest rates (Glaeser et al 2010) have
also failed to account for its magnitude. This has led to economists such as Glaeser et al (2010) to
propose looking at the irrational exuberance of home-buyers.2 This might seem appealing at rst:
survey evidence from Case and Shiller (2003) highlights the highly optimistic outlook buyers in the
property market had concerning future capital gains, expecting an average annual gain of at least
11% for the next ten years in the four cities sampled.
In this chapter we consider theoretically the role of these three factors in the housing boom.
The implications for policy are very di¤erent depending on the major cause, whether a fall in
interest rates, an easing of non-price credit terms, or exogenous optimism. If the fall in interest
rates was the main factor, then existing monetary policy tools could have been used to attenuate
the boom. If an easing of credit standards was the primary culprit, through looser LTV and LTI
ratios, interest rate policy may be largely ine¤ective as well as undesirable, given its impact on the
wider economy. New macroprudential policies such as LTV or LTI caps, as well as di¤erent capital
requirements for loans to the housing market, could prove to be useful and e¢ cient by targeting
just the housing market. We are left with irrational exuberance: if this were indeed responsible
for the boom, there is no obvious policy prescription. Given the various possibilities, each with
di¤erent implications, it is crucial to determine the primary cause so that future damaging booms
may be attenuated using appropriate policy measures.
An econometric approach cannot be used to help determine the contribution of buyer optimism
to the housing boom, as there is insu¢ cient time series data on future price expectations.3 It is
neither possible to eyeball this from the aggregate data, as a boom caused by optimism will look
very similar to a boom caused by a fall in interest rates or an easing of credit standards. A residual
1See Brueckner et al (2012). They formalise this mechanism showing theoretically that a positive shift in lenders
house price expectations reduces default concerns, thereby spuring lending. They also nd tentative evidence for
this mechansim during the boom in the US, showing that borrower riskiness rises when a proxy for price expectations
improves.
2This is to be distinguished from any irrational exuberance on the part of mortgage lenders, which has been
studied indirectly by Mian and Su (2009). In this paper we focus on the exuberance of buyers.
3Case et al (2012) have recently produced time-series for future price expectations from 2003 until 2012, however
it only covers four US cities.
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Figure 1.1: Case-Shiller National Data
component of the boom, unexplained by credit and interest rate studies, cannot be attributed to
buyer optimism due to serious endogeneity concerns regarding credit supply and house prices. In
this paper I shall not o¤er any novel instruments to resolve this econometric issue or unveil any
new data regarding price expectations. Rather, I shall argue for the necessity of the credit channel
through analysis of tiered housing data.
In addition to their famous repeat-sales aggregate house price index, Case and Shiller have
produced an index that breaks the housing data within each city down into three equal tiers, sorted
by value.4 A weighted average of this across 17 publicly available Case-Shiller cities is shown in
Figure 1.3. A striking pattern emerges regarding relative capital gains: prior to the boom, all price
tiers grow at the same rate; during the boom, the cheapest houses see the highest relative gains,
followed by the middle tier, with the most expensive houses experiencing the smallest increase.
The pattern is not a feature of aggregation. I augment the public data with additional purchased
data from Fiserv giving tiered Case-Shiller house price indices during the boom for a total of 52
US cities, covering 26 states, with graphs given in the appendix to chapter 2. Remarkably, low
tier prices grew relatively more than the high tier prices during the boom in 51 of the 52 cities.
The pattern is not a quirk of the way the data is constructed; indeed, using Case-Shiller data,
Mayer (1993) documented that in the 1970s and 80s the opposite pattern occurred with high tier
house prices growing relatively more in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and Oakland. Poterba (1991) has
similar ndings. Finally, using di¤erent methods, Smith and Tesarek (1991) show that in the 1970s
boom in Houston, high tier houses had the greatest appreciation. Indeed such was the prevalence
4A detailed description of this data is given in Chapter 2.
15
Figure 1.2: Credit Easing: Average for Case-Shiller 19 MSAs
of this pattern, Mayer (1993) suggests a theory based on an extension of Stein (1995) showing why
its inevitable that high tier house prices will grow more than low tier prices during a boom. The
recent experience was not inevitable.
Tiered housing data tells us something new about the housing market because the buyers of
houses in di¤erent tiers are di¤erent in a crucial respect. Specically, buyers of low tier houses are
likely to be credit constrained when buying, whilst the buyers of high tier houses are not. Mayer
and Engelhardt (1996) show that rst time buyers, who buy cheaper houses, make signicantly
smaller percentage down-payments than repeat buyers, who purchase more expensive houses.5 The
reason for this is that rst-time buyers tend to be younger, typically have low wealth, and must
save on average for 2.5 years to accumulate their deposit. By contrast, repeat buyers are older and
have built up housing equity in their present house through paying down their mortgage, and are
therefore able to make larger relative down-payments. Engelhardt (1996) demonstrates the burden
of saving for the deposit on a rst house, using panel data to show that people actually reduce their
expenditure on food whilst saving for this rst purchase.
This heterogeneity between buyers of cheap and expensive houses a¤ects not only how they
respond to credit easing but also their response to other shocks. The relative price growth of the
5 In Table 1.2 in the appendix we provide average low and high tier LTV data for 26 of our 52 cities during di¤erent
stages of the recent boom, with data coming from various editions of the American Housing Survey. In 25 of the 26
cities, the average low tier LTV is higher than the average high tier LTV. This is survey data with a small sample
size, so comparisons should only be made between low and high tier buyers within a city, not between cities, or over
time.
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Figure 1.3: Tiered Case-Shiller Data
tiers during the housing boom can thus be used to infer the underlying shocks. We argue that the
price of low tier housing could not have grown relatively more than the high tier in the absence of
an easing of non-price credit terms.
Home-buyers constrained by a maximum LTV ratio make the minimum percentage down-
payment that theyre required to and would like to make an even smaller down-payment for the
purpose of smoothing consumption across their life rather than reducing their expenditure on food
for a few years prior to buying. Being credit-constrained reduces the responsiveness of the price
they pay to changing factors in the housing market, such as expectations of future price growth.
Ultimately, any increase in the price that constrained house buyers pay must come from a reduction
in current consumption, as it requires a greater absolute deposit. As people are limited by their
ability to reduce their expenditure on food, there is a limit to how much they can respond in the
absence of credit easing, regardless of how optimistic they are. This contrasts with unconstrained
home buyers who make a greater deposit than the minimum required. If they want to pay more
for a house, they can do so without a¤ecting current consumption. They thus have the resources to
respond more elastically to optimism over future price growth or a fall in the interest rate.
For both constrained and unconstrained house buyers, a reduction in the interest rate or an
increase in future resale prices reduces the lifetime cost of owning a house, inducing a greater price
paid. However, the increase in price paid will be greater for the unconstrained buyer as they have
the resources to increase the price paid without a¤ecting current consumption, thereby pushing up
demand. An easing of the down-payment requirement will have no direct e¤ect on unconstrained
buyers; relaxing this, on the other hand, will increase the price that constrained buyers can pay for
a house.
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An additional pertinent feature of the housing market is the housing ladder. People typically
move from lower to higher quality houses as age, income, and wealth increase.6 This channel acts
as a mechanism for transmitting capital gains from the low to the high tier: as people move up the
housing ladder, any increase in the price received for the sold low quality house can be used for a
greater deposit for the purchase of a higher quality house. In practice, low tier buyers are credit
constrained and at the bottom of the housing ladder, whilst high tier buyers are unconstrained and
higher up the housing ladder.
An easing of non-price credit terms directly a¤ects only the low tier buyers, and whilst the high
tier buyers have an indirect e¤ect through transmitted capital gains, the relative price increase will
be greater for the low tier. By contrast, with buyer optimism or a fall in the interest rate, the
relative price growth of the high tier will be greater. As high tier buyers are unconstrained, there is
a greater direct e¤ect on the price they pay from the change in expectations or the interest rate. In
addition, there is the indirect positive e¤ect on the price from transmitted capital gains. Thus, the
pattern observed in the US of the low tier growing relatively more than the high tier could not have
occurred without an easing of non-price credit terms. If credit standards had not been reduced, and
the boom was caused by a fall in interest rates or buyer optimism alone, we would have observed
exactly the opposite pattern.7
I shall not attempt to disentangle the likely endogenous relationship between credit easing,
house price expectations, and interest rates to point to an ultimate cause of the housing boom.
We do not need to do this to be able to draw useful policy implications. The results we develop
show that the whole cycle could not have taken place as it did if credit standards were not relaxed.
The growth of the high tier places a lower bound on how much low tier prices could have been
attenuated, if these were the three factors driving the boom.8 This bound implies an average 55
percentage point reduction in the nominal growth rate of the low tier to the peak of the housing
boom, across the 52 cities studied (the reduction in low tier price growth required for the high tier
to grow more in the average city).
In this paper we present a housing model comprised of two types of houses to buy and a housing
ladder that formalises the above arguments. The remainder of Section 1.1 discusses the modelling
approach, whilst Section 1.2 elaborates on a basic model with only one type of house to buy and
develops the intuition regarding the di¤ering responses of constrained and unconstrained house
buyers. Section 1.3 extends this model to include two types of houses available for purchase and
a housing ladder, and it presents the main results of the paper. Section 1.4 shows robustness to
alternative explanations, whilst Section 1.5 establishes the negative welfare cost of boom and bust
cycles, and the benet that policy can bring. Section 1.6 concludes.
6 In the last decade an average of 66% of recent home-buyers say they have moved to a higher quality house
(American Housing Survey).
7The approach taken here is similar in spirit to Landvoigt et al (2012) in seeking to distinguish between di¤erent
candidate explanations for the US housing boom by looking at the di¤erential e¤ect each has on relative price gains
within a metro area.
8 It is a lower bound as the actual growth in the low tier contributed to the growth of the high tier.
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1.1.1 Modelling approach
The standard existing theoretical literature on the housing market, such as Iacoviello (2005), Kiy-
otaki et al (2007), and the user cost models in the style of Poterba (1984), are completely silent
on the relative capital gains across di¤erent housing tiers, as these models only include one type of
house. However, if these models included tiered housing, the relative capital gains would be iden-
tical. This is because they treat housing as an innitely divisible9 asset, with individuals choosing
how much housing to buy, rather than whether or not to buy a specic house of xed size.10 Con-
sequently, in equilibrium, all agents adjust the amount of housing and non-housing consumption
during each period in such a way that they all have the same intratemporal MRS between the two:
all agents are thus marginal buyers. Therefore, each unit of housing has the same price in terms of
consumption, so a house of size (alternatively quality) S costs exactly half that of a house of size
2S. Let the price of a unit of housing be p. Thus a house of size S costs P (S) = pS: Suppose due
to a shock the price changes from p to p0: Then the house of size S now costs p0S and the relative
capital gain is given by
p0S   pS
pS
=
p0   p
p
which is independent of S so all houses have exactly the same relative capital gains. Such a
modelling approach is clearly of no use for our purposes.
To tackle the US experience, we build a housing model with an indivisible housing stock. One
approach is that of Landvoigt et al (2012) who use an assignment model that maps a continuum of
house buyers into a continuum of indivisible houses.11 Equilibrium house prices adjust to assign
movers to the distribution of houses. Movers di¤er along three dimensions: wealth, income and
age; whilst it is assumed that all the features that matter for the quality of a house, such as the
neighbourhood and structure, can be combined into a unique quality index. Estimating the quality
index from microdata for San Diego, they numerically solve for the change in the distribution of
house prices over the boom from 2000-2005, comparing their results to the data.
For tractability, we instead make the choice over housing discrete rather than continuous. Pre-
vious work in this area has been done by Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) in an OLG set-up with
agents living for 4 periods. To keep their analysis tractable, they assume that low tier buyers buy
a house as soon as they can a¤ord the required down-payment. The low tier buyers do not take
interest rates and future house prices into account when making their purchase, thereby rendering
their model unsuitable for our purposes. By making simplications along other dimensions (agents
live 2 rather than 4 periods), we are able to present a model in which interest rates and future
house prices inuence the decision of both low and high tier buyers.
9A key requirement for this is that there exist a costless linear technology for turning di¤erent types of house into
each other, allowing people to get exactly the amount of housing they want. This allows that, for example, a house
of size S and a house of size 2S can be combined to produce, say, two houses of size 1:5S. When housing is treated
as indivisible, this rearrangement is not possible.
10This point is made in detail in Landvoigt et al (2012).
11 It is possible to have a continuous housing choice with indivisible housing. The key is that the distribution of
the housing stock is xed and cannot be altered.
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1.2 Model With One Type of House to Buy
1.2.1 Set-Up
We rst develop a model in which agents can choose between renting and buying one type of house.
This simple set-up shows the di¤erent responses of constrained and unconstrained home buyers
to not only changes in credit conditions, but also to buyer optimism over future prices and the
interest rate. In the next section, we extend the model to include two types of houses to buy,
thereby demonstrating that the tiered pattern observed in the data cannot have occurred without
credit easing.
As discussed in the introduction, in order for di¤erential responses across housing tiers to be
possible, the choice over housing must be indivisible. We model this with a discrete choice over
housing: agents choose whether to buy or not, not how much housing services to buy. To keep
the model tractable and bring out the intuition, we use an overlapping generations model with
homogeneous agents living for two periods, being born without assets, and leaving no bequests.
We model this in a partial equilibrium setting to simplify the model and keep the focus on the
housing market. Agents born at time t have exogenous income ow y0;t ; y1;t and must allocate
this between housing and non-housing consumption. Agents can rent a house in each period at
exogenous rental price Rt: This gives them uR units of utility per period. Alternatively, agents
can buy one house when young and sell it when old, with the agent renting for the last period
of life.12 Living in a house gives uL units of utility per period, with uL  uR reecting a weak
preference for owning a house over renting.
Agents can save between the rst and second period of life at a risk-free rate rt: However, the
only borrowing available to young agents is borrowing secured against their house, with the same
risk-free rate rt. Consistent with the evidence regarding the importance of the down-payment
constraint on rst time buyers, a minimum down payment Pt is required with  2 (0; 1) and Pt
the price of the house when bought.13 Equivalently, the maximum LTV allowed in the model is
(1  ): Whilst  is exogenous in the model, agents can endogenously choose any LTV  (1  ):
In a standard housing model with a continuous choice over how much housing to buy, agents will
typically buy as much housing as they can and the constraint will always bind. However, with the
discrete choice set-up here, the LTV constraint need not bind in equilibrium. This allows us to
examine the contrasting price response when the constraint does and does not bind.
The utility function for non-housing consumption is an increasing concave function:
u0(C) > 0; u00(C) < 0 (1.1)
There is no uncertainty in the model, so for both renters and buyers, the lifetime utility from
12We do this so that a high resale price boosts the non-housing consumption of the agent and hence their utility.
Alternatively, we could specify that the agents non-housing consumption occurs at the end of each period.
13 In Section 4 the analysis is redone with a maximum LTI ratio instead, producing analogous results.
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non-housing consumption is given by
max
b0;t0
u(xi0;t   b0;t) + u
 
xi1;t + (1 + rt)b0;t

where xj;t are the resources available for non-housing consumption after housing expenses have
been paid for the period.
Denition 1 An agent is constrained under housing choice i i¤
u0(Ci0;t) > (1 + rt)u
0  Ci1;t
An agent is unconstrained under housing choice i i¤
u0(Ci0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0  Ci1;t
Constrained agents have lower non-housing consumption when young than they would like,
and they wish to borrow from future income to smooth this consumption but cannot (b0;t = 0).
Unconstrained agents wish to save (b0;t  0) so the credit constraint does not a¤ect them and they
are able to spread consumption as desired, with their Euler equation holding with equality.
When an agent rents in both periods of their life, the resources available for non-housing con-
sumption in each period are simply given by income minus the rental price: xRj;t = yj;t Rt: When
an agent buys a house when young, selling it when old
xL0;t = y0;t   Pt
xL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)(1  )Pt + Pt+1
A young household consumes whats left out of income after theyve made their down-payment.
When old, they sell their house, paying o¤ the remainder including interest, and pay the rental cost.
If the agent is constrained, they make the minimum down-payment Pt. If they are unconstrained,
they save some rst period income, which pays the same rate of interest as their mortgage. Thus,
unconstrained agents e¤ectively make a down-payment larger than Pt:
To pin down equilibrium prices in the model, we assume that there are more people interested in
buying houses than houses available to be bought, with a perfectly elastic rental market unlimited
in size.14 Specically, we assume there is a constant mass N of people in each generation and
a xed mass M of houses available to buy with N > M: In equilibrium we must therefore have
agents indi¤erent between owning a house and renting:
u(CL0;t) + u
 
CL1;t

+ uL + uR = u(C
R
0;t) + u
 
CR1;t

+ uR + uR (1.2)
14A responsive housing supply would not a¤ect price responses in this model as all agents are homogeneous, with
the demand for housing a step function in its price. However, in a fuller model with heterogeneous agents and a
downwards sloping demand curve for housing, changes in the housing supply will a¤ect prices. The role of supply
in the housing boom is tackled empirically in Chapter 2.
21
In the appendix we give conditions under which there is a unique Pt that solves this for a given
Pt+1: If there is a positive premium for owning rather than renting, uL > uR; then utility from
non-housing consumption will be greater for renters.
1.2.2 Analytic Solutions in Special Cases
In general there is no analytic solution to (1.2) though in a special case the equilibrium relationship
is identical to the user cost model.
Proposition 2 15Suppose there is no utility premium from owning a house, uL = uR and agents
are unconstrained both when buying and renting. Then
Pt = Rt +
Pt+1
1 + rt
(1.3)
In this special case, the price of housing is like any other asset: the value of the asset today is the
sum of dividends (the rental payment avoided) plus the discounted future resale price. The intuition
for the result is straightforward: when there is no utility premium from owning, lifetime utility from
non-housing consumption must be equal for renters and buyers. As they are unconstrained in both
cases, all that matters is the present value of resources available for lifetime consumption. The
present value of the cost of renting and buying are thus equated, which is precisely the user cost
model.
The above proposition holds for any utility function satisfying (1.1). In the special case of log
utility we can generalise the user cost model to the case of a positive housing utility premium.
Example 3 Suppose u(C) = log(C) and agents are unconstrained both when buying and renting.
Then
Pt = Rt +
Pt+1
1 + rt
+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A (1.4)
In this case, the price paid for a house is greater than in the user cost model when there is a
positive utility premium from owning a house: uL > uR: Intuitively, this greater price is required
to lower the non-housing consumption of the buyer to o¤set the greater utility living in a house
brings.
1.2.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
The solution to (1.2) is an equilibrium price of housing today as a function of the price in the
following period: Pt(Pt+1): It can be shown that the current price is su¢ ciently insensitive to
future prices that the model has a unique steady state, which it jumps to instantly following any
unanticipated shock.
15Proofs of all propositions are given in the appendix.
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Proposition 4 With equilibrium in the housing market given by (1.2), in all cases, assuming
rt > 0;
0 <
dPt
dPt+1
 1
1 + rt
< 1
Further, under conditions given in the appendix, the economy has a unique steady state P  which
it jumps to, and no bubbles are possible.
The user cost model (1.3) has a unique steady state under the assumption of no bubbles.
Specically a transversality condition has to be assumed
lim
s!1
Pt+s
s 1Q
i=0
(1+rt+i)
= 0
and so ultimately only the rental dividend from owning a house matters. Bubbles can only
arise in the standard user cost model because agents can borrow an unlimited amount against
future housing, so a high expected resale price can be translated into a high price today. By
contrast, bubbles cannot arise in this model due to the borrowing constraint. Because home-
buyers must make a minimum down-payment, CL0;T  y0;T   PT and, with non-negative non-
housing consumption, we must have PT  y0;T : Thus prices are bounded in all periods and cannot
become arbitrarily large.16
1.2.4 Constrained vs Unconstrained Buyers
We now explore the contrasting responses of house prices to a given shock when home-buyers are
constrained and unconstrained. The tiered data on the US housing boom we have shows the
relative gains across di¤erent types of housing. We are thus interested in relative price responses
to common shocks for constrained and unconstrained buyers.
The key di¤erence between constrained and unconstrained buyers is captured in the rst order
condition: the Euler equation holds with equality for unconstrained agents and inequality for
constrained agents
u0(CL;c0;t ) > (1 + rt)u
0

CL;c1;t

u0(CL;u0;t ) = (1 + rt)u
0

CL;u1;t

The rental market is identical in both cases so the di¤erential response to common shocks
highlights the impact made by the presence of a credit constraint. It is important to emphasise
that the results presented below are very general, holding for any utility function that satises
(1.1).
16This argument is formalised in the proof in the appendix.
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Shock to 
We begin with a shock to the down-payment requirement ;which provides the starkest contrast
between these two cases. An increase in  means a smaller maximum LTV, representing a tightening
of credit conditions.
Proposition 5 Suppose the home-buyer is constrained in equilibrium with price P ct : Then
dP ct
d
< 0
Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
d
= 0
The proposition says that a loosening of credit standards (fall in ) increases the current price
of housing when the buying agent is constrained, but that it has no impact on the price when the
buying agent is unconstrained. Clearly then dP
c
t
d
1
P ct
<
dPut
d
1
Put
= 0 so the relative price responses
have a clear ordering.
The di¤erence between these cases is about the ability to smooth non-housing consumption.
Suppose the minimum required down-payment is 10%. An unconstrained agent makes a larger
payment than this, say 20%, and spreads non-housing consumption in the desired manner across
time. A reduction in the minimum down-payment to 5% has no impact on their utility as a non-
binding constraint has been relaxed. There is thus no change in the equilibrium price that leaves
them indi¤erent to renting.
Contrast this with a constrained agent. They make the minimum down-payment they can
and would make a smaller payment if they could. They cannot smooth non-housing consumption
across time in the desired manner (we recall Engelhardts study showing that rst time buyers
reduce their consumption of food in order to put together the down-payment). Holding house
prices constant, a relaxation of the constraint increases utility as it allows them to transfer lifetime
resources from consumption when old to consumption when young. To ensure equilibrium and
leave them indi¤erent to renting, the price paid must increase.
Shock to Pt+1
The di¢ culty in knowing how much of the boom in US house prices can be attributed to buyer
irrational exuberance is exacerbated by scant data on price expectations, and in the aggregate it is
di¢ cult to di¤erentiate a boom caused by expectations rather than fundamental economic variables.
Here we show that a given degree of irrational exuberance will di¤erentially a¤ect constrained and
unconstrained buyers. Whilst in our model rational agents perceive that (1.2) is repeated every
period in the future, to examine irrational exuberance we depart from this and allow the current
generation to have arbitrary expectations of the resale price for their house next period.
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Proposition 6 Suppose the home-buyer is constrained in equilibrium with price P ct : Then
0 <
dP ct
dP ct+1
<
1
1 + rt
Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
dPut+1
=
1
1 + rt
For both constrained and unconstrained buyers, a higher expected resale price results in a higher
price paid today, though the absolute size of the response is always smaller for the constrained buyer.
In both cases, a higher resale price directly raises consumption when old, increasing lifetime utility,
resulting in an increase in the equilibrium price.
The di¤erence in the size of the price responses is determined by whether the agent is able
to smooth non-housing consumption. An unconstrained agent can increase the price they pay for
a house today without a¤ecting rst period consumption by making a smaller deposit. As they
are unconstrained, what matters for lifetime non-housing utility is the present value of lifetime
resources available for consumption. In this, the resale price is discounted at the market rate 1+rt
and so if Pt+1increases by 1 unit, Pt must increase by 11+rt units to leave their lifetime consumption
unaltered.
In contrast to the unconstrained case, the constrained agent is already making the minimum
down-payment possible. If they pay more for a house today, the absolute size of their deposit
must increase, which comes out of current non-housing consumption. As they are constrained,
consumption when young is lower than they would like and the further reduction exacerbates this.
The burden of a higher purchase price falls disproportionately on consumption when young, greatly
hurting their lifetime utility. This results in only a small increase in Pt being required to o¤set the
benet of an increase in Pt+1, keeping them indi¤erent to renting.
It can be further shown that
dP ct
dP ct+1
=
1
1+rt

h
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL`;t)
  1
i
+ 1
For the constrained buyer
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL`;t)
> 1 and further, the more constrained they are, the
greater
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL`;t)
is above 1 and hence the smaller dP
c
t
dP ct+1
is. Thus, the more constrained a
home-buyer is, the less responsive is the price theyll pay to optimism about the future resale price.
This is because the more constrained the buyer is, the more an increase in the deposit paid when
young hurts their lifetime utility. A highly constrained buyer will have an absolute price response
signicantly lower than that of the unconstrained buyer. We now turn to relative price responses.
Corollary 7 Suppose the expected relative capital gains are equal for constrained and unconstrained
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buyers:17
dP ct+1
P ct
=
dPut+1
Put
Then the price response of unconstrained buyers is relatively greater:
0 <
dP ct
P ct
<
dPut
Put
The proposition states that the absolute increase Pt for a given change in Pt+1 is greater for
unconstrained agents. The corollary says that if the expected capital gains for constrained and
unconstrained buyers are proportionate, then the relative increase in price is greater for uncon-
strained buyers. Thus if both expected prices to increase by 10%, then the relative price increase
would be greater for the unconstrained buyer. To see the reason for this intuitively, we make use
of the following decomposition for discrete price changes:
Pt
Pt
=
Pt
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt
The relative increase in Pt following an increase in Pt+1 is given by the product of the absolute
increase in Pt in response to a given change in Pt+1 and the increase in Pt+1 relative to Pt:
From the proposition, the absolute increase in Pt for a given change in Pt+1 is greater in the
unconstrained case, thus with proportionate expected price increases, the relative gain is greater in
the unconstrained case.
Shock to rt
We now consider how having a constrained buyer a¤ects the responsiveness of the equilibrium price
to a fall in the interest rate. We contrast the relative price responses of the model above, in which
the buyer is constrained by a maximum LTV ratio 1   ; with that in which the buyer does not
face a borrowing constraint, and so is unconstrained.
Proposition 8 Let P ct be the equilibrium house price with a constrained buyer and P
u
t be the
equilibrium house price when the buyer does not face a down-payment constraint, and so is uncon-
strained. Then
0 <
 dP ct
drt

1
P ct
<
 dPut
drt

1
Put
In both cases, a decrease in the interest rate increases the price paid today, with unconstrained
agents having a greater relative response.18 When the agent facing the borrowing constraint is
just unconstrained, with desired borrowing exactly 0; the prices in both cases are identical and
17Unlike for changes in  and r we need such a restriction here as the constrained and unconstrained groups are
not being hit by a change in a common variable. As the expectations could di¤er between the groups, for the result
we need them to increase in a comparable manner.
18The result does not depend on any assumption about how the interest rate the renter can save at moves with the
mortgage rate the buyer faces. There is no spread in the model, but if there were and the rates were independent,
the result still goes through.
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so too are the responses to a change in the interest rate. The proof establishes that the relative
price response decreases as the agent becomes more constrained ( increases), thus showing that
the relative price response will always be lower for the constrained agent.
For the unconstrained buyer 1+rt is the rate at which they discount second period consumption.
A decrease in rt then raises utility, increasing the price that leaves them indi¤erent to renting. This
is similar to the user cost model (1.3) in which a lower interest rate results in future capital gains
being discounted at a lower rate, increasing the price paid today.
For the constrained buyer, a decrease in rt results in them having to pay a lower rate of interest
on their mortgage, which directly raises their second period consumption. However, as they
are constrained, their primary concern is low rst period consumption, so the change in second
period consumption does not greatly impact their lifetime utility. Consequently, whilst the price
that leaves them indi¤erent to renting increases, the relative increase is not as great as for the
unconstrained buyer.
1.2.5 Summary
The results developed in this section are key building blocks when coming to the full model with
two types of houses available for purchase. We have shown under very general conditions, with
minimal assumptions on the utility function and no assumptions on the rental market, that relative
price responses are markedly di¤erent for constrained and unconstrained house buyers. Specically,
unconstrained buyers have greater relative price reactions to changes in interest rates and expected
future prices, as well as a smaller (zero) reaction to changes in the down-payment requirement. In
the next section, these results are combined with a housing ladder to generate predictions about
the relative price movements of low and high tier houses in response to common shocks.
1.3 Model With Two Types of Housing to Buy
In this section, we extend the model to include two types of house available for purchase to enable
comparison with the US experience. The houses available are H for high quality, and L for low
quality. In addition to these, there is still the option of renting. We assume that living in each
environment for 1 period delivers respective utility levels uH ; uL and uR with
uH > uL  uR
so there is a utility premium for living in the high quality housing. In fact, this is what
distinguishes a high quality house from a low quality house.
We shall assume parameter values that result in unconstrained high tier buyers and constrained
low tier buyers, consistent with the US evidence. Directly applied, the results from the previous
section imply that the price of high tier houses will grow relatively more in response to a fall in
interest rates and high future price expectations, whilst the low tier will grow relatively more in
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response to a fall in down-payment requirements. This may seem enough to complete our argument,
though the analysis is further complicated by the presence of the housing ladder. Recall from the
American Housing Survey that 66% of recent movers moved to a higher quality house. A price
increase in low tier houses can then be transmitted to high tier houses through the realised capital
gains of those moving from the low to a higher tier. It is important to incorporate these e¤ects
in our model, so we include two types of housing to buy as well as the option of moving between
houses.19
To keep the model simple and the analysis clear, we continue to assume that agents live for
two periods. As agents rent in the last period of their life, they can only buy one house. Thus, for
movement up the housing ladder to be possible, some agents must be born owning a house. These
agents do not pay for the house they inherit. However, for anticipated capital gains to a¤ect the
price paid for housing today, we require agents to expect to sell their house when old. To enable
these to be mutually consistent we introduce agent heterogeneity and allow that some agents face a
constant probability of death before old age. Formally, we suppose there are two groups of agents
(each a continuum):
 Group A: These agents are born without housing and have the set-up of agents in Section
1.2, choosing between renting their whole life or buying a house when young and selling it
when old.
 Group B: These agents are identical to group A agents except they are born owning a low
tier house.
We assume that group A agents face a constant probability (1  q) of dying before old age, with
this probability independent of their housing choice (group B agents reach old age with certainty).
As there is a continuum of group A agents, a constant fraction of each of their cohorts will die before
old age. Given this, we can costlessly transfer the low tier houses of the home-owners who die to
the next cohort of group B. However, as the group A agents dont know who will die, anticipated
capital gains play a role in their decision when considering how much to pay for a low tier house.
More formally, with group A agents dying between young and old age with probability (1  q);
lifetime utility becomes
V = u(C0;t) + u(H0;t) + q  (u(C1;t) + u(H1;t)) + (1  q)  0
= u(C0;t) + u(H0;t) + (q) (u(C1;t) + u(H1;t))
The agents in group A are thus identical to the agents in the model of Section 1.2 (so all the
results go through) except that they discount the future more, placing weight q as opposed to 
on future utility when young.20
19The Landvoigt et al (2012) paper also features links between the markets for di¤erent houses. They nd that
strong buyer demand for low quality houses can "spillover" onto the demand for higher quality houses, a¤ecting their
price too.
20The di¤erential discount rates for the low and high tier buyers are not responsible for any of the results in this
section: they all hold for any q 2 (0; 1):
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To keep the analysis simple we limit the housing options available to both groups. Group A-who
are born without a house-can either rent their whole life, or buy L when young and sell it when
old. Group B agents-who are born owning a low tier house-can either live in L when young and
sell it when old, or move up the housing ladder, selling their low tier house to help fund the buying
of a high tier house, which they sell when old. For completeness, we list the resources available for
non-housing consumption in each period for each of groups A and B under each available housing
choice.21
Group A Resources Under Each Housing Choice
xA;Rj;t = yj;t  Rj
xA;L0;t = y0;t   PLt
xA;L1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)(1  )PLt + PLt+1
As in Section 1.2, when group A agents rent their whole life, their available resources for non-
housing consumption in each period are given by income minus the rental cost. When group
A agents buy a low tier house when young and sell it when old-housing option xA;Lj;t -they have
analogous resources to the model of Section 1.2.
Group B Resources Under Each Housing Choice
xB;L0;t = y0;t
xB;L1;t = y1;t  Rt+1 + PLt+1
xB;H0;t = y0;t + P
L
t   PHt
xB;H1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)(1  )PHt + PHt+1
Under their rst housing option (xB;Lj;t ) group B agents continue to live in the low tier house they
are born with when young, selling it when old. In this case their resources when young is simply
their income, as they have no housing costs, and their resources when old are given by income plus
the resale value of their house, minus the cost of the rental accommodation they live in when old.
Alternatively, they can sell this low tier house when young and move up the housing ladder to a
high tier house (option xB;Hj;t ): In this case they can put their income and the funds from selling
their house PLt  towards the downpayment on the high tier house, PHt . When old, they sell this
high tier house at price PHt+1; pay o¤ the rest of their mortgage and rent for the remainder of their
life.
Under conditions given in the appendix, the equilibrium is pinned down by group A being
indi¤erent between buying L and renting, and group B being indi¤erent between staying in L
21This is prior to any saving that may be done by the agents to smooth non-housing consumption between the
two periods of their lives.
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and trading up to H. As no agent goes from owning a high tier house to a low tier house, the
equilibrium is recursive: PLt is determined independently of P
H
t from the indi¤erence of group A
agents in exactly the manner of the simple model of Section 1.2. Taking this price as an input,
PHt is then determined by the indi¤erence of group B agents.
In the rest of the analysis, we use log utility, which simplies the model and gives a clean
intuitive expression of how the housing ladder a¤ects the price of high tier housing.
Proposition 9 Suppose u(Ct) = log(Ct) and high tier buyers are unconstrained.22 Then
PHt =
PHt+1
1 + rt
+ PLt  
PLt+1
1 + rt
1
exp

uH uL
1+
 + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A (1.5)
The proposition is a clear extension of (1.4) when there was only one type of house to buy. The
price paid, PHt ; depends on its resale price discounted at the gross interest rate (1 + rt): Further,
part of the price is independent of the resale price and represents the utility gained by living in
a high rather than low tier house. The di¤erence here is the terms in PLt ; P
L
t+1 which are due
to the housing ladder. An increase in PLt directly increases the income of the high tier buyer,
allowing more consumption at unchanged PHt : Thus P
H
t must rise to keep the agent indi¤erent
between buying and staying in the low tier house, maintaining equilibrium. Counteracting this
is the foregone sale price PLt+1 that the agent would have realised had they stayed in the low tier
house, before selling it in the following period. This resale price is discounted not only by the gross
rate of interest, but also by a utility term reecting the lower housing utility from staying in the
low tier house for an extra period.
1.3.1 High vs Low Tier Prices
We now show that the pattern observed in the US data could not have occurred without credit
easing. We do this by comparing the relative growth in the low and high tiers in response to
credit easing, buyer optimism about future prices, and a fall in interest rates. As a result of the
housing ladder, any change can have direct and indirect e¤ect on the high tier price. For a change
in variable x we have the following price response:
dPHt
dx
=
@PHt
@x
+
@PHt
@PLt

dPLt
dx

The term @P
H
t
@PLt
gives the strength of the capital gains transmission up the housing ladder, with
dPLt
dx the full e¤ect of the variable on P
L
t :
22Precisely, group B agent are unconstrained both when buying and when they stay living in L.
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Credit Easing
We rst consider the impact on tiered housing of a change in the down-payment requirement  by
itself.
Proposition 10 Suppose low tier buyers are constrained when buying and high tier buyers are
unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy. Then the relative price
change is greater for low tier housing:
0 <
 dPHt
d

1
PHt
<
 dPLt
d

1
PLt
The proposition shows that a decrease in , representing an easing of credit conditions, results
in higher prices for the high and the low tier, with a greater relative price increase for low tier
housing. As discussed in the previous section, with the low tier buyer constrained, an easing of
credit conditions at unchanged prices allows them to better smooth consumption, thereby improving
lifetime utility. In equilibrium, to keep them indi¤erent to renting, the price of low tier housing
must increase. The easing of credit conditions has no direct e¤ect on high tier housing as they
are already able to smooth consumption as desired. However, there is an indirect e¤ect due to
the transmission of capital gains via the housing ladder. This group simultaneously sells a low
tier house as they buy the high tier house. A greater price for the low tier house results in higher
consumption and utility at unchanged prices, so in equilibrium the high tier price must increase to
leave group B agents indi¤erent between buying and staying in a low tier house.
To understand the intuition for the relative price responses, we look at the relationship between
the low and high tier prices in equilibrium:
PH =
0@1 + 1
r
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1APL + (1 + rt)
rt

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
Given uH > uL; 1+ 1r

1  1
exp(uH uL1+ )

> 1 so an increase in PL results in an absolute increase
in PH greater than the increase in PL: However, because housing is a consumption good, PH has
a xed component independent of PL reecting the preference for living in a high tier house. This
results in the elasticity of PH wrt PL; @P
H
@PL
PL
PH
being less than 1: A given rise in PL then results
in a proportionately smaller rise in PH : Thus the relative increase in PH following an decrease in
 is smaller than the relative increase in PL:
Consequently, the pattern observed in the US data of low tier house prices growing more than
high tier house prices is consistent with an easing of down-payment requirements.23
23Landvoigt et al (2012) nd in their assignment model for San Diego that lower downpayment requirements lead
to higher captial gains during the boom for the least expensive houses. The intuition is similar to that developed
here with the buyers of less expensive houses more likely to be credit constrained. Consequently, a relaxation of
these constrants will have a greater impact on the price of these houses.
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Buyer Optimism
We now consider the relative pattern between the tiers when there is optimism about future prices
for both low and high tier buyers and no change in down-payment requirements or interest rates.
For the purpose of a fair experiment, we suppose proportionate expected price increases for the low
and high tier.
Proposition 11 Suppose low tier buyers are constrained when buying and high tier buyers are
unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy. Further, suppose the
relative expected price increases are the same for low and high tier buyers:
dPHt+1
PHt
=
dPLt+1
PLt
Then the relative price increase is greater for high tier houses:
0 <
dPLt
PLt
<
dPHt
PHt
The proposition states that both the low and the high tiers experience price growth following an
increase in future expected prices, but the relative growth is greater for the high tier. The increase
in future prices increases non-housing consumption when old for both low and high tier buyers, so
both prices must increase to maintain equilibrium in their respective markets. However, as the
low tier buyer is constrained, their price response is muted compared to direct response of the high
tier buyer. In addition to this, the housing ladder results in an indirect increase in PHt from the
capital gains of high tier buyers. The overall result is a greater relative price increase for the high
tier houses.
It follows that the pattern observed in the US could not have been generated by buyer optimism
alone. If this were the only change in the market, we would have observed greater relative price
growth in the high tier, which is contrary to what we see in the data.
Fall in the Interest Rate
We now consider the impact of a change in the interest rate by itself.
Proposition 12 Suppose low tier buyers are constrained when buying and high tier buyers are
unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy. Then the relative price
change is greater for high tier housing:
0 <
 dPLt
drt

1
PLt
<
 dPHt
drt

1
PHt
The proposition shows that following a fall in interest rates with other variables held constant,
low and high tier house prices will increase, with relative growth greater for high tier houses. The
fall in interest rates gives a boost to the low tier buyer by reducing their mortgage payments when
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old, resulting in PLt increasing in equilibrium. However, this increase is muted because the utility
gain is small as it does not a¤ect the consumption of the constrained buyer when young. The
fall in rt reduces the discount rate of the unconstrained high tier buyer, increasing the value of
future capital gains as in the user cost model. From Proposition 8, for comparable constrained and
unconstrained buyers, this results in a larger relative price response for the unconstrained buyer.
In the tiered model we add to this the transmission of capital gains from PLt to P
H
t resulting in a
greater relative price increase for the high tier.
The US housing boom could not have been caused by a fall in interest rates alone without a
change in any other variables. Whilst a fall in interest rates by itself can explain a rise in house
prices, it cannot in and of itself explain why the low tier has grown relatively more than the high
tier during the US boom.
1.3.2 Summary & Policy Implications
During the US housing boom, low tier house prices grew signicantly more in relative terms than
high tier prices across 51 of 52 cities. If the housing boom were caused by a fall in interest rates
alone, we would have witnessed the opposite, with growth in the high surpassing that of the low
tier. If this were due to home-buyersirrational exuberance, the high tier would also have grown
relatively more than the low tier. In short, unless there was an easing of non-price credit terms,
and just a fall in the interest rate or buyer exuberance, the low tier would not have grown relatively
more than the high tier. Given that this did occur, we can conclude that neither of these two
explanations could have caused the boom without a signicant easing of non-price credit terms.
It may be objected that, in practice, the variables are all endogenous and that a lowering of
interest rates drove a search for yield and an easing of non-price credit terms, in turn fuelling
price rises and buyer optimism. This is not denied. The fall in global interest rates may well
have been the driver behind the whole process, with the easing maximum LTV ratios a symptom
of this. Regardless, if the whole chain could not have happened without a reduction of non-price
credit terms, it shows that the intervention of policy could have attenuated the housing boom by
preventing this reduction. As shown in the model, if there had not been an easing of non-price
credit terms, the low tier would have grown relatively less than the high tier, with the high tier
growing even less due to smaller passed on capital gains. The relative growth in the low tier over
the high tier thus places a lower bound on the contribution of the easing of non-price credit terms
in the housing boom, and what macroprudential policy such as an LTV cap could have achieved in
attenuating the boom. This counter-factual calculation on the 52 cities we have data for results
in the low tier growing by 55 percentage points less in nominal terms on average during the boom.
In summary, whilst we cannot disentangle the complex endogenous relationships between house
price expectations, interest rates, and non-price credit terms, we can assert that if these were the
three factors driving the US housing boom, an LTV cap would have signicantly attenuated it.
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1.4 Robustness
We now consider the robustness of the prior analysis to alternative explanations.
1.4.1 Greater Buyer Optimism for Low Tier Buyers
In the previous section, it was shown that in the absence of credit easing, if low and high tier
buyers had proportionate expectations about price growth across the tiers, the high tier would
grow relatively more than the low tier, contrary to what was observed in the data. However, this
result could be reversed if low tier buyers were su¢ ciently more optimistic than high tier buyers.
We might expect this to be the case because of di¤ering levels of housing market experience.24
Specically, low tier buyers are likely to be younger, and inexperienced in the housing market.
With less experience, they may think prices only ever go up resulting in wild expectations of future
house price increases. By contrast, high tier buyers will likely be older repeat buyers, thereby
having more experience with the housing market and having lived through previous housing busts.
This institutional memory could temper the capital gains they expect. In order to deal with this
challenge, we rst calibrate the model to provide a bound on how much more optimistic low tier
buyers would need to be than high tier buyers to generate the pattern observed in the data. We
then turn to the available indirect evidence on this.
Model Bound
In the prior analysis of the model we implicitly assumed low and high tier buyers had common
expectations of PLt+1(for the high tier buyers, P
L
t+1 matters as it represents the price they could
eventually sell their low tier house for had they not bought a high tier house). To address this
challenge, we now relax this assumption and allow expectations specic to each group, PL;At+1 ; P
L;B
t+1
which will not be equal in general. For a fair test we assume that the high tier buyers of group B
expect proportionate price growth in the low and high tiers:
dPH;Bt+1
PHt
=
dPL;Bt+1
PLt
Recall, for the low tier buyer (those in group A), the price responsiveness is given by
(1 + rt)
dPLt
dPL;At+1
=
1
1 + 

u0(CL;A0;t )
(1+rt)u0(C
L;A
1;t )
  1
 < 1
This price responsiveness is dampened as the buyer becomes more constrained. Crucially, as
PL;At+1 increases, the buyer becomes more constrained. This is due to a direct e¤ect that increases
consumption when old, and an indirect e¤ect coming through the equilibrium increase in Pt; that
24 Id like to thank John Van Reenen for suggesting this alternative explanation.
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further reduces consumption when young. Thus as PL;At+1 increases the responsiveness of P
L
t
decreases. Formally, for a constrained buyer25
d2PLt
d(PL;At+1 )
2
< 0:
We build upon this insight and consider the impact of large discrete changes in PL;At+1 over the
length of the housing boom. As we shall show below, with a large discrete increase in PL;At+1 ; the
total price response (1+rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
can be signicantly less than 1: The following theorem establishes
this this quantity is a key bound.
Theorem 13 Suppose the low tier buyer is constrained when buying and the high tier buyer is
unconstrained when buying and staying in L:
Suppose
PH;Bt+1
PHt
 P
L;A
t+1
PLt
 
(1 + rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
!
Then
PHt
PHt
>
PLt
PLt
The theorem provides a lower bound on the high tier expectations required relative to low tier
expectations in order for the high tier to grow relatively more than the low tier. For example, if
(1+rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1

= 0:6; then so long as high tier expectations were at least 60% of low tier expectations,
high tier prices would grow relatively more than low tier prices during the housing boom.
To quantify (1+rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
we calibrate26 the model under the conservative assumption that the low
tier buyer is initially just unconstrained (i.e. their desired equilibrium borrowing is exactly 0).27We
also assume that initially, prior to the increase in expectations, PLt = P
L
t+1: In Figure 1.4 we graph
the results for the calibrated model, both for a constrained buyer and an unconstrained buyer, with
PLt+1 on the x-axis and P
L
t on the y-axis, with both taken relative to the initial price.
For the unconstrained buyer, PL;Ut =
PL;Ut+1
1+rt
; thus, taking the ratio of the two graphs for a
given PLt+1 gives:
PL;Ct
PL;Ut
=
PL;Ct
PLt+1
1+rt
 = (1 + rt)PL;Ct
PL;Ct+1
The ratio of the constrained over the unconstrained graphs for a given PLt+1 thus measures
(1+rt)P
L;C
t
PL;Ct+1
. With the buyer initially unconstrained in the equilibrium we have picked, the two
lines initially grow at the same rate. Then, as the expected future increase in prices becomes
larger, the responsiveness of the constrained buyer decreases as they become more constrained.
25For an unconstrained buyer d
2Pt
dP2t+1
= 0
26Details on the calibration are given in the appendix.
27This is conservative, because if they were initially constrained, this would dampen the price response further.
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Figure 1.4: Model Response to Changing Expectations
Table 1.1: Response of Constrained Buyer
PLt+1
PLt
(1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
100% 0:73
150% 0:64
200% 0:57
The greater the expected increase in future prices, the smaller (1 + rt)
PL;Ct
PL;Ct+1
becomes. Summary
data from the chart is presented in Table 1.1.
From the table, if the low tier price was expected to increase by 200% over the course of the
boom (a tripling), high tier prices would have greater growth if they were expected to grow at
least 114% (57% of 200%). This expected low tier price growth is comparable to the average
expected price growth of those surveyed in Case and Shiller (2003).28 This demonstrates that
for the observed pattern to be caused by buyer optimism alone, low tier buyers would need to be
signicantly more optimistic than the high tier buyers. We now turn to the available evidence on
buyer expectations during the boom.
28Their average expected increase was over 11.7% for 10 years-growth which would amount to a 202% increase in
prices over the period.
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Figure 1.5: Perceived Nominal House Prices
Indirect Evidence
A major issue in assessing the role of optimism during the US housing boom is the lack of su¢ ciently
thorough time series data for buyer expectations.29 Further, there is no time series data that
distinguishes between the capital gains expected by low and high tier buyers. Instead, to assess
this, we use an indirect approach using data from the American Housing Survey (AHS). The
AHS is a longitudinal study taking place every second year, surveying around 50,000 housing units
nationally in each edition. The study asks homeowners what they think their house is worth in
each year. By controlling for the same households throughout the sample period, we can track how
the perceived market value of the same housing units changes over time. We proxy low tier buyers
with rst time buyers and high tier buyers with repeat buyers.30 Using the AHS data we can
compare how the perceived market value of their house varies between these two groups. Given
that buyers are likely to rely upon aggregate house price indices, either for their city, or nationally,
di¤erences in optimism between the two groups would likely show up in di¤erences in how they
perceive the value of their house has changed over time. Specically, if low tier buyers were carried
away by market inexperience that resulted in highly optimistic price growth expectations, theyd
likely also overestimate how much the value of their house had increased during the boom to date.
The results for the two groups are shown below in Figure 1.5.
29As noted in the introduction, the survey in Case et al (2012) doesnt start until 2003 and only covers four cities.
30A simple approach just looking at the cheapest and most expensive houses within the AHS sample will conate
high tier buyers in cheaper places like Atlanta, with low tier buyers in more expensive places like San Francisco.
37
We see that throughout the boom, the two series are very close together, with the perceived
increase in value at the peak of the boom just 2% higher for rst time buyers. This evidence
is of course indirect and deals with perceptions, not future expectations, but it does suggest that
inexperienced home owners were not signicantly more optimistic than experienced ones.31
Summary
In summary, the calibrated model shows that for buyer optimism to have caused the tiered pattern in
the data without an easing of credit standards, low tier buyers would have needed to be signicantly
more optimistic about future price growth than high tier buyers. The available indirect evidence
on price expectations does not suggest that such a di¤erence exists between the two groups. We
thus conclude that the boom was not caused by optimism alone.
1.4.2 LTI
In our model, agents are credit constrained by a maximum LTV ratio. Here we show that our
results are una¤ected if agents are instead constrained by a maximum LTI ratio. HMDA data
shows during the housing boom that house buyers in all our cities with lower income, who buy
cheaper houses, had higher LTIs than buyers with greater income who buy the more expensive
houses.32 Consequently, a relaxation of LTI limits only directly a¤ects the low tier buyers. There
is direct evidence33 in the HMDA data of an increase in LTI ratios over time, though this likely
understates the true magnitude of the increase due to the increased use of stated income loans.
The share of no/low-documentation mortgage purchases in the US went from 18% in 2001 to 49%
in 2006 (Credit Suisse 2007). These loans have rightly been labelled "liar loans": a 2006 study
found that out of a sample of stated income loans, over 60% had overstated their income by 50%
or more (Credit Suisse 2007).
Our model can be modied in a simple way to incorporate a LTI constraint rather than a
LTV constraint. Recall, both when buying a house and renting, the utility from non-housing
consumption is given by
max
b0;t0
u(xi0;t   b0;t) + u
 
xi1;t + (1 + rt)b0;t

where xj;t are the resources available for non-housing consumption after housing expenses have
been paid for the period.
With the rental market unchanged, we modify the housing expenses when an agent buys a house
31 Interestingly, the rst time buyers did not believe that the value of their house fell during 2007-2009, contrasting
with the repeat buyers. This may reect their inexperience of housing market busts.
32Data on 26 of these is given in Table 1.3 in the appendix, for both 1997 and 2006.
33Evidence for 26 of these cities is given in Table 1.3 in the appendix. In the full sample of 51 cities we have data
on, the average LTI for the low tier buyers increased from 2.43 in 1997 to 3.51 in 2006.
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when young:
xL0;t = y0;t + y0;t   Pt
xL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + Pt+1
where  represents the exogenous maximum LTI ratio permitted in the market.34 The buying
agent pays the price of the house Pt up front, and the maximum total resources available to them
are given by y0;t + y0;t, their income when young, plus the maximum loan that can be secured
against it.35 The agent need not take out the maximum loan they can however, with the e¤ective
size of loan they take out given by y0;t  b0;t with b0;t  0: When they are old, they sell the house
receiving Pt+1, pay rental cost Rt+1, receive income y1;t and pay back the interest on the loan taken
out (1 + rt) (y0;t   b0;t) : An agent is constrained when buying if they take out the maximum loan
they can against their income.
An increase in  represents a loosening of the credit constraint here, allowing an agent to take
out a bigger loan and transfer resources from consumption when old to consumption when young to
better smooth consumption. Agents constrained by an LTV or an LTI constraint similarly su¤er
in having lower non-housing consumption than they would like when young. We thus obtain an
analogous series of results when agents are LTI constrained.
Proposition 14 When u(C) = log(C); and the low tier buyer is constrained and the high tier
buyer is unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy, we have:
(i) Credit result:
0 <

dPHt
d

1
PHt
<

dPLt
d

1
PLt
(ii) Interest rate result:
0 <
 dPLt
drt

1
PLt
<
 dPHt
drt

1
PHt
(iii) Expectations result: if expectations for growth in both tiers are proportionate
dPHt+1
PHt
=
dPLt+1
PLt
then
0 <
dPLt
PLt
<
dPHt
PHt
A relaxation of the LTI constraint results in low tier prices growing relatively more than high tier
prices36 , whilst buyer optimism or a fall in interest rates results in the high tier growing relatively
more than the low tier.
34We suppose that y0;t  Pt so the maximum permitted LTV is 100%:
35 Income when young is the relevant income in practice for setting the LTI against: people generally cannot borrow
based on expectations of a higher salary many years into the future.
36Note that an increase in the maximum LTI  represents an easing of credit standards.
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Thus, if in fact low tier buyers were constrained by an LTI rather than an LTV constraint, our
analysis is unchanged: the observed pattern in the US with the low tier growing relatively more
than the high tier could not have occurred without an easing of the credit constraint.
1.4.3 Other Potential Explanations
We have used the tiered pattern to discriminate between three explanations of the housing boom.
There are other possible factors that could generate the pattern beyond the three considered, such
as greater income growth for low tier buyers, a surge in speculators buying low tier houses, or a
surge in house building for high tier houses. In the next chapter we tackle these and alternative
explanations empirically, showing they were not responsible for the tiered pattern, thus reinforcing
the conclusions of this chapter.
1.5 Welfare
We have argued that the US housing boom would have been signicantly attenuated if non-price
credit terms had not been eased. Here we look at the welfare implications of housing booms and
busts, showing rst that they have a welfare cost which is increasing in the size of the boom and
bust cycle. We then show that policy which limits the easing of the down payment requirement is
welfare improving.
1.5.1 Welfare Cost of Boom and Bust
It may not be obvious that preventing the reduction of non-price credit terms will be welfare
improving. Indeed, all else equal, easing the constraint on constrained house buyers is welfare
improving, as it allows them to better smooth consumption throughout their lifetime. However,
all else is not equal, and in equilibrium, from (1.2), prices will adjust to leave buyers indi¤erent
to renting, leaving their lifetime utility unchanged.37 However, whilst the lifetime utility of those
buying will not be a¤ected by a shock to the housing market, the utility of the old will be a¤ected
as the price they sell for will be di¤erent to what they expected. During a boom and bust cycle,
there will be winners and losers in the housing market. Those that buy before and sell during the
boom for a higher price than expected are the winners, whilst those that buy during the boom and
sell during the bust su¤er with a lower selling price than anticipated.
37 It does however improve their utility when young. From the proof of Lemma (24) we have that
 1 < dP
L
t
d

PLt
< 0
Hence,
 dC
L
0;t
d
= PLt () + 
dPLt
d
> 0
Showing that consumption when young increases as  decreases.
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For simplicity, we suppose there is only one type of house to buy in addition to a rental market.
To examine the welfare question in a simple way, we assume the boom is caused by an exogenous
generic positive shock to house prices. We model the bust as a negative shock, with the price
reverting to the pre-boom level. We show that the net utility e¤ect of a symmetric boom and
bust cycle, starting and nishing with the same price, is negative. That is, whilst some win and
some lose from a boom and bust, the losers lose more than the winners win. It is notable that we
get this result without considering many other negative e¤ects of housing busts, such as possible
resultant banking crises. We summarise this in a proposition, which holds regardless of whether
the buyer is constrained or unconstrained.
Proposition 15 Suppose the buyers utility from consumption is increasing and concave: u0(:) > 0;
u00(:) < 0: Let V (Pt+1; ePt+1) be the lifetime utility of a buyer who expects to sell at price Pt+1 but
sells at price ePt+1: Consider a symmetric boom and bust, with the selling price rising from Pt+1
to Pt+1 + x; (x > 0) then in the bust falling from Pt+1 + x back to Pt+1; with the change in price
unanticipated on both occasions.
The impact on lifetime utility for the buyer who sold during the boom is
V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)  V (Pt+1; Pt+1) > 0
Whilst the impact on the buyer who sold during the bust is
V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1)  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x) < 0
We show that the net welfare cost of the boom and bust is negative:
[V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)  V (Pt+1; Pt+1)] + [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1)  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x)] < 0
Further,
d
dx
([V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)  V (Pt+1; Pt+1)] + [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1)  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x)]) < 0
so, the net welfare cost of the boom and bust is increasing in the amplitude of the cycle.
The intuition for the result is based on diminishing marginal utility. The increase in consump-
tion for the buyer who sells during the boom is equal to the decrease in consumption for the buyer
who sells in the bust. However, because of diminishing marginal utility, the increase in utility for
the boom seller is smaller than the decrease in utility for the bust seller. Because we are considering
a symmetric boom and bust, the size of this fall in aggregate utility is increasing in the amplitude
of the boom cycle.
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1.5.2 Impact of Policy
Thus far in the paper we have taken the minimum down payment requirement, ; as an exogenous
parameter to perform the counterfactual analysis. However, bubble conditions with high prices
could reduce lendersconcerns about borrowers defaulting, easing the credit standards they lend at
(Brueckner et al 2012). We now extend the model to consider the utility benet of macroprudential
policy in a context where credit standards fall in response to higher prices. Specically, we look
at the utility benet of macroprudential policy that keeps  xed at its initial pre-boom level by
comparing it to the net utility loss when  varies in addition to Pt+1: For the latter, we assume
that when prices are higher, the required minimum percentage down payment decreases:
0(Pt+1) < 0
For the change in  to play a role, we focus on the case of constrained buyers. Given this, the
easing of  further raises Pt: We rst calculate the expected net utility cost of the boom when 
is endogenous. The endogeneity of  does not change the utility benet for the pre-boom buyer,
as the boom was not expected. Rather, the di¤erence between the cases arises in the utility cost
su¤ered by those who buy in the boom and sell in the bust. As they bought during the boom, 
is lower than before the boom ((Pt+1 + x) < (Pt+1)), further increasing the price they initially
paid for their house. We can show that this results in a higher utility cost of the boom when  is
endogenous.
Proposition 16 Let V (Pt+1; ePt+1; (Pt+1)) be the lifetime utility of a buyer who expects to sell at
price Pt+1 but sells at price ePt+1, where  is endogenous, with 0(Pt+1) < 0: Consider a symmetric
boom and bust, with the selling price rising from Pt+1 to Pt+1 + x; (x > 0) then in the bust falling
from Pt+1 + x back to Pt+1; with the change a shock in both occasions.
Then
[V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1))  V (Pt+1; Pt+1; (Pt+1))]
+ [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; (Pt+1 + x))  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x))]
< [V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x; )  V (Pt+1; Pt+1; )]
+ [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; )  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; )]
< 0
where  := (Pt+1) represents the central bank xing a minimum percentage down payment
requirement at the pre-boom level.
Thus, the net utility loss from the boom and bust is lower when the central bank sets a binding
minimum down payment requirement, than when they dont and this is allowed to fall during the
boom.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. As discussed, in both cases the utility gain
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from the boom is the same. The loss in utility from the bust arises because consumption is lower
than expected due to the drop in resale price. Due to decreasing marginal utility, the utility loss
worsens as the level of consumption decreases. When  is endogenous, consumption is lower for two
reasons. First, the lower gamma increased the price paid for the house during the boom. Second,
a lower percentage of the price was paid during the rst period, resulting in a higher remainder to
be repaid in the second period. Thus, with endogenous  the utility loss from a housing bust is
greater than if policy limits the decline in :
1.5.3 Summary
We have shown that a symmetric housing boom and bust results in a net welfare loss, with the
losers who sell in the bust outweighing the winners who sell during the boom. Further, the size
of the welfare loss is increasing in the amplitude of the housing cycle. When (as seems likely
in practice) credit standards endogenously fall during the boom, an LTV cap that prevents the
reduction in credit standards reduces the welfare cost of the boom and bust.
1.6 Conclusion
The bust of the housing market in America triggered enormous nancial and ultimately scal
consequences around the world that continue to be felt today. Policy-makers are desperate to avoid
a repeat of this in the years to come, and central banks around the world are being given new
macroprudential policy tools to try and attenuate the next bubble. Despite widespread recognition
that there was substantial easing of credit standards in America during the housing boom, its
causal role is still not well understood, in part because of the sheer complexity of the nancial
operations that took place at the time. This paper contributes to the debate by highlighting the
information that can be inferred from the relative growth of di¤erent sections of the housing market
during the boom. We show that when buyers of cheaper houses are constrained by maximum LTI
or LTV ratios, a fall in interest rates or increased buyer optimism alone would result in greater
relative price growth for expensive houses. The fact that we witnessed the opposite pattern in
the US housing boom tells us that neither of these two explanations could have caused the boom
without a signicant easing of non-price credit terms. A simple calculation demonstrates that if
non-price credit terms had not been relaxed during the boom, and it was caused by either falling
interest rates or buyer exuberance, the nominal growth of low tier house prices would have been
at least 55 percentage points less. This suggests a highly signicant benet from the future use of
macroprudential tools.
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Table 1.2: Low and High Tier Average Loan to Value Ratio
Metro Low T. High T. Year
Phoenix, AZ 90.04 75.99 2001
Los Angeles, CA 100.10 57.83 2001/02
Santa Ana, CA 85.51 71.40 2001
San Diego, CA 79.70 74.10 2001
San Jose, CA 84.87 73.86 1997
Oakland, CA 82.70 71.60 1997
Riverside, CA 95.59 86.49 2001
San Francisco, CA 69.13 76.51 1997
Sacramento, CA 89.76 73.79 2003
Denver, CO 99.02 79.82 2003
Washington, DC 88.66 74.54 1997
Miami,FL 85.36 75.43 2001
Tampa,FL 82.00 76.45 1997
Atlanta, GA 95.00 78.92 2003
Chicago, IL 83.63 65.94 2001/02
Boston, MA 81.86 69.41 1997
Detroit, MI 92.36 69.72 2001/02
Minneapolis, MN 92.14 80.73 1997
Rochester, NY 84.33 79.68 1997
New York, NY 78.05 54.76 2001/02
Cincinnati, OH 94.65 75.28 1997
Columbus, OH 88.43 81.38 2001
Portland, OR 86.47 74.55 2001
Philadelphia, PA 86.52 78.66 2001/02
Providence, RI 85.88 73.91 1997
Seattle, WA 91.40 73.03 2003
Milwaukee, WI 89.88 79.18 2001
Source: AHS, Fiserv inc. Tiered breakpoints are used
to group the low and high tier buyers in each city.
44
Table 1.3: Low and High Tier Average Loan to Income Ratio
1997 2006
Metro Low T. High T. Low T. High T.
Phoenix, AZ 2.45 1.27 3.75 1.67
Los Angeles, CA 2.78 1.61 3.96 2.14
Santa Ana, CA 2.74 1.54 3.92 2.05
San Diego, CA 2.88 1.60 3.92 2.04
San Jose, CA 2.71 1.82 4.16 2.49
Oakland, CA 2.77 1.69 4.06 2.43
Riverside, CA 2.62 1.27 3.81 1.98
San Francisco, CA 2.89 1.67 4.00 2.14
Sacramento, CA 2.79 1.38 3.97 1.95
Denver, CO 2.72 1.50 3.55 1.78
Washington, DC 2.68 1.38 3.99 2.31
Miami,FL 2.13 0.82 3.17 1.53
Tampa,FL 2.05 1.07 3.14 1.33
Atlanta, GA 2.37 1.44 3.31 1.70
Chicago, IL 2.44 1.43 3.29 1.80
Boston, MA 2.50 1.43 3.91 1.85
Detroit, MI 2.15 1.53 2.99 1.77
Minneapolis, MN 2.34 1.39 3.69 1.81
Rochester, NY 1.90 0.98 2.29 1.24
New York, NY 2.23 1.19 3.45 1.82
Cincinnati, OH 2.19 1.35 2.85 1.57
Columbus, OH 2.31 1.35 2.92 1.54
Portland, OR 2.73 1.45 3.78 1.68
Philadelphia, PA 2.13 1.43 2.98 1.67
Providence, RI 2.40 1.00 3.95 1.89
Seattle, WA 2.78 1.62 3.89 2.05
Milwaukee, WI 2.05 1.43 3.09 1.62
Source: HMDA. See appendix to Chapter 2 for details.
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1.A Proofs With One Type of House To Buy
1.A.1 User Cost Model as Special Case
We restate the proposition. Suppose there is no utility premium from owning a house, uL = uR;
and agents are unconstrained both when buying and renting. Then
Pt = Rt +
Pt+1
1 + rt
Proof of Proposition 2. With the agent unconstrained when buying and renting:
(1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) = u
0(CL0;t) (1.6)
(1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t) = u
0(CR0;t)
From (1.2) with uL = uR we have that
u(CL0;t) + u(C
L
1;t) = u(C
R
0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) (1.7)
So the lifetime utility from non-housing consumption is the same when buying and renting in
equilibrium.
Now in general, for an unconstrained consumer C0;t = x0;t   b0;t and C1;t = x1;t + (1 + rt)b0;t
so it follows that
C0;t +
C1;t
1 + rt
= x0;t +
x1;t
1 + rt
Thus
CL0;t +
CL1;t
1 + rt
= y0;t   Pt + y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1
1 + rt
  (1  )Pt
= y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1
1 + rt
  Pt
Similarly
CR0;t +
CR1;t
1 + rt
= y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
We now show that CR1;t = C
L
1;t:
Suppose not. Suppose CR1;t > C
L
1;t. Then it follows that u(C
R
1;t) > u(C
L
1;t) as u
0 > 0: Then
from (1.7) we have that u(CR0;t) < u(C
L
0;t) and so C
R
0;t < C
L
0;t:
Now, given u00 < 0; as CR1;t > C
L
1;t we have that u
0(CR1;t) < u
0(CL1;t)
Thus from (1.6) it follows that
u0(CL0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t)
> (1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t)
= u0(CR0;t)
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Hence, it follows that CL0;t < C
R
0;t: But C
R
0;t < C
L
0;t; a contradiction. Hence we cant have
CR1;t > C
L
1;t: By symmetry of argument, we cant have C
R
1;t < C
L
1;t; hence we must have C
R
1;t = C
L
1;t:
From (1.7) it follows that CL0;t = C
R
0;t: Thus
CL0;t +
CL1;t
1 + rt
= CR0;t +
CR1;t
1 + rt
so
y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1
1 + rt
  Pt = y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
so
Pt = Rt +
Pt+1
1 + rt
This completes the proof of the proposition.
1.A.2 Generalisation of User Cost Model with Log Utility
Here we prove Example 3
Recall, it states that when u(C) = log(C) and agents are unconstrained both when buying and
renting, then
Pt = Rt +
Pt+1
1 + rt
+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
Proof. With the agent unconstrained when buying and renting:
(1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) = u
0(CL0;t)
(1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t) = u
0(CR0;t)
With log utility, we have
Ci0;t(1 + rt) = C
i
1;t
As they are unconstrained C0;t +
C1;t
1+rt
= x0;t +
x1;t
1+rt
(as discussed in the prior proof).
Then we have
C0;t

1 +
(1 + rt)
(1 + rt)

= x0;t +
x1;t
1 + rt
Hence, for both buyers and renters, we have
C0;t =
1
1 + 

x0;t +
x1;t
1 + rt

C1;t =
(1 + rt)
1 + 

x0;t +
x1;t
1 + rt

Given the discounted lifetime resources available for non-housing consumption in each case, by
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(1.2) in equilibrium we have
log

1
(1 + )

y0;t   Pt + y1;t + Pt+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ log

(1 + rt)
(1 + )

y0;t   Pt + y1;t + Pt+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ uL + uR
= log

1
1 + 

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ log

(1 + rt)
1 + 

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ (1 + )uR
Thus
(1 + ) log

y0;t   Pt + y1;t + Pt+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ uL   uR
= (1 + ) log

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

log

y0;t   Pt + y1;t + Pt+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+
uL   uR
(1 + )
= log

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

Taking exponentials of both sides

y0;t   Pt + y1;t + Pt+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

=

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@ 1
exp

uL uR
(1+)

1A
Rearranging gives
Pt =
Pt+1
(1 + rt)
+

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

 

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@ 1
exp

uL uR
(1+)

1A
= Rt +
Pt+1
(1 + rt)
+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
(1+)

1A
This completes the proof.
1.A.3 Equilibrium and Dynamic Equilibrium
Here we establish conditions under which the solution to (1.2) is a function, Pt(Pt+1); and prove
Proposition 4. We prove both through a series of lemmas.
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Lemma 17 Suppose Pt+1 is such that38
u(0) + u

y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t

+ Pt+1

+ uL   uR < u(CR0;t) + u
 
CR1;t

then there is a function Pt(Pt+1) that solves the housing market equilibrium condition (1.2).
Proof. For a given Pt+1  0, let
g(Pt; Pt+1) : = u(C
L
0;t) + u(C
L
1;t) + uL   uR
   u(CR0;t) + u  CR1;t
Then we have equilibrium in the housing market when g(Pt; Pt+1) = 0: To show existence, we
thus show that there is a Pt  0 that solves g(Pt; Pt+1) = 0:
Suppose Pt = 0: We show that g(0; Pt+1) > 0 so, if the price of a house is 0 everybody prefers
to buy a house to renting.
Under these conditions, when buying
bxL0;t = y0;tbxL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1bxR0;t = y0;t  RtbxR1;t = y1;t  Rt+1
Claim
Let
V (bx0;t; bx1;t) := max
b0;t
u (bx0;t   b0;t) + u (bx1 + b0;t(1 + rt))
Then
dV
dbx0;t > 0 and dVdbx1;t > 0
Proof of Claim
dV
dbx0;t = u0 (bx0;t   b0;t)

1  db0;t
dbx0;t

+ u0 (bx1 + b0;t(1 + rt)) (1 + rt) db0;t
dbx0;t

= u0 (bx0;t   b0;t) + db0;t
dbx0;t [(1 + rt)u0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t)]
= u0 (bx0;t   b0;t) > 0
To see the last step if the agent is unconstrained when buying (1 + rt)u0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t) = 0.
Otherwise, if theyre constrained when buying b0;t  0 and db0;tdbx0;t = 0:
38This is guaranteed if
lim
C!0
u(C) =  1
As with log utility.
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The proof for dVdbx1;t is similar. This completes the proof of the claim.
Thus, by the claim, as bxL0;t > bxR0;t and bxL1;t  bxR1;t we have V (bxL0;t; bxL1;t) > V (bxR0;t; bxR1;t): Thus
g(0; Pt+1) > 0 as uL  uR:
We now show that for su¢ ciently high Pt; g(Pt; Pt+1) < 0:
Suppose Pt =
y0;t
 ; then the buying agents entire income when young is spent in the housing
deposit. Their consumption when young is thus 0: If their lifetime utility is then  1 (as with
u(C) = log(C)) then g(y0;t ; Pt+1) < 0
Otherwise, if lifetime utility is still well dened, by the assumption for the lemma we have
g(
y0;t
 ; Pt+1) < 0:
Now, as @g(Pt;Pt+1)@Pt is well dened, g(Pt; Pt+1) is continuous in Pt: Hence, by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists P t 2 (0; y0;t ) with g(P t ; Pt+1) = 0: Hence, an equilibrium exists.
We now show uniqueness.
For this it is enough to show that @g(Pt;Pt+1)@Pt < 0: The change in Pt only a¤ects V (bxL0;t; bxL1;t)
(i.e. the change in price doesnt a¤ect the utility of the renting agent).
Now
bxL0;t = y0;t   PtbxL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1  )(1 + rt)Pt + Pt+1
Thus
@bxL0;t
@Pt
=   < 0 and @bxL0;t@Pt =  (1  )(1 + rt) < 0
Hence, by the claim, holding the rest constant, as Pt increases, bxL0;t and bxL1;t decrease, decreasing
V (bx0;t; bx1;t); in turn decreasing g(Pt; Pt+1): This shows that @g(Pt;Pt+1)@Pt < 0 establishing uniqueness
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 18 In the dynamic equilibrium of the housing market, regardless of whether the house-
buying agent is constrained or unconstrained, we have, assuming rt > 0;
0 <
dPt
dPt+1
 1
1 + rt
< 1
Proof. This is proved below in the proof of Proposition 6
Lemma 19 Suppose that39
u(0) + u

y1;t  Rt+1 + (1  (1  )(1 + rt)) y0;t


+ uL   uR < u(CR0;t) + u
 
CR1;t

(1.8)
and rt > 0; then the model has a unique steady state.
Proof. Let
g(Pt) := u(C
L
0;t) + u(C
L
1;t) + uL   uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u
 
CR1;t

39This is guaranteed if
lim
C!0
u(C) =  1
As with log utility.
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Where we have held Pt  Pt+1: Given this, we have
bxL0;t = y0;t   PtbxL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1 + (1  (1  )(1 + rt))PtbxR0;t = y0;t  RtbxR1;t = y1;t  Rt+1
Then we have a steady-state equilibrium in the housing market when g(Pt) = 0: To show
existence, we thus show that there is a Pt  0 that solves g(Pt) = 0:
Suppose Pt = 0: We show that g(0) > 0 so, if the price of a house today and tomorrow is 0
everybody prefers to buy a house to renting.
Under these conditions, when buying
bxL0;t = y0;tbxL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1
Then bxL0;t > bxR0;t, and bxL1;t = bxR1;t: Hence by the claim in the previous lemma, it follows that
V (bxL0;t; bxL1;t) > V (bxR0;t; bxR1;t): Thus g(0; Pt+1) > 0 as uL  uR:
We now show that for su¢ ciently high Pt; g(Pt) < 0:
Suppose Pt =
y0;t
 ; then the buying agents entire income when young is spent in the housing
deposit. Their consumption when young is thus 0: If their lifetime utility is then  1 (as with
u(C) = log(C)) then g(y0;t ) < 0
Otherwise, if lifetime utility is still well dened, by the assumption for the lemma we have
g(
y0;t
 ) < 0:
Now, as dg(Pt)dPt is well dened, g(Pt) is continuous: Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
there exists P t 2 (0; y0;t ) with g(P t ) = 0: Hence, an equilibrium exists.
We now show uniqueness.
For this it is enough to show that g0(Pt) < 0:
Now
g(Pt) = u (y0;t   Pt   b0;t) + u (y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt (1  (1  )(1 + rt) + b0;t(1 + rt))
+uL   uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u
 
CR1;t

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Thus
g0(Pt) = u0(C0;t)

    db0;t
dPt

+ u0(C1;t)

(1  (1  )(1 + rt) + db0;t
dPt
(1 + rt)

=
db0;t
dPt
[(1 + rt)u
0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t)]
 u0(C0;t) + u0(C1;t) ((1  (1  )(1 + rt))
=  u0(C0;t) + u0(C1;t) ((1  (1  )(1 + rt))
=  [(1 + rt)u
0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t)] + u0(C1;t) ((1  (1 + rt))
=  [(1 + rt)u
0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t)]  rtu0(C1;t) < 0
The last line follows as the rst term is non-positive and rt > 0. Further, we have used (as
with the proof of the claim) that db0;tdPt [(1 + rt)u
0(C1;t)  u0(C0;t)] = 0:
This shows that g0(Pt) < 0 establishing uniqueness which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 20 Let P  be the unique steady state price. Then, for given Pt+1; the function Pt(Pt+1)
satises
jPt(Pt+1)  P j  1
(1 + r)
jPt+1   P j
Proof. By above results, 9P  : Pt(P ) = P  (this is just the steady state solution).
Let
f(z) := Pt(z)  P 
Thus f(P ) = 0: Further f 0(z) = P
0
t (z)  1(1+r)  k; say
Claim: If Pt+1 > P ; then Pt(Pt+1) > P ; and if Pt+1 < P ; then Pt(Pt+1) < P :
This follows as Pt(P ) = P and from the above result that P 0t (Pt+1) > 0: This completes the
proof of the claim.
We now proceed through the various cases.
(i) Suppose Pt+1 > P : From the derivative result it follows that
Pt+1Z
P
f 0(z)dz 
Pt+1Z
P
kdz
And so
f(Pt+1)  f(P )  k(Pt+1   P )
But f(P ) = 0; so
Pt(Pt+1)  P   k(Pt+1   P )
As both sides of the inequality are positive (LHS following from the above claim)
jPt(Pt+1)  P j  k j(Pt+1   P )j
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(ii) Suppose Pt+1 = P  Then its trivially true that
jPt(Pt+1)  P j  k j(Pt+1   P )j
(iii) Suppose nally that Pt+1 < P  then
PZ
Pt+1
f 0(z)dz 
PZ
Pt+1
kdz
Thus
f(P )  f(Pt+1)  k(P    Pt+1)
So
k(Pt+1   P )  f(Pt+1) = Pt(Pt+1)  P 
But, from above claim, given that Pt+1 < P ; we have Pt (Pt+1) < P ; so RHS<0. But
k(Pt+1   P ) =  k jPt+1   P j so
 k jPt+1   P j  Pt(Pt+1)  P 
And then as RHS<0,
 k jPt+1   P j  Pt(Pt+1)  P   k jPt+1   P j
And so
jPt(Pt+1)  P j  k jPt+1   P j
This completes the proof.
Corollary 21 Let PT be nite, and P  be the steady state equilibrium of the system. Then, given
rt > 0 we have
lim
s!1PT s = P

Proof. Claim
8s  0 jPT s   P j  ks jPT   P j
Proof of Claim
We prove this by induction.
Base Case s = 0: This is trivially true.
Inductive Step s = n: Suppose jPT n   P j  kn jPT   P j
By the corollary jPT n 1   P j  k jPT n   P j
Thus jPT n 1   P j  k (kn jPT 1   P j) = kn+1 jPT   P j ;completing the inductive step.
Thus, by induction, the claim is established.
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We now conclude the proof.
As k 2 (0; 1) when rt > 0; lim
s!1k
s jPT   P j = 0 ; thus by the sandwich theorem lim
s!1 jPT s   P
j =
0 and so lim
s!1PT s = P
 completing the proof.
Lemma 22 The model jumps instantly to its steady state price and no bubbles are possible.
Proof. As discussed in the text, no bubbles are possible, because on all dates T we must have
PT  y0;T for consumption when young to be non-negative. Thus, arbitrarily far into the future,
the price of housing must be nite. Thus, by the corollary, (with parameters xed at their current
level), we must have Pt = P : That is, with no future shocks anticipated, the price of housing
must be at its steady state level. This completes the proof of the lemma.
1.A.4 Constrained vs Unconstrained Response to Change in Max LTV
We restate the proposition. Suppose the home-buyer is constrained in equilibrium with price P ct :
Then
dP ct
d
< 0
Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
d
= 0
Proof of Proposition 5. Let
g(P t (); ) := u(C
L
0;t) + u(C
L
1;t) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

Then, in equilibrium we have
g(P t (); )  0
Thus
@g(P t (); )
@P t
dP t
d
+
@g(P t (); )
@
= 0
Thus
dP t
d
=
 @g(Pt ();)@
@g(Pt ();)
@Pt
(i) we rst suppose the agent is constrained when buying.
As the agent is constrained b0;t = 0 and
CL0;t = y0:t   P t
CL1;t = y1:t  Rt+1 + (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P t
Thus
@g(P t (); )
@P t
=  u0(CL0;t) + u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
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And
@g(P t (); )
@
=  u0(CL0;t)P t + u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)P t
Thus
dP t
d
=
    u0(CL0;t)P t + u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)P t 
 u0(CL0;t) + u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
(1.9)
Further
 u0(CL0;t)P t + u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)P t < 0 i¤
u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)P

t < u
0(CL0;t)P

t i¤
u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt) < u
0(CL0;t)
But this is the condition for the agent being constrained so @g(P

t ();)
@ < 0:
Similarly
 u0(CL0;t) + u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) < 0 i¤
u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) < u0(CL0;t)
Now
1  (1  )(1 + rt) < (1 + rt) i¤ (1.10)
1 < (1 + rt) + (1  )(1 + rt) i¤ (1.11)
1 < (1 + rt) (1.12)
Which is true.
Putting this together,
u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
< u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)
< u0(CL0;t)
Thus @g(P

t ();)
@Pt
< 0:
It thus follows from (1.9) that
dP t
d
< 0
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(ii) Unconstrained buyer
dP t
d
=
 

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@ + u
0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
=
 

u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@ + u
0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@

u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CH1;t
@Pt
(1.13)
=
 

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@ +
@CL1;t
@

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
(1.14)
Where we have used the fact that as the agent is unconstrained when buying,
u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt) = u
0(CL0;t)
Further,
CL0;t +
CL1;t
1 + rt
 y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
  rtP

t
1 + rt
Thus
@CL0;t
@
+

@CL1;t
@

1 + rt
= 0 and
@CL0;t
@P t
+

@CL1;t
@Pt

1 + rt
=
 rt
1 + rt
Thus
dP t
d
=
 0
 rt
1+rt
 = 0
This completes the unconstrained case and the proof of the proposition.
1.A.5 Constrained vs Unconstrained Price Response to Optimism With
Max LTV Constraint
We prove an extension of the formula, also demonstrating the price response formula for the con-
strained buyer. Suppose the home-buyer is constrained in equilibrium with price P ct : Then
0 <
dP ct
dP ct+1
=
1
1+rt

h
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL1;t)
  1
i
+ 1
<
1
1 + rt
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Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
dPut+1
=
1
1 + rt
Proof of Proposition 6. Let
g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1) := u(C
L
0;t) + u(C
L
1;t) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

Then, in equilibrium we have
g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1)  0
Thus
@g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1)
@Pt
dPt
dPt+1
+
@g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1)
@Pt+1
= 0
And
dPt
dPt+1
=
 @g(Pt(Pt+1);Pt+1)@Pt+1
@g(Pt(Pt+1);Pt+1)
@Pt
We consider the two cases separately.
(i) Agent constrained when buying
As the agent is constrained b0;t = 0 and
CL0;t = y0;t   Pt
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)(1  )Pt + Pt+1
Thus
@g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1)
@Pt
=  u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t)(1 + r)(1  )
And
@g(Pt(Pt+1); Pt+1)
@Pt+1
= u0(CL1;t)
Thus
dPt
dPt+1
=
 @g(Pt(Pt+1);Pt+1)@Pt+1
@g(Pt(Pt+1);Pt+1)
@Pt
=
 u0(CL1;t)
 u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)(1  )
=
u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t) + u0(C
L
1;t)(1 + rt)(1  )
> 0
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Dividing top and bottom by u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt);
dPt
dPt+1
=
1
(1+rt)
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL1;t)
+ (1  )
=
1
(1+rt)

h
u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL1;t)
  1
i
+ 1
As the agent is constrained, (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t) < u
0(CL0;t); and so the term in [:] is positive,
resulting in the denominator being greater than 1. It follows that
dPt
dPt+1
<
1
(1 + rt)
And this completes the constrained case.
(ii) Unconstrained buyer.
We have
dPt
dPt+1
=
 

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
As the agent is unconstrained when buying,
(1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) = u
0(CL0;t)
And so
dPt
dPt+1
=
 

(1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

(1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
=
 u0(CL1;t)

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+ 
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

u0(CL1;t)

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ 
@CL1;t
@Pt

=
 

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
Now as the agent is unconstrained when buying, we have the following identity:
CL0;t +
CL1;t
1 + rt
 y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1
1 + rt
  Pt
Thus, di¤erentiating with respect to Pt :
@CL0;t
@Pt
+

@CL1;t
@Pt

1 + rt
=  1
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Similarly
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+

@CL1;t
@Pt+1

1 + rt
=
1
1 + rt
Thus
dPt
dPt+1
=
 

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
=
 1
 (1 + rt)
=
1
(1 + rt)
This completes the proof for the constrained case and the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 7
Here we show a stronger result: that if expected relative capital gains are at least as great for
unconstrained buyers
dP ct+1
P ct
 dP
u
t+1
Put
Then the price response of unconstrained buyers is relatively greater:
0 <
dP ct
P ct
<
dPut
Put
Proof. To implement this mathematically, we suppose that P ct+1 is a function of P
u
t+1: The
expectations assumption can then be implemented as
dP ct+1
dPut+1
 P
c
t
Put
Then, using Proposition 6
dP ct
dPut+1
=
dP ct
dP ct+1
dP ct+1
dPut+1


dP ct
dP ct+1

P ct
Put
<

dPut
dPut+1

P ct
Put
Thus
dP ct
dPut+1
1
P ct
<
dPut
dPut+1
1
Put
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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1.A.6 Constrained vs Unconstrained Response to Changes in Interest
Rate When Constrained by Max LTV
Here we prove Proposition 8
We restate the proposition. Let P c;t be the price when the agent buying a house is constrained
and Pu;t be the price when the agent buying the house is unconstrained. Then
0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
>

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
The proof is highly involved so we proceed via a number of lemmas. We rst dene the following
functions.
For the constrained agent, let
gc(P c;t (rt); rt) := u(C
L;c
1;t ) + u(C
L;c
1;t ) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

And for the unconstrained agent let
gu(Pu;t (rt); rt) := u(C
L;u
0;t ) + u(C
L;u
1;t ) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

In gc when the agent is buying b0;t  0 so the agent cannot borrow or save. In gu; b0;t can
take any value when the agent buys, thus they are unconstrained.
Then we have 
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)@rt
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
=
 @gu(Pu;t (rt);rt)@rt
@gu(Pu;t (rt);rt)
@Pu;t
Pu;t
Lemma 23 When b0;t = 0 in the constrainedmodel then
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
Proof. When b0;t = 0 the agent is just unconstrained. Thus the constrained and unconstrained
buyers would be solving an identical problem (as they have the same parameters) so P c;t  Pu;t :
Thus
dP c;t
drt
=
dPu;t
drt
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 24 In the constrained model with desired b0  0 (i.e. the agent wishes to borrow unsecured
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but cannot):
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
> 0
This says that as  is increased, the agent becomes more constrained. In particular, it follows that
if the agent is constrained and  is increased, then the agent will still be constrained.
Proof.
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
= u00(CL0;t)
dCL0;t
d
  (1 + rt)u00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
As b0  0,
CL0;t = y0 t   P c;t
CL1;t = y1 t  Rt+1 + P c;t (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
So
dCL0;t
d
=  

P c;t + 
dP c;t
d

dCL1;t
d
=
dP c;t
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;t (1 + rt)
And so
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
(1.15)
=  u00(CL0;t)

P c;t + 
dP c;t
d

  (1 + rt)u00(CL1;t)

dP c;t
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;t (1 + rt)

We show that
P c;t + 
dP c;t
d
> 0
To do this, from (1.9) we have that
dP c;t
d
=
 P c;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
with the denominator positive and term in brackets on the numerator non-negative.
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Thus
P c;t + 
dP c;t
d
(1.16)
=
P c;t

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
  P c;t  u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t
 u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL1;t) [(1 + rt)   (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))]
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL1;t) [(1 + rt)( + 1  )  1]
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL1;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
> 0
Incidentally, this establishes that
0 <  dP
c;
d

P c;
< 1 (1.17)
Turning to the other term,
dP c;
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;(1 + r) (1.18)
=
  (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t

u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

+P c;(1 + rt)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
  (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t u0(CL0;t) + P c;(1 + rt)u0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL0;t) [(1 + rt)   (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))]
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
(1.19)
=
P c;t u
0(CL0;t) [(1 + rt)( + 1  )  1]
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
(1.20)
=
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
(1.21)
Thus dP
c;
t
d (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;t (1 + rt) > 0
and so from (1.15) using u00(:) < 0;
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
> 0
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma 25
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=
P c;t
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt + u0(CL1;t) u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Where
T (rt) := u
0(CR0;t)
@CR0;t
@rt
+ u0(CR1;t)
@CR1;t
@rt
Proof.
@gu(Pu;(rt); rt)
@rt
= u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@rt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@rt
  T (rt)
As the agent is constrained when buying
CL0;t = y0 t   P c;t
CL1;t = y1 t  Rt+1 + P c; (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
And so
@CL0;t
@rt
= 0
@CL1;t
@rt
=  P c;t (1  )
Thus
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
This completes the rst part of the lemma.
Turning to the second part:
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=  P c;t (1  )u00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
+ u0(CL1;t)

P c;t  
dP c;
d
(1  )

=  P c;t (1  )u00(CL1;t)

dP c;t
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;t (1 + rt)

+u0(CL1;t)

P c;t  
dP c;t
d
(1  )

We compute the terms in the square brackets.
Recall
dP c;t
d
=
 P c;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
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Hence
P c;t  
dP c;
d
(1  )
=

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

P c;t + (1  )P c;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t   (1  )P c;t (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)  P c;t u0(CL1;t) [(1 + rt)(1  ) + (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))]
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)  P c;t u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
> 0
Now from (1.18)
dP c;
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;(1 + rt) =
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Thus
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=
 P c;t (1  )u00(CL1;t)P c;t u0(CL0;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
+
u0(CL1;t)P
c;
t

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
P c;t
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt + u0(CL1;t) u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
> 0
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 26 T (rt)  0 Further, if the agent is unconstrained when renting then
T (rt) = u
0(CR1;t)(y0;t  Rt   CR0;t)
Proof.
T (rt) := u
0(CR0;t)
@CR0;t
@rt
+ u0(CR1;t)
@CR1;t
@rt
(i) Suppose the rate an agent can borrow at does not move with the mortgage interest rate. In
this case, a change in the mortgage rate has no impact on the utility of the agent who rents, thus
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T (rt) = 0:
(ii) Suppose the rates move together and the agent is constrained when renting.
Then
CR0;t = y0;t  Rt
CR1;t = y1;t  Rt+1
And so
@CR0;t
@rt
= 0
@CR1;t
@rt
= 0
Thus T (rt) = 0:
(iii) Suppose the rates move together and the agent is unconstrained when renting. In this
case a change in rt will have an impact on the utility of an agent who rents. As the agent is
unconstrained, u0(CR0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t) and b

0;t  0
Thus
T (rt) = u
0(CR0;t)
@CR0;t
@rt
+ u0(CR1;t)
@CR1;t
@rt
= (1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t)
@CR0;t
@rt
+ u0(CR1;t)
@CR1;t
@rt
= u0(CR1;t)
"
(1 + rt)
@CR0;t
@rt
+
@CR1;t
@rt
#
Now, as the agent is unconstrained, it follows that
CR0;t +
CR1;t
1 + rt
= y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
And so
(1 + rt)C
R
0;t + C
R
1;t  (1 + rt) (y0;t  Rt) + y1;t  Rt+1
Di¤erentiate both sides wrt r:
CR0;t + (1 + rt)
@CR0;t
@rt
+
@CR1;t
@rt
= (y0;t  Rt)
Thus
(1 + rt)
@CR0;t
@rt
+
@CR1;t
@rt
= (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t
Thus
T (rt) = u
0(CR1;t)

(y0 t  Rt)  CR0;t

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Now (y0;t  Rt) CR0;t = b0;t and as the agent is unconstrained they are a saver, so (y0;t  Rt) 
CR0;t  0: Thus T (rt)  0
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 27
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t = u
0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (rt)  u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t (rt)
d
h
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
i
d
=
P c;t ()P
c;
t ()rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
  u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)   u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Proof. When the agent is constrained
CL0;t = y0 t   P c;t
CL1;t = y1 t  Rt+1 + P c;t (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Thus
@CL0;t
@P c;t
=  
@CL1;t
@P c;t
= (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Now
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t =  u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@P c;t
P c;t (rt)  u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@P c;t
P c;t (rt)
= u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (rt)  u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t (rt)
We now turn to the second term.
To ease notation, let
H() : = u0(y0;t   h())h()
h() : = P c;()
And
F () : = u0(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())f()
f() : = (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t ()
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Then
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t = H()  F ()
And
d
h
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
i
d
= H 0()  F 0()
We calculate these in turn.
H 0() =  u00(y0;t   h())h0()h() + u0(y0;t   h())h0()
= h0() [ u00(y0;t   h())h() + u0(y0;t   h())]
Using (1.16)
h0() = P c;t + 
dP c;t
d
=
P c;t u
0(CL1;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
> 0
We compute an analogous expression for F 0() :
F 0() = u00(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())f 0()f() + u0(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())f 0()
= f 0() [u00(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())f() + u0(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())]
And
f 0() = (1 + rt)P
c;
t () + (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
P c;t ()
d
Now from (1.18)
dP c;
d
(1  (1 + rt)(1  )) + P c;(1 + rt) =
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Thus
f 0() =
P c;t u
0(CL0;t)rt
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
> 0
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Thus, combining results
H 0()  F 0()
= h0() [ u00(y0;t   h())h() + u0(y0;t   h())]
 f 0() [u00(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())f() + u0(y1;t  Rt+1 + f())]
=
P c;t u
0(CL1;t)rt
 u00(CL0;t)P c;t () + u0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
 P
c;
t u
0(CL0;t)rt

u00(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t () + u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t ()rt
"
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)P c;t () + u0(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)
 u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t ()  u0(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)
#
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t ()rt
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)P c;t ()  u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t ()
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
=
P c;t ()P
c;
t ()rt
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)   u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 28
d
"
  @g
c(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@rt
@gc(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@P
c;
t
P c;t
#
d
> 0
Proof. Let
W () : =
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
V () : =  @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
Then
d
"
  @g
c(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@rt
@gc(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@P
c;
t
P c;t
#
d
=

W ()
V ()
0
=
W 0()V () W ()V 0()
V ()2
Thus
d
"
  @g
c(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@rt
@gc(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@P
c;
t
P c;t
#
d
> 0 i¤W 0()V () > W ()V 0()
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We show this.
From Lemmas 25,27 we have
W () =  P c;t (1  )u0(CL;c1;t )  T (rt)
W 0() =
P c;t
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt + u0(CL1;t) u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
V () = u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t
V 0() =
P c;t P
c;
t rt
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)   u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
Thus W 0()V () > W ()V 0() i¤
P c;t
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt + u0(CL1;t) u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (rt)  u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t (rt)

>
h
 P c;t (1  )u0(CL;c1;t )  T (rt)
i
P c;t ()P
c;
t ()rt
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)   u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
I¤
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt + u0(CL1;t) u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

>
 P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
rt
 u00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)   u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
We move all the terms in u00(CL1;t) to the LHS of the inequality. Collecting these:
 (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt

u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

+u00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) rt
 P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
=  (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rtu0(CL0;t)
+(1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rtu0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))
 u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) rtP c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)
 T (rt)u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) rt
=  (1  )P c;t u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rtu0(CL0;t)   T (rt)u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) rt
=  u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt

u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) + T (rt) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

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Thus W 0()V () > W ()V 0() i¤
u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

 u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt

u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) + T (rt) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

>
 P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)   rtu00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t)
Now u0 > 0; u00 < 0 and T (rt)  0 and as the agent is constrained when buying
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t) > 0
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) > 0
Hence
u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 
u0(CL0;t)   u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

> 0 P c;t (1  )u0(CL1;t)  T (rt)   rtu00(CL0;t)u0(CL1;t) < 0
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for W 0()V () > W ()V 0() holding is that
 u00(CL1;t)u0(CL0;t)rt

u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) + T (rt) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))

> 0 i¤
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) + T (rt) (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) > 0 i¤
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) + T (rt) > T (rt)(1 + rt)(1  )
We now show this.
If the agent is constrained when renting, or the interest rate they can borrow at does not move
with the mortgage rate, then T (rt) = 0 and the condition holds.
Otherwise,
T (rt) = u
0(CR1;t)

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t
  0
Given T (rt)  0 it is su¢ cient to show that
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (1  ) > (1 + rt)u0(CR1;t)

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

(1  ) (1.22)
As the agent is unconstrained when renting,
u0(CR0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t)
Hence it is su¢ cient to show that
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t > u
0(CR0;t)

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

We rst show that u0(CL0;t) > u
0(CR0;t)
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To see this, suppose it didnt hold. Then u0(CR0;t)  u0(CL0;t) so CR0;t  CL0;t Further as the agent
is constrained when buying,
(1 + rt)u
0(CR1;t) = u
0(CR0;t)  u0(CL0;t) > (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
So u0(CR1;t) > u
0(CL1;t) giving C
R
1;t < C
L
1;t:
Thus
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) < u(C
L
0;t) + u(C
L
1;t)  u(CL0;t) + u(CL1;t) + uL   uR
This is a contradiction, as then the market is not in equilibrium as everyone prefers to buy a
house than to rent.
Thus we must have
u0(CL0;t) > u
0(CR0;t)
CL0;t < C
R
0;t
Now
P c;t > (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t i¤
CR0;t +Rt > y0;t   P c;t
But this holds as
CL0;t = y0;t   P c;t
Hence
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t > u
0(CR0;t)P
c;
t > u
0(CR0;t)

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

Weve thus shown (1.22), completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 29
0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
Proof. 
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)@rt rt
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
From Lemmas 27,25
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  P c;t (1  )u0(CL;c1;t )  T (rt) < 0
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t = u
0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (rt)  u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t (rt) > 0
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To see the second inequality, note that as the agent is constrained when buying
u0(CL0;t) > (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t)
Thus
u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t (rt) > (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t)P
c;(rt)
> u0(CL1;t) (1  (1 + rt)(1  ))P c;t (rt)
This last line follows because
(1 + rt) > (1  (1 + rt)(1  )) i¤
(1 + rt)( + 1  ) > 1 i¤
rt > 0
which we assume.
Thus 0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
: This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 12. From Lemma 23 when the agent is just unconstrained
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
Let this correspond to  i.e. b0;t() = 0 (i.e. for desired borrowing for the buying agent). From
Lemma 24 as  is increased from this point, the agent becomes constrained when buying and is
constrained for all higher : From Lemma 28

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
increases as  increases. Further,
dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
is clearly una¤ected by changes in :
Thus for a constrained agent,  >  and
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t


>

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t

=
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
Finally, from Lemma 29
0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
This completes the proof of the proposition.
1.B Proofs With Two Types of Houses to Buy
1.B.1 Conditions for Market Equilibrium in Tiered Model
Here we give conditions on the housing market that ensure that equilibrium in the tiered housing
model is given by group A agents indi¤erent between renting and a low tier house, and group B
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agents indi¤erent between staying in a low tier house and moving to a high tier house.
Proposition 30 Let the mass of X be denoted by jXj : Suppose
jAj > jLj
jLj > jBj
jBj > jHj > 0
1  q = jBjjLj   (jBj   jHj)
jBj < jLj+ jHj
2
Where 1  q is the probability of death for group A agents between young and old age. And e.g.
jAj is the mass of new young agents born each period in group A. Then equilibrium in the tiered
model is given by indi¤erence for group A between renting and buying and for group B between
staying in the low tier house and trading up to the high tier house.
Proof. As jBj > jHj and only group B agents can buy high tier houses we must have indi¤erence
between staying in L and trading up to H for this group. Otherwise, if they all preferred to buy
H, there would be excess demand for H, whilst if they all preferred to stay in L, there would be
excess supply of H, neither an equilibrium.
As jAj > jLj ; in equilibrium we cannot have all group A agents preferring to move to a L house
than renting, as then there would be excess demand for L. If on the other hand, they all preferred
to rent, the total demand for L would be jBj   jHj ; given by the group B agents who dont trade
up. But jLj > jBj so jLj > (jBj   jHj) so the market for L does not clear and we do not have
an equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, group A agents must be indi¤erent between buying L and
renting.
We now show that markets can clear with these indi¤erence conditions for both groups A and
B holding. Consider the following allocation: in each generation jHj of group B buy a H house,
and jBj  jHj stay in the low tier house. Further, jLj  (jBj  jHj) group A agents buy the low tier
house, with the remainder renting. Then total demand for H = jHj so the market for H clears.
Total demand for L = (jBj   jHj) + jLj   (jBj   jHj) = jLj so the market for L clears. We must
also verify that the intergenerational allocation of houses is correct. Fraction 1   q of the young
group A agents die before old age, and this is independent of whether they bought L or not. Thus,
fraction 1  q of the low tier houses they hold are transferred to the next cohort of group B. Given
our assumptions, the total transferred to group B is given by
[jLj   (jBj   jHj)] (1  q)
= [jLj   (jBj   jHj)] jBjjLj   (jBj   jHj)
= jBj
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Thus the intergenerational allocation of houses is correct.
Finally, we must verify that q 2 (0; 1) so is indeed a probability. As jLj > jBj > 0 we clearly
have 1  q > 0: Further 1  q < 1 i¤ jBj < jLj   (jBj   jHj): This holds as jBj < jLj+jHj2 : Thus q
is a well dened probability. Thus, as markets clear and agentschoices are optimal, we have an
equilibrium. This completes the proof.
1.B.2 Proof of Proposition 9: High Tier Price Formula With Log Utility
This proposition states that with u(Ct) = log(Ct) and group B buyers unconstrained both when
trading up to a high tier house and staying in their low tier house:
PHt =
PHt+1
1 + rt
+ PLt  
PLt+1
1 + rt
1
exp

uH uL
1+
 + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
Proof. For the group B agents that dont move, the pdv of lifetime resources they have for
non-housing consumption is given by
y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1 + PLt+1
(1 + rt)
This reects the fact that they sell their house when old, and rent for the last period of life.
For the group B agent that trade up to the high tier house, the pdv of lifetime resources they
have for non-housing consumption is given by
y0;t + P
L
t   PHt +
y1;t + P
H
t+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
This reects that they sell a low tier house and buy a high tier house when young, then sell this
high tier house when old, renting for the last period of their life.
As with the proof of Example 3, with group B agents unconstrained under both housing scenarios
they face, and log utility, in equilibrium we have the following relationship between the pdvs of
lifetime utility under the two scenarios:
(1 + ) log

y0;t + P
L
t   PHt +
y1;t + P
H
t+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

+ uH   uL
= (1 + ) log

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1 + PLt+1
(1 + rt)

Thus, rearranging and applying the exponential function to both sides
y0;t + P
L
t   PHt +
y1;t + P
H
t+1  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

=

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1 + PLt+1
(1 + rt)

1
exp

uH uL
1+

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Rearranging for PHt we have
PHt =
PHt+1
1 + rt
+ PLt  
PLt+1
(1 + rt)
1
exp

uH uL
1+
 + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
This completes the proof of the proposition.
1.B.3 Low vs High Tier Response to Change in LTV Constraint: Proof
of Proposition 10
We restate the proposition. Suppose low tier buyers are constrained when buying and high tier
buyers are unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy. Further,
suppose u(C) = log(C): Then the relative price change is greater for low tier housing:
0 >

dPHt
d

1
PHt
>

dPLt
d

1
PLt
Proof. Under the given conditions, by Proposition 9
PHt =
PHt+1
1 + rt
+ PLt  
PLt+1
(1 + rt)
1
exp

uH uL
1+
 + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
From our prior analysis we concluded that absent any shocks, PLt ; P
L
t+1 will be at their steady state
value PL; thus the pricing equation becomes
PHt =
PHt+1
(1 + rt)
+
0@ (1 + rt) exp

uH uL
(1+)

  1
(1 + rt) exp

uH uL
(1+)

1APL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
Following additional prior analysis, if this system is repeated innitely into the future (or at least
expected to be) it will jump to its steady state value PH : This will satisfy
PH =
0@ (1 + rt) exp

uH uL
(1+)

  1
rt exp

uH uL
(1+)

1APL + 1 + rt
rt

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
(1.23)
We can then write
PH = aPL + b
with a; b > 0 constants independent of :
Then 
dPH
d

PH
= a

dPL
d

PH
= a
PL
PH

dPL
d

PL
< 0
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Where weve used that as the low tier buyer is constrained, dP
L
d < 0:
Thus 
dPH
d

PH
>

dPL
d

PL
i¤
a
PL
PH

dPL
d

PL
>

dPL
d

PL
i¤
a
PL
PH
< 1
The last line again uses dP
L
d < 0:
Now
a
PL
PH
=
aPL
aPL + b
< 1
This completes the proof of the proposition.
Remark 31 This result is not a¤ected by the probability of reaching old age for group A agents,
q: All that is required is dP
L
d < 0which holds for all positive discount factors, so for all q 2 (0; 1):
1.B.4 Low vs High Tier Response to Change in Optimism: Proof of
Proposition 11
We prove a more general proposition. Suppose the low tier buyers are constrained when buying
and high tier buyers are unconstrained when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy.
Further, suppose the relative expected price increase for high tier prices is at least that of low tier
prices:40
dPHt+1
PHt
 dP
L
t+1
PLt
Then the relative price increase in greater for the high tier house:
0 <
dPLt
PLt
<
dPHt
PHt
We establish the result in general, for any increasing concave utility function with w.d. deriva-
tives.
To implement the proof mathematically, we consider PHt+1 to be a function of P
L
t+1 and consider
the impact of changes in PLt+1: We rst establish a lemma capturing the impact of these changes.
40This clearly incorporates the case covered in the text.
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Lemma 32 Consider PHt+1 as a function of P
L
t+1: Then, when group B agents are unconstrained
both when moving to H and staying in L :
dPHt
dPLt+1
=
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
1
1 + rt

dPHt+1
dPLt+1

  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)u0(C
B;H
1;t )
where CB;i1;t represents the second period consumption for group B agents when they make housing
choice i 2 fL;Hg:
Remark 33 Note that were assuming common expectations: both group A and group B agents
expect the same change in PLt+1:
Proof. Let
g(PHt (P
L
t+1); P
L
t ) := u(C
B;H
0;t ) + u(C
B;H
1;t ) + uH   uL  

u(CB;L0;t ) + u(C
B;L
1;t )

Then in equilibrium
g(PHt (P
L
t+1); P
L
t+1)  0
And so
@g
@PHt
dPHt
dPLt+1
+
@g
@PLt+1
= 0 so
dPHt
dPLt+1
=
  @g
@PLt+1
@g
@PHt
We calculate these in turn (using the fact that the group B agents are unconstrained):
@g
@PHt
= u0(CB;H0;t )
@CB;H0;t
@PHt
+ u0(CB;H1;t )
@CB;H1;t
@PHt
= (1 + rt)u
0(CB;H1;t )
@CB;H0;t
@PHt
+ u0(CB;H1;t )
@CB;H1;t
@PHt
= u0(CB;H1;t )
"
(1 + rt)
@CB;H0;t
@PHt
+
@CB;H1;t
@PHt
#
Now
CB;H0;t (1 + rt) + C
B;H
1;t = (y0;t + P
L
t )(1 + rt)  (1 + rt)PHt + y1;t  Rt+1 + PHt+1 (1.24)
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Thus
(1 + rt)
@CB;H0;t
@PHt
+
@CB;H1;t
@PHt
=  (1 + rt) and
@g
@PHt
=  (1 + rt)u0(CB;H1;t )
Turning to the other term, we have
@g
@PLt+1
= u0(CB;H0;t )
@CB;H0;t
@PLt+1
+ u0(CB;H1;t )
@CB;H1;t
@PLt+1
 
"
u0(CB;L0;t )
@CB;L0;t
@PLt+1
+ u0(CB;L1;t )
@CB;L1;t
@PLt+1
#
= u0(CB;H1;t )
"
(1 + rt)
@CB;H0;t
@PLt+1
+
@CB;H1;t
@PLt+1
#
  u0(CB;L1;t )
"
(1 + rt)
@CB;L0;t
@PLt+1
+
@CB;L1;t
@PLt+1
#
From (1.24)41
(1 + rt)
@CB;H0;t
@PLt+1
+
@CB;H1;t
@PLt+1
= (1 + rt)
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
dPHt+1
dPLt+1
Now
CB;L0;t (1 + rt) + C
B;L
1;t = y0;t(1 + rt) + y1;t  Rt+1 + PLt+1
So
(1 + rt)
@CB;L0;t
@PLt+1
+
@CB;L1;t
@PLt+1
= 1
Thus
@g
@PLt+1
= u0(CB;H1;t )

(1 + rt)
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
dPHt+1
dPLt+1

  u0(CB;L1;t )
Combining results
dPHt
dPLt+1
=
  @g
@PLt+1
@g
@PHt
=
 
h
u0(CB;H1;t )
h
(1 + rt)
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
dPHt+1
dPLt+1
i
  u0(CB;L1;t )
i
 (1 + rt)u0(CB;H1;t )
=
u0(CB;H1;t )
h
(1 + rt)
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
dPHt+1
dPLt+1
i
  u0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)u0(C
B;H
1;t )
=
dPLt
dPLt+1
+
1
1 + rt
dPHt+1
dPLt+1
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)u0(C
B;H
1;t )
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
41The derivative is partial in the sense that it it ingores the e¤ect on the equilibriating variable PHt : The full
derivative is taken w.r.t. the remaining variables.
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Using the lemma we now prove the proposition.
Proof. We show that
0 <
dPLt
dPLt+1
1
PLt
<
dPHt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
From Lemma 32
dPHt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
=
dPLt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
+
1
1 + rt

dPHt+1
dPLt+1

1
PHt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
 dP
L
t
dPLt+1
1
PHt
+
1
1 + rt

PHt
PLt

1
PHt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
=
dPLt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
+
1
1 + rt
1
PLt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
Thus for dP
L
t
dPLt+1
1
PLt
<
dPHt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
it is su¢ cient that
dPLt
dPLt+1
1
PLt
<
dPLt
dPLt+1
1
PHt
+
1
1 + rt
1
PLt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
i¤
dPLt
dPLt+1

1
PLt
  1
PHt

<
1
1 + rt
1
PLt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
Now
dPLt
dPLt+1
 1
1 + rt
(this holds in all cases-regardless of whether they are constrained or not).
So, given that 1
PLt
  1
PHt
> 0
dPLt
dPLt+1

1
PLt
  1
PHt

 1
1 + rt

1
PLt
  1
PHt

Its thus su¢ cient that
1
1 + rt

1
PLt
  1
PHt

<
1
1 + rt
1
PLt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
i¤
0 <
1
1 + rt
1
PHt
  u
0(CB;L1;t )
(1 + rt)PHt u
0(CB;H1;t )
i¤
u0(CB;L1;t )
u0(CB;H1;t )
< 1
Now as uH > uL and group B agents are unconstrained in both cases, it follows that C
B;L
1;t >
CB;H1;t and so u
0(CB;L1;t ) < u
0(CB;H1;t ): To show the rst point more formally, note that if C
B;L
1;t  CB;H1;t
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then u0(CB;L1;t )  u0(CB;H1;t ) and so u0(CB;L0;t ) = (1 + rt)u0(CB;L1;t )  u0(CB;H1;t )(1 + rt) = u0(CB;H0;t )
so CB;L0;t  CB;H0;t : Then
u(CB;H0;t ) + u(C
B;H
1;t ) + uH   uL >

u(CB;L0;t ) + u(C
B;L
1;t )

This is a contradiction as then the market is not in equilibrium. This completes the proof of
the proposition.
Remark 34 This result is not a¤ected by the probability of reaching old age for group A agents,
q: All that is required is that dP
L
t
dPLt+1
 11+rt which holds for all positive discount factors, so for all
q 2 (0; 1):
1.B.5 Low vs High Tier Response to Change in Interest Rate: Proof of
Proposition 12
We restate the proposition.
Suppose low tier buyers are constrained when buying and high tier buyers are unconstrained
when buying and would be unconstrained if they didnt buy. Further, suppose u(C) = log(C):
Then the relative price change is greater for high tier housing:
0 >

dPLt
drt

1
PLt
>

dPHt
drt

1
PHt
We prove this in a series of steps using several lemmas.
Lemma 35
dPH
drt
=
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+
dPL
drt
0@1 + 1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1A
Proof. Given that the high tier buyer faces interest rate 1 + rt and is unconstrained when buying
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and renting, it follows from (1.23) that
PH =
0@ (1 + rt) exp

uH uL
(1+)

  1
rt exp

uH uL
(1+)

1APL + 1 + rt
rt

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
=
0@ (1 + rt)
rt
  1
r exp

uH uL
(1+)

1APL + y0;t1 + rt
rt

+
y1;t  Rt+1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
=
0@1 + 1
rt
  1
rt exp

uH uL
(1+)

1APL + y0;t 1
rt
+ 1

+
y1;t  Rt+1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
=
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1Ay0;t
rt
+
y1;t  Rt+1
rt
+
PL
rt

+ PL + y0;t
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
(1+)

1A
Thus
dPH
drt
=
 1
r2t
(y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+
dPL
drt
+
0@d

PL
rt

drt
1A0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
=
 1
r2t
(y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+
dPL
drt
+

dPL
drt
1
rt
  1
r2t
PL
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
=
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+
dPL
drt
0@1 + 1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1A
This completes the proof of the lemma
Lemma 36 Suppose the low tier buyer is constrained (by an LTV or LTI constraint), and we have
u(C) = log(C) then the following inequality holds
1
PL

dPL
drt
>
 1
rt
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

[rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1]
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Proof. We establish the following:

1
PL

dPL
drt
>
 1
rt

Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

(1 + rt)Rt + (1 + rt)

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

>
 1
rt
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

[rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1]
From Proposition 8 with the low tier buyer constrained,
0 <  

dPLt
drt

1
PLt
<  
 
dPL;ut
drt
!
1
PL;ut
Where PL;ut is the low tier price is the low tier buyer didnt face a credit constraint.
From (1.4)
PL;ut = Rt +
PL;ut+1
1 + rt
+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
In equilibrium we have
PL;ut =
(1 + rt)
rt
Rt +
(1 + rt)
rt

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
= Rt

1
rt
+ 1

+

(y0;t  Rt)

1
rt
+ 1

+
y1;t  Rt+1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
= Rt + (y0;t  Rt)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
+
Rt
rt
+
1
rt
[y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1]
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
Thus
dPL;ut
dr
1
PL;ut
=
 1
PL;ur2t
0@Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
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So
dPLt
drt

1
PLt

>

dPL;u
drt

1
PL;ut
=
 1
PL;ut r
2
t
0@Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
=
  1
r2t

Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

(1+rt)
rt
Rt +
(1+rt)
rt

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

=
  1rt

Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

(1 + rt)Rt + (1 + rt)

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

The second part of the inequality holds i¤
 

Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

(1 + rt)Rt + (1 + rt)

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )
 >    PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
[rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1]
i¤
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

[rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1] >

Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

(1 + rt)Rt + (1 + rt)

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1  1
exp(uL uR1+ )

Cross multiplying, this reduces to
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1


24(1 + rt)Rt + ((y0;t  Rt) (1 + rt) + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
> [rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1]
0@Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
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Expanding the LHS we have
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
+
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

rt
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
> [rty0;t + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1]
0@Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
Cancelling the common terms this reduces to
PL
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
+
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

rt
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
> rty0;t
0@Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
Cancelling further common terms gives
PL
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
+
 
PL + y1;t  Rt+1

rt
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
> rty0;t
0@(y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
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Rewriting the second term on the LHS we have that
PL
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
+
 
PL + y1;t  Rt+1

rt
24 Rt
exp

uL uR
1+

35+  PL + y1;t  Rt+1 rty0;t
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
> rty0;t
0@(y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A1A
Cancelling further terms were left with
PL
24Rt + (y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1)
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A35
+
 
PL + y1;t  Rt+1

rt
24 Rt
exp

uL uR
1+

35+ PLrty0;t
0@1  1
exp

uL uR
1+

1A
> 0
This inequality is true because all the terms on the LHS are positive (given rt > 0). This
completes the proof of the lemma.
Using this lemma we now prove the main proposition.
Proof of Proposition 12. From Lemma 35
dPHt
drt
=
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A+dPL
drt
0@1 + 1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1A
Then well have
0 >
1
PL
dPL
drt
>
1
PH
dPH
drt
i¤
1
PL
dPL
drt
 
PH

>
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+
dPL
drt
0@1 + 1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1A
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i¤
1
PL
dPL
drt
24PH   PL
0@1 + 1
rt
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A1A35
>
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
Now, we have that
PHt = P
L
t

1 + rt
rt
0@1   1
1 + rt

1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
+

1 + rt
rt

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
241  1
exp

uH uL
1+

35
Hence the condition reduces to
1
PL
dPL
drt

1 + rt
rt

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
241  1
exp

uH uL
1+

35
>
 1
r2t
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
0@1  1
exp

uH uL
1+

1A
Which gives a nice cancellation:
1
PL
dPL
drt
(1 + rt)

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt

>
 1
rt
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

Reducing to
1
PL
dPL
drt
>
 1
rt
 
PL + y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1

y0;t + rty0;t + y1;t  Rt+1
But this conditions follows from Lemma 36.
This completes the proof of Proposition 12.
Remark 37 This result is not a¤ected by the probability of reaching old age for group A agents, q:
All that is required is that Lemma 36 holds. It can be seen that this holds for all positive discount
factors, so for all q 2 (0; 1):
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1.C Proofs for Robustness Section
1.C.1 Discrete Changes in Expectations: Proof of Theorem 13
To implement this section mathematically, we assume the group B expectations for both the low
and the high tier, PL;Bt+1 ; P
H;B
t+1 are functions of the group A expectations for the low tier, P
L;A
t+1 :
We assume that group B agents have proportional expectations for low and high tier growth.
However, here we make it explicit that its relative to the initial equilibrium prices:
dPH;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
1
PHt
=
dPL;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
1
PLt
Given this from Lemma 32 the following formula now describes the response of PHt to a change
in expectations:
dPHt
dPL;At+1
=
dPLt
dPL;At+1
+
1
1 + rt
 
dPH;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
! 
1  u
0(CB;L1;t )P
L
t
u0(CB;H1;t )P
H
t
!
(1.25)
In discrete form the expectations assumption for group B agents can be restated as
PH;Bt+1
1
PHt
= PL;Bt+1
1
PLt
(1.26)
where
P i;Bt+1 : =
eP i;Bt+1   P i;Bt+1
 P i;Bt+1( ePL;At+1 )  P i;Bt+1(PL;At+1 )
with x representing the initial values of the variables, prior to the change in expectations.
We establish the following lemma as a step towards the main result.
Lemma 38 Suppose PH;Bt+1 increases, with P
L;B
t+1 increasing according to (1.26). Then P
H
t
increases.
Proof. Equilibrium for PHt comes from the following equality:
u(CH;B0;t ) + u(C
H;B
1;t ) + uH   uL  u(CL;B0;t ) + u(CL;B1;t ) (1.27)
With
CH;B0;t +
CH;B1;t
(1 + rt)
= y0;t + P
L
t   PHt +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
+
PH;Bt+1
1 + rt
CL;B0;t +
CL;B1;t
(1 + rt)
= y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
+
PL;Bt+1
1 + rt
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Given that uH > uL and group B agents are unconstrained we have C
H;B
0;t +
CH;B1;t
(1+rt)
< CL;B0;t +
CL;B1;t
(1+rt)
. With the given parameter values, expectations and PLt ; P
H
t adjusts to ensure that (1.27)
always holds. Suppose now there is a discrete increase in PH;Bt+1 ; P
L;B
t+1 with (1.26) holding: P
H;B
t+1 =
PL;Bt+1
PHt
PLt
> PL;Bt+1 > 0:
We use this information after establishing a small result.
Let V (a+ x) := u(C0;t) + u(C1;t) where C0;t +
C1;t
(1+rt)
= a+ x and where u0 > 0; u00 < 0; with
u0(C0;t) = (1 + rt)u0(C1;t).
Suppose
V (a) + uH   uL = V (b)
with a < b and uH   uL > 0. Suppose c > d > 0; then
V (a+ c) + uH   uL > V (b+ d)
To show this we rst note that
V 0(a+ x) = u0(C0;t)
dC0;t
dx
+ u0(C1;t)
dC1;t
dx
= u0(C1;t)

(1 + rt)
dC0;t
dx
+
dC1;t
dx

= u0(C1;t) (1 + rt) > 0
And
V 00(a+ x) = (1 + rt)u00(C1;t)
dC1;t
dx
< 0
For the last inequality, note that (1 + rt)
dC0;t
dx +
dC1;t
dx > 0 and the Euler equation holds, so
when x increases, C0;t and C1;t have to move in the same direction, which must be positive for
both.
Given V 00(a+ x) < 0 and a < b it follows that V 0(a+ x) > V 0(b+ x): Thus
d [V (a+ x)  V (b+ x)]
dx
> 0
Thus for c > 0
V (a+ c) + uH   uL > V (b+ c)
> V (b+ d)
where the last line uses V 0 > 0: This completes the proof of the small result.
We can now use this small result to complete the proof of the lemma. We apply the lemma
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with
a : = y0;t + P
L
t   PHt +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
+
PH;Bt+1
1 + rt
b : = y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
1 + rt
+
PL;Bt+1
1 + rt
c : = PL;Bt+1
PHt
PLt
 PHt
d : = PL;Bt+1
Then a < b. If PHt  0 then c > d > 0: From the small result, it then follows that the
utility of group B agents is strictly greater when buying a high tier house, thus we cannot be in
equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, we must have PHt > 0. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
We can now state the main result:
Proposition 39 Suppose PH;Bt+1
1
PHt
= PL;Bt+1
1
PLt
and
PH;Bt+1
P
H
t
 P
L;A
t+1
P
L
t
 
(1 + rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
!
Then
PHt
P
H
t
>
PLt
P
L
t
Proof. Let
dPH;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
= (1 + rt)
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
Then from (1.25) we have
dPHt
dPL;At+1
=
dPLt
dPL;At+1
+
1
1 + rt
 
(1 + rt)
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
! 
1  u
0(CB;L1;t )P
L
t
u0(CB;H1;t )P
H
t
!
=
dPLt
dPL;At+1
+
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
 
1  u
0(CB;L1;t )P
L
t
u0(CB;H1;t )P
H
t
!
>
dPLt
dPL;At+1
+
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
 
1  P
L
t
P
H
t
!
=
dPLt
dPL;At+1
"
1 +
P
H
t
P
L
t
  1
#
=
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
89
Where the inequality uses the fact that u0(CB;L1;t ) < u
0(CB;H1;t ) as demonstrated before.
Thus
dPHt
dPL;At+1
>
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
Therefore Z ePL;At+1
P
L;A
t+1
 
dPHt
dPL;At+1
!
dPL;At+1 >
Z ePL;At+1
P
L;A
t+1
 
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
!
dPL;At+1 so
PHt
 ePL;At+1   PHt PL;At+1 > PHt
P
L
t
Z ePL;At+1
P
L;A
t+1
 
dPLt
dPL;At+1
!
dPL;At+1
=
P
H
t
P
L
t

PLt
 ePL;At+1   PLt PL;At+1 giving
PHt >
P
H
t
P
L
t
PLt
We thus have
PHt
P
H
t
>
PLt
P
L
t
Now, given
dPH;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
= (1 + rt)
dPLt
dPL;At+1
P
H
t
P
L
t
we have
Z ePL;At+1
P
L;A
t+1
dPH;Bt+1
dPL;At+1
dPL;At+1 = (1 + rt)
P
H
t
P
L
t
Z ePL;At+1
P
L;A
t+1
dPLt
dPL;At+1
dPL;At+1 so
PH;Bt+1
 ePL;At+1   PH;Bt+1 PL;At+1 = (1 + rt)PHt
P
L
t

PLt
 ePL;At+1   PLt PL;At+1 giving
PH;Bt+1 = (1 + rt)
P
H
t
P
L
t
PLt
This can be rewritten as
PH;Bt+1
P
H
t
=
PL;At+1
P
L
t
 
(1 + rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
!
From Lemma 38 if \PH;Bt+1  PH;Bt+1 (and from (1.26) \PL;Bt+1  PL;Bt+1 ), then\PHt  PHt .
It thus follows that if
\PH;Bt+1
P
H
t
 P
L;A
t+1
P
L
t
 
(1 + rt)P
L
t
PL;At+1
!
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then
\PHt
P
H
t
>
PLt
P
L
t
This completes the proof of the Theorem.
1.C.2 Calibration of (1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
for Section 1.4.1
We rst demonstrate that when the agent is initially unconstrained, the response of PLt to a change
in PLt+1 does not depend on y0;t; y1;t; Rt; Rt+1 but the ratio of these terms to y0;t: We thus dont
need to calibrate the level of these variables but only y1;ty0;t ;
Rt
y0;t
; Rt+1y0;t :
Proposition 40 Suppose the agent is unconstrained when buying, with PLt = P
L
t+1 = P
L: Suppose
u(C) = log(C): Then (1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
does not depend on the levels of y0;t; y1;t; Rt; Rt+1; but only their
size relative to each other: y1;ty0;t ;
Rt
y0;t
; Rt+1y0;t
Proof. In equilibrium, the utility from non-housing consumption must be the same for the agent
before and after the change in PLt+1: Suppose P
L
t+1 increases to ePLt+1; resulting in an equilibrium
increase in PLt to ePLt : Then we must have
log

y0;t    ePLt +  log y1;t  Rt+1 + ePLt+1   (1  )(1 + rt) ePLt 
= log
 
y0;t   PL

+  log
 
y1;t  Rt+1 + PL (1  (1  )(1 + rt))

Rearranging the rst equation gives
log
 
y0;t   PL   PLt

+ log
 
y1;t  Rt+1 + PL (1  (1  )(1 + rt)) + PLt+1   (1  )(1 + rt)PLt

= log
 
y0;t   PL

+  log
 
y1;t  Rt+1 + PL (1  (1  )(1 + rt))

Where PLt := ePLt   PL and PLt+1 := ePLt+1   PL: Let  := PLt+1PL ; so  gives the percentage
increase in buyer expectations.
Then
log

y0;t

1  P
L
y0;t
  P
L
t
y0;t

+ log

y0;t

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
PL
y0;t
(1  (1  )(1 + rt)) +
PLt+1
y0;t
  (1  )(1 + rt)P
L
t
y0;t

= log

y0;t

1   P
L
y0;t

+  log

y0;t

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
PL
y0;t
(1  (1  )(1 + rt))

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Thus, cancelling log(y0;t) +  log(y0;t) from each side we have
log

1  P
L
y0;t
  P
L
t
y0;t

+ log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
PL
y0;t
(1  (1  )(1 + rt)) +
PLt+1
y0;t
  (1  )(1 + rt)P
L
t
y0;t

= log

1   P
L
y0;t

+  log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
PL
y0;t
(1  (1  )(1 + rt))

Now, with the agent unconstrained initially and PLt = P
L
t+1,
PL =
(1 + rt)
rt
Rt +
(1 + rt)
rt

y0;t  Rt   y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

u
1+

1A
Thus
PL
y0;t
=
(1 + rt)
rt
Rt
y0;t
+
(1 + rt)
rt
 
1  Rt
y0;t
 
y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1y0;t
(1 + rt)
!0@1  1
exp

u
1+

1A
Thus y0;t = PLc where c is a constant depending only on the ratios
y1;t
y0;t
; Rty0;t ;
Rt+1
y0;t
and not on
the levels of these variables.
Thus, we can write
log

1  
c
  P
L
t
cPL

+ log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
1
c
(1  (1  )(1 + rt)) +
PLt+1
cPL
  (1  )(1 + rt)P
L
t
cPL

= log

1  
c

+  log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
1
c
(1  (1  )(1 + rt))

With  :=
PLt+1
PL
; we can write PL =
PLt+1
 and the equation becomes
log

1  
c
  
c(1 + rt)

(1 + rt)P
L
t
PLt+1

+ log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
1
c
(1  (1  )(1 + rt)) + 
c
  (1  )
c

(1 + rt)P
L
t
PLt+1

= log

1  
c

+  log

y1;t
y0;t
  Rt+1
y0;t
+
1
c
(1  (1  )(1 + rt))

The equation shows that (1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
only depends on the ratios y1;ty0;t ;
Rt
y0;t
; Rt+1y0;t , not the levels of
these variables (noting that c also only depends on the ratios).
This completes the proof.
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Remark 41 To calibrate (1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
for a given percentage change in future price expectations (i.e.,
a given ), we need to calibrate the following variables: y1;ty0;t ;
Rt
y0;t
; Rt+1y0;t ; rt; ; uL uR: The value for 
is chosen to ensure the agent is just unconstrained in the initial equilibrium (i.e. their unconstrained
desired borrowing is exactly 0).
Lemma 42 The value of  that leaves the agent initially just unconstrained is given by
 =

y0;t   11+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1
exp( u1+ )

rt
1+rt
Rt +

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+1(1+rt)

1  1
exp( u1+ )

Proof. For an unconstrained buyer (with log utility),
C0;t =
1
1 + 

y0;t +
y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
  rt
1 + rt
PL

But
PL =
(1 + rt)
rt
Rt +
(1 + rt)
rt

y0;t  Rt   y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

u
1+

1A
So
C0;t =
1
(1 + )

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

1
exp

u
1+

But C0;t = y0;t   PL   b0: If the agent is just unconstrained (with desired saving of exactly
0), then C0;t = y0;t   PL
Thus, we must have
y0;t    (1 + rt)
rt
24Rt + y0;t  Rt   y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)
0@1  1
exp

u
1+

1A35
=
1
(1 + )

y0;t  Rt + y1;t  Rt+1
(1 + rt)

1
exp

u
1+

This holds i¤
 =

y0;t   11+

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+11+rt

1
exp( u1+ )

rt
1+rt
Rt +

y0;t  Rt + y1;t Rt+1(1+rt)

1  1
exp( u1+ )

This completes the proof of the lemma.
Table 1.4 gives the calibration for the model used in the text.
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Table 1.4: Model Calibration for Optimism Calculation
Parameter Value Source
Length of Period 11 years AHS
rt 1:22 Mortgage-x.com (annual interest rate of 7:75% in 1997)
 0:90 Standard (based on annual discount rate of 0:99)
R
y0;t
0:3 AHS
y1;t
y0:t
1 Imposed
uL   uR 0 Imposed
Table 1.5: Optimism Calibration Robustness
(1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
PLt+1
PLt
y1;t
y0:t
= 0:5
y1;t
y0:t
= 1
y1;t
y0:t
= 1:5
100% 0:74 0:73 0:85
150% 0:49 0:64 0:79
200% 0:42 0:57 0:73
The rst choice for the calibration is the choice of period length. We choose 11 years as
that is the average length of time people live in a house they buy (AHS). We take a standard
annual discount factor of 0:99, resulting in the discount factor over our period of 0:9: The quantity
R
y0;t
is matched to the average proportion of income spent on rent, with the rental price assumed
constant over time. The mortgage rate is set to the average of the rate on 30 and 15-year xed
rate mortgages in 1997, prior to the beginning of the boom. This is then compounded over 11
years. The di¤erence in utility between renting and buying a house is set conservatively to 0 :
in calculations, a greater value for this results in a lower value for (1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
: The nal choice of
parameter is y1;ty0:t : It is not clear whether this should be greater than 1 reecting income growth
over the life-cycle or less than 1 with the last period of life representing retirement. In the baseline
calibration we set it to 1 and perform robustness to this parameter assumption in Table 1.5.
The higher y1;t is relative to y0;t the greater the value of
(1+rt)P
L
t
PLt+1
: However, even with
y1;t
y0:t
= 1:5, this value is 0:73 when prices are expected to triple over the boom. Thus, even in this
case, if the high tier expected growth is at least 73% of low tier expected growth, the high tier will
grow relatively more over the boom than the low tier.
1.C.3 Proofs of Tiered Results with LTI Constraint
We split the proof of this into three subsections, one for the change in each variable. From the
above proofs for the low versus the high tier when the low tier buyer is LTV constrained, we only
need to show analogous proofs for LTI constrained vs unconstrained buyers, when there is only
one type of house to buy. This follows as the high tier buyer who is not constrained by an LTI
constraint behaves identically to a high tier buyer who is not constrained by an LTV constraint.
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Constrained vs Unconstrained Response to Change in LTI Constraint 
Proposition 43 Suppose the home-buyer is constrained by the LTI constraint in equilibrium with
price P ct : Then (noting that an increase in  is an easing of the LTI constraint):
dP ct
d
> 0
Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
d
= 0
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 5 well have
dPt
d
=
 

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@ + u
0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
(1.28)
(i) Suppose the buyer is constrained.
Then
CL0;t = y0;t(1 + )  P t
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P t
Thus
@CL0;t
@
= y0;t
@CL1;t
@
=  y0;t(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@P t
=  1
@CL1;t
@P t
= 1
So, from (1.28)
dPt
d
=
   u0(CL0;t)y0;t   y0;t(1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
 u0(CL0;t) + u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
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As the agent is constrained,
u0(CL0;t) > (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) > u
0(CL1;t)
Hence both numerator and denominator are positive, giving dP
c
t
d > 0
(ii) Suppose the buyer is unconstrained.
Then u0(CL0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) and so from (1.28) we have
dPt
d
=
 

(1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t)
@CL0;t
@ + u
0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@

(1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
=
 

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@ +
@CL1;t
@

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
For the unconstrained buyer
(1 + rt)C
L
0;t + C
L
1;t  (1 + rt) [y0;t(1 + )  P t ] + y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P t
 (1 + rt) [y0;t   P t ] + y1;t  Rt+1 + P t
 (1 + rt)y0;t + y1;t  Rt+1   rtP t
Thus
(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@
+
@CL1;t
@
= 0
(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@P t
+
@CL1;t
@P t
=  rt
Hence dP
u
t
d = 0
This completes the unconstrained case and the proof of the proposition.
LTI: Constrained vs Unconstrained Response to Change in Pt+1
Proposition 44 Suppose the home-buyer is constrained in equilibrium with price P ct : Then
0 <
dP ct
dP ct+1
<
1
1 + rt
Suppose the home-buyer is unconstrained in equilibrium with price Put : Then
dPut
dPut+1
=
1
1 + rt
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 6 well have
dPt
dPt+1
=
 

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@Pt
(1.29)
(i) Suppose the buyer is constrained.
Then
CL0;t = y0;t(1 + )  Pt
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + Pt+1
Thus
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
= 0
@CL1;t
@Pt+1
= 1
@CL0;t
@Pt
=  1
@CL1;t
@Pt
= 0
So, from (1.29)
dPt
dPt+1
=
 u0(CL1;t)
 u0(CL0;t)
=

1
1+rt


u0(CL0;t)
(1+rt)u0(CL1;t)
 2 0; 1
(1 + rt)

Where we have used the fact that the denominator is greater than 1 as the agent is constrained.
(ii) Suppose the buyer is unconstrained.
Then u0(CL0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) and so from (1.29) we have
dPt
dPt+1
=
 

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+
@CL1;t
@Pt+1

(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
For the unconstrained buyer
(1 + rt)C
L
0;t + C
L
1;t  (1 + rt) [y0;t(1 + )  Pt] + y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + Pt+1
 (1 + rt) [y0;t   Pt] + y1;t  Rt+1 + Pt+1
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Thus
(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt+1
+
@CL1;t
@Pt+1
= 1
(1 + rt)
@CL0;t
@Pt
+
@CL1;t
@Pt
=  (1 + rt)
Hence dPtdPt+1 =
 1
 (1+rt) =
1
(1+rt)
This completes the unconstrained case and the proof of the proposition.
LTI: Constrained vs Unconstrained Response to Change in Interest Rate
Proposition 45 Let P ct be the equilibrium house price with a buyer constrained by an LTI con-
straint, and Put be the equilibrium house price when the buyer does not face a down-payment con-
straint. Then
0 >

dP ct
drt

1
P ct
>

dPut
drt

1
Put
The proof is highly involved so we proceed via a number of lemmas. We rst dene the following
functions.
For the constrained agent, let
gc(P c;t (rt); rt) := u(C
L;c
1;t ) + u(C
L;c
1;t ) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

And for the unconstrained agent let
gu(Pu;t (rt); rt) := u(C
L;u
0;t ) + u(C
L;u
1;t ) + uL + uR  
 
u(CR0;t) + u(C
R
1;t) + (1 + )uR

In gc when the agent is buying b0;t  0 so the agent cannot borrow or save. In gu; b0;t can
take any value when the agent buys, thus they are unconstrained.
Then we have 
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)@rt
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
=
 @gu(Pu;t (rt);rt)@rt
@gu(Pu;t (rt);rt)
@Pu;t
Pu;t
Lemma 46 When b0;t = 0 in the constrainedmodel (i.e. desired borrowing is 0) then
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
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Proof. When b0;t = 0 the agent is just unconstrained. Thus the constrained and unconstrained
buyers would be solving an identical problem so P c;t  Pu;t : Thus
dP c;t
drt
=
dPu;t
drt
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 47 In the constrained model with desired b0  0 (i.e. the agent wishes to borrow unsecured
but cannot):
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
< 0
This says that as  is decreased (the LTI constraint is tightened), the agent becomes more con-
strained. In particular, it follows that if the agent is constrained and  is decreased, then the agent
will still be constrained.
Proof. As the agent wishes to borrow unsecured but cannot
u0(CL0;t) > u
0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)
Now
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
= u00(CL0;t)
dCL0;t
d
  (1 + rt)u00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
As were in the constrained model
CL0;t = y0;t(1 + )  P t
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P t
Hence
dCL0;t
d
= y0;t   dP

t
d
dCL1;t
d
=  y0;t(1 + rt) + dP

t
d
From the proof of Proposition 1.28
dPt
d
=
y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
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Thus
dCL0;t
d
= y0;t  
y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;t

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t) 
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) [  + (1 + rt)]
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;trtu
0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
> 0
And
dCL1;t
d
=  y0;t(1 + rt) +
y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
  y0;t(1 + rt)  u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
y0;tu
0(CL0;t)  y0;t(1 + rt)u0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=
 ry0;tu0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
< 0
Where for both we have used that as the agent wishes to borrow unsecured, but cannot,
u0(CL0;t) > u
0(CL1;t)(1 + rt) > u
0(CL1;t): We see that an increase in  (an easing of the LTI
constraint) thus shifts resources from old to young for a constrained buyer, making them less
constrained.
To show this formally, putting the parts together we have
d

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)(1 + rt)

d
= u00(CL0;t)
y0;trtu
0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
+ (1 + rt)u
00(CL1;t)
ry0;tu
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
< 0
Where we have used the fact that u00(:) < 0:
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 48
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=  y0;t
 
u0(Cc1;t) 
ry0;tu
00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
!
Where (as with the proof in the LTV case)
T (rt) := u
0(CR0;t)
@CR0;t
@rt
+ u0(CR1;t)
@CR1;t
@rt
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Proof.
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
= u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@rt
+ u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@rt
With a constrained buyer
CL0;t = y0;t(1 + )  P t
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P t
So
@CL0;t
@rt
= 0
@CL1;t
@rt
=  y0;t
This gives
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
It follows that
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
But from Lemma 47
dCL1;t
d
=
 ry0;tu0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
Thus
d
h
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@rt
i
d
=  y0;tu0(CL1;t) + y0;tu00(CL1;t)
ry0;tu
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
=  y0;t
"
u0(CL1;t) 
ry0;tu
00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
#
This completes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 49
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t = P
c;
t
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

d
h
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
i
d
= y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

+
y0;trP
c;
t

u00(CL0;t)u
0(CL1;t) + u
00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
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Proof. As we have a constrained buyer
CL0;t = y0;t(1 + )  P t
CL1;t = y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P t
Thus
@CL0;t
@P c;t
=  1
@CL1;t
@P c;t
= 1
Now
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t =  u0(CL0;t)
@CL0;t
@P c;t
P c;t   u0(CL1;t)
@CL1;t
@P c;t
P c;t
= u0(CL0;t)P
c;
t   u0(CL1;t)P c;t > 0
It follows that
d
h
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
i
d
= u0(CL0;t)
dP c;t
d
+ u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u0(CL1;t)
dP c;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
=
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 dP c;t
d
+ u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
So
d
h
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
i
d
=
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 y0;t  u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
+ u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
y0;trtu
0(CL1;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
+u00(CL1;t)P
c;
t
ry0;tu
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
= y0;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

+
y0;trtP
c;
t

u00(CL0;t)u
0(CL1;t) + u
00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
where weve used results from Lemma 47.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma 50
d
h
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
i
d

d
"
  @g
c(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@rt
@gc(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@P
c;
t
P c;t
#
d
< 0
Proof. Let
W () : =
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
V () : =  @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
Then
d
"
  @g
c(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@rt
@gc(P
c;
t (rt);rt)
@P
c;
t
P c;t
#
d
=

W ()
V ()
0
=
W 0()V () W ()V 0()
V ()2
We show that W 0()V () < W ()V 0()
From Lemmas 48,49 we have
W () =  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
W 0() =  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
V () = P c;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

V 0() =
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 dP c;t
d
+ u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
Thus W ()V 0() > W 0()V () holds i¤" 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 dP c;t
d
+ u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
#
   y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
>
 
 y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
!
P c;t
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

We gather the terms in u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t) together on the RHS. Then W ()V 0() > W 0()V ()
i¤ "
u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
#   y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt)
>
" 
 y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
!
P c;t +
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
#
  u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
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Now from the proof of Lemma 49
u00(CL0;t)P
c;
t
dCL0;t
d
  u00(CL1;t)P c;t
dCL1;t
d
=
y0;trtP
c;
t

u00(CL0;t)u
0(CL1;t) + u
00(CL1;t)u
0(CL0;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
< 0
Hence, the LHS of the expression is positive (noting from the Lemma 26 that T (rt)  0). As usual,
with the agent desiring to borrow unsecured, u0(CL0;t) > (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) > u
0(CL1;t): Thus, to
prove the lemma it is su¢ cient to establish that 
 y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)
dCL1;t
d
!
P c;t +
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  0
But
dCL1;t
d
=  y0;t(1 + rt) + dP

t
d
So its enough to establish that
 y0;tu0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)

 y0;t(1 + rt) + dP

t
d

P c;t +
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  0
i¤
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  y0;tu00(CL1;t)P c;t 
 P c;t
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t)  y0;tu00(CL1;t)y0;t(1 + rt)

i¤
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  P c;t y0;tu0(CL1;t)
  P c;t y0;tu00(CL1;t)

y0;t (1 + rt)  dP
c;
t
d

Now, using from the proof of Lemma 47
y0;t (1 + rt)  dP
c;
t
d
=
y0;trtu
0(CL0;t)
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
> 0
Given u00(CL1;t) < 0 the RHS is positive. Thus its su¢ cient to show that the LHS  0 :
dP c;t
d
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  P c;t y0;tu0(CL1;t)  0 i¤ 
u0(CL0;t)  (1 + rt)u0(CL1;t)

u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  P c;t u0(CL1;t)
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As (
u0(CL0;t) (1+rt)u0(CL1;t))
u0(CL0;t) u0(CL1;t)
2 (0; 1) its su¢ cient to show that
 
y0;tu
0(CL1;t) + T (rt)
  P c;t u0(CL1;t)
We consider two cases.
(i) The renter is constrained/the interest rate they face doesnt move with the mortgage rate.
Then T (rt) = 0
Thus, we require that
y0;tu
0(CL1;t)  P c;t u0(CL1;t) i¤
y0;t  P c;t
This condition states that some deposit has to be made, and we maintain this assumption. The
the lemma holds in this case.
(ii) The renter is unconstrained and their interest rate moves with the mortgage rate. Then
from Lemma 26
T (rt) = u
0  CR1;t (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t  0
Its enough to show that
T (rt) 
 
P c;t   y0;t

u0(CL1;t)
So, we want to show that
 
P c;t   y0;t

u0(CL1;t)  u0
 
CR1;t
 
(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

With log utility, this condition becomes 
P c;t   y0;t

CL1;t


(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

CR1;t
i¤ 
P c;t   y0;t

CR1;t 

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t

CL1;t i¤ 
P c;t   y0;t
  
y1;t  Rt+1 + (1 + rt)
 
y0;t  Rt   CR0;t

 (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t  y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P c;t 
i¤
 
P c;t   y0;t

(y1;t  Rt+1)
 (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t
 y1;t  Rt+1   (1 + rt)y0;t + P c;t    P c;t   y0;t (1 + rt)
=

(y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t
 
y1;t  Rt+1   rtP c;t

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i¤
(y1;t  Rt+1)

P c;t   y0;t  
 
y0;t  Rt   CR0;t
   (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t   rtP c;t  i¤
(y1;t  Rt+1)

P c;t   y0;t(1 + ) +Rt + CR0;t
   (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t   rtP c;t  i¤
(y1;t  Rt+1)

Rt + C
R
0;t   CL0;t
   (y0;t  Rt)  CR0;t   rtP c;t 
As the renter is unconstrained (y0;t  Rt)   CR0;t  0 so the RHS  0: Its thus su¢ cient that
Rt + C
R
0;t  CL0;t:
But, in the proof of Lemma 28 is was shown that with an unconstrained renter and a constrained
buyer we have CL0;t < C
R
0;t, and this result also holds here. This thus completes the proof for the
unconstrained renter case.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 51
0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
Proof. 
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=
 @gc(P c;t (rt);rt)@rt rt
@gc(P c;t (rt);rt)
@P c;t
P c;t
From Lemmas 48,49
@gc(P c;t (rt); rt)
@rt
=  y0;tu0(CL1;t)  T (rt) < 0
 @g
c(P c;t (rt); rt)
@P c;t
P c;t = P
c;
t
 
u0(CL0;t)  u0(CL1;t)

> 0
To see the second inequality, note that as the agent is constrained when buying
u0(CL0;t) > (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t) > u
0(CL1;t)
Thus 0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
: This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 45. From Lemma 46, when the buying agent is just unconstrained
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
Let this correspond to  i.e. b0;t() = 0 (i.e. for desired borrowing for the buying agent). From
Lemma 47 as  is decreased from this point, the agent becomes constrained when buying and
is constrained for all lower : From Lemma 50

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
increases as  decreases. Further,
dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
is clearly una¤ected by changes in :
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Thus for a constrained agent,  <  and
dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t


>

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t

=
=

dPu;t
drt

1
Pu;t
Finally, from Lemma 51
0 >

dP c;t
drt

1
P c;t
This completes the proof of the proposition.
1.D Welfare Proofs
1.D.1 Welfare Cost of Boom and Bust Cycle
Here we Prove Proposition 15
Proof. Lifetime utility is given by,
V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)
= u (y0;t   Pt(Pt+1)  b0;t(Pt+1))
+u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1 + x) + uL + uR
Where we note that the price they bought for, Pt(Pt+1) and the saving b0;t(Pt+1) depends on
the price they expected to sell for (with b0;t(Pt+1) = 0 if theyre constrained).
Then
V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)  V (Pt+1; Pt+1)
= u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1 + x)
 u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1)
This is positive as x > 0 (the resale price is greater than expected) and u0(:) > 0:
Similarly
V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1)  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x)
= u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1)
 u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1 + x)
This is negative as they sell for Pt+1 having expected to sell at the boom price of Pt+1 + x:
Let
f(x) := [V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x)  V (Pt+1; Pt+1)] + [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1)  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x)]
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We show that f(x) < 0 for x > 0 and f 0(x) < 0; establishing the result.
We rst show that f(0) = 0 :
f(0) = u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1)
 u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1)
+u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1)
 u (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1)
= 0
When there are no shocks, lifetime utility is una¤ected for both.
We show that f 0(x) < 0 for x > 0 which then also ensures that f(x) < 0 for x > 0:
f 0(x) = u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1 + x)
+u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1)
(1 + rt)

b00;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )P 0t (Pt+1 + x)

 u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1 + x)
 (1 + rt)  b00;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )P 0t (Pt+1 + x)+ 1
So
f 0(x) =
"
u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1)] + Pt+1 + x)
 u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1 + x)
#
+(1 + rt)

(1  )P 0t (Pt+1 + x)  b00;t(Pt+1 + x)


"
u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1 + x)
 u0 (y1;t  R+ (1 + rt) [b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  (1  )Pt(Pt+1 + x)] + Pt+1)
#
We now show that b00;t(Pt+1 +x)  0: First suppose the buyer is constrained. Then b0;t(Pt+1 +
x)  0; b00;t(Pt+1 + x) = 0:
Otherwise if they are unconstrained, we have u0(CL0;t) = (1 + rt)u
0(CL1;t): Suppose Pt+1 in-
creases. Then in equilibrium, non-housing consumption in both periods is unchanged. To see
this, suppose CL1;t increases, then from the Euler equation, C
L
0;t must increase as well. But then
lifetime utility has increased when buying, which is a contradiction as it is xed at the same level
as the lifetime utility from renting. Similarly, CL1;t cannot decrease in equilibrium. Thus C
L
1;t; C
L
0;t
are unchanged in equilibrium following a change in Pt+1:
Now CL0;t  y0;t   Pt(Pt+1)   b0;t(Pt+1): Hence, totally di¤erentiating wrt x :  P 0t (Pt+1 +
x)  b00;t(Pt+1 + x) = 0; giving
b00;t(Pt+1 + x) =  P 0t (Pt+1 + x) =
 
(1 + rt)
< 0
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Where we have used that P 0t (Pt+1 + x) =
1
1+rt
for the unconstrained buyer. So, in both cases
b00;t(Pt+1 + x)  0:
Now, as shown in the appendix, for both constrained and unconstrained buyers, P 0t (Pt+1+x) > 0
and so Pt(Pt+1 + x) > Pt(Pt+1): Then, noting that for x > 0 b0;t(Pt+1 + x)  b0;t(Pt+1); the rst
[:] term is then negative as consumption is greater in the top expression (having paid a lower price
for the house and sold at the same price) and u00(:) < 0.
Similarly the second [:] term is negative as consumption is higher in the top expression, due to
the same price being paid and a higher resale price. Further (1 )P 0t (Pt+1 +x) b00;t(Pt+1 +x) > 0
regardless of whether the buyer is constrained or not. Thus f 0(x) < 0: This completes the proof
of the proposition.
1.D.2 Benet of Policy
Here we prove Proposition 16
Proof. Clearly, as  := (Pt+1);
[V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1))  V (Pt+1; Pt+1; (Pt+1))] = [V (Pt+1; Pt+1 + x; )  V (Pt+1; Pt+1; )]
Thus it is su¢ cient to prove that the cost from the bust is worse without regulation:
[V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; (Pt+1 + x))  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x))]
< [V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; )  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; )]
Now, as with the prior proof (in constrained case)
V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; (Pt+1 + x))  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x))
= u (y1;t  R  (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1 + x))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x)) + Pt+1)
 u (y1;t  R  (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1 + x))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x)) + Pt+1 + x)
where we have written Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x)) to emphasise that Pt+1 a¤ects Pt not only
directly through the usual channel, but also indirectly through changing :
When policy constrains  =  = (Pt+1) the utility cost in the bust is given by
V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1; (Pt+1))  V (Pt+1 + x; Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1))
= u (y1;t  R  (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1)) + Pt+1)
 u (y1;t  R  (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1)) + Pt+1 + x)
Now for x > 0;the total amount to be repaid on the mortgage is higher when  is endogenous:
(1  (Pt+1))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1) < (1  (Pt+1 + x))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x)) (1.30)
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This reects  being lower, which means a greater percentage of the purchase price needs to be
repaid when old. Further, it reects that with lower ; the initial price paid was higher as @Pt@ < 0:
We obtain our result by combining (1.30) with the following claim.
Claim
Let
f(z) := u(a  z)  u(b  z)
With u0 > 0; u00 < 0 and a < b: Then z1 > z2 =) f(z1) < f(z2) < 0
Proof of Claim
f(z) < 0 i¤ u(a  z) < u(b  z) i¤ a  z < b  z which is true.
We now establish that f 0(z) < 0:
f 0(z) =  u0(a  z) + u0(b  z)
< 0 i¤
u0(b  z) < u0(a  z) i¤
a  z < b  z i¤
a < b
This completes the proof of the claim.
Apply this with
a : = y1;t  R+ Pt+1
b : = y1;t  R+ Pt+1 + x
z1 : = (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1 + x))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1 + x))
z2 : = (1 + rt)(1  (Pt+1))Pt(Pt+1 + x; (Pt+1))
Then f(z) is the utility cost from the unexpected drop in price, z1 is the case with endogenous
; and z2 is the case with policy preventing the fall in :
Then, by (1.30) z1 > z2 so by the claim f(z1) < f(z2) < 0 and the utility cost of the bust is
lower with policy present. This completes the proof of the proposition.
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Chapter 2
Empirical Analysis of Housing
Model
This chapter introduces a new house price dataset for the US, with separate house price indices
for low, middle and high tier houses across 52 cities during the recent boom and bust. Using this
data we introduce several new facts about the boom, the bust and the link between them. These
facts can be accounted for in a parsimonious way using the theoretical prediction of Chapter 1 that
an easing of non-price credit terms will have a relatively greater impact on low tier prices. Using
this data we test this implication of the theory, nding statistically and economically signicant
relationships between two separate measures of changes in credit availability, and relative changes
in low and high tier prices, both during the boom and bust. Further, we then augment the analysis
of Chapter 1 by examining alternative explanations for the tiered pattern, including changes in
housing supply, speculators and di¤erential income growth for low and high tier buyers. We show
that these variables are not responsible for the pattern.
2.1 Introduction
Previous studies of the US housing boom have documented the wide dispersion in growth rates
experienced across di¤erent regions (Davis et al 2007, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill 2010). For
example, many Californian cities experienced nominal growth of more than 200% during the housing
boom, whilst in the major cities in Ohio, it was less than 50% (see Table 2.5 in the appendix).
However, the dispersion in growth rates within cities has received much less attention, despite
striking variation. In Riverside, CA, the cheapest third of houses (low-tier houses) grew 166
percentage points (pp.) more than the most expensive third (high-tier houses) during the boom.
By contrast, during the bust, the cheapest third of houses in Atlanta lost 59% of their value, over
twice as much as the 22% lost by the most expensive houses. However, more striking than these
large di¤erences within cities is the systematic pattern in the within-city variation across cities. In
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the appendix we use a new housing dataset to provide real house price graphs from January 1997
until September 2012 for 52 metro areas that accounted for 41% of the US population in 1997.12
In 51 of the 52 cities, the low-tier houses had greater price growth than the high tier during the
boom3 (growing 55pp. more on average), whilst the low-tier prices fell by even more in 46 of the
51 cities during the bust4 (falling 14pp. more on average). The result of this collapse is that at the
time of the bust in 2011, the cumulative growth since 1997 was greater for the low tier in only 26
of the 51 cities (down from 50 at the peak).
Even though low-tier house prices had higher growth in 51 of the 52 cities during the boom,
there is large variation in the size of this di¤erence, ranging from the 166pp. di¤erence in Riverside,
CA to 8pp. in Colorado Springs. Using this measure, we uncover further facts about the recent
boom and bust. In the paper we show that the di¤erence in growth rates between cheap and
expensive houses increases with the size of the boom in a city. There is also mean-reversion in the
tiered pattern, and we establish that cheaper houses have the largest collapse relative to expensive
houses in the places where the reverse was true during the boom. Finally we show that, mirroring
the pattern during the boom, the relative collapse in low-tier houses is particularly bad in cities
with the largest housing bust.
The theory developed in the previous chapter provides a parsimonious explanation of these
facts. Recall that the theory predicts that an easing of non-price credit terms will result in greater
relative price growth for low rather than high-tier houses. This is because, unlike high tier buyers,
low tier buyers are credit constrained, so a relaxation of these constraints only directly a¤ects the
price low tier buyers can pay for a house. The price paid by the high-tier buyer also increases
due to capital gains being passed on by the housing ladder, though the relative increase is not as
great. As we show in the text, from this prediction it follows that the di¤erence between the low
and high tier growth rates will increase in the extent of credit easing. Further, where there is
a greater degree of credit easing, both low and high tier prices will grow by more, increasing the
growth of the aggregate house price level. Thus, with credit easing, wed expect the di¤erence
between low and high tier growth rates to be greater in places with larger booms. The same logic
applies in reverse: all else equal, places with a greater degree of credit tightening will have larger
collapses in the aggregate house price index, and will experience low tier prices falling even more
than high tier ones. Finally, with a boom caused by credit easing and a bust following subsequent
tightening back to pre-boom standards, the places with the biggest easing in credit will have the
largest subsequent tightening. With this well see the largest di¤erential between low and high tier
price growth in the boom matched with the largest di¤erence between their price collapses in the
bust.5
In the paper we test the predicted relationship between relative house price movements and
1The house price data comes from S&P/Case-Shiller and Fiserv, Inc.
2The data for Cleveland nishes in 2008.
3From 1997-2006.
4Dened as 2006-2011.
5The role of credit tightening in the bust is likely to be reinforced in practice by an increase in foreclosures due
to people on teaser-ratemortgages being unable to renance them.
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credit, comparing variation in credit measures with variation in the di¤erence between low and
high tier price growth across cities. We do this both with a proxy for changes in credit availability
and the Loan-to-Income (LTI) ratio, and perform the analysis both during the housing boom
and bust. Both unconditionally, and whilst controlling for other variables, we show statistically
signicant relationships between both credit measures and relative house price movements, in the
direction predicted by theory. The estimates are also economically signicant, predicting price
changes reassuringly close to those in the data, at the mean. For example, the credit easing proxy
predicts that in the average city the low tier will grow 62pp. more than the high tier during the
boom, compared with the observed average of 55pp. The same variable predicts the low tier to
fall by 13pp. more than the high tier in the bust in the typical city, compared to 14pp. observed
in the data.
In the previous chapter we used a model to distinguish between three possible explanations of
the pattern observed in tiered housing during the boom, arguing that without an easing of non-
price credit terms, we would not have observed the low tier growing relatively more in 51 of the
52 cities. Here we rule out alternative explanations for the pattern not considered in the model,
including greater income growth for low tier buyers, a surge in speculators buying low tier houses,
and a surge in house building for high tier houses. This is done by comparing variation in these
variables with variation in the di¤erence between low and high tier price growth across the cities.
We show that none of these alternative explanations can account for the observed pattern, either
being statistically insignicant or pushing in the opposite direction, predicting the high tier should
have grown more than the low tier during the boom. Ruling out these alternative explanations
re-enforces the conclusions of the rst chapter that the tiered pattern during the boom provides
indirect evidence of a signicant e¤ect of credit easing on house prices during the boom.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 explains the housing data in detail
and details new facts about the housing boom and bust and their relation to the existing literature.
Section 2.3 then introduces the data on other economic variables during the boom and their relation
with the tiered pattern, with regression results in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides similar analysis
for the housing bust and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 New Facts About the US Housing Boom and Bust
In this section we discuss new facts about the recent US experience, looking in detail at the variation
within cities during the recent US housing boom and bust. We rst explain the data used for this.
2.2.1 Case-Shiller Tiered House Price Data
A major di¢ culty with constructing accurate time series for house prices is how to control for the
changing composition of houses sold over time. This is an acute issue because in the US in any
given year, typically around only 5% of the housing stock is sold (Case et al 2012). Thus, a change
in the average price of a house sold in a given place over time could reect either a genuine change
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in house prices (i.e. the change in the price of a given standard house) or simply that a di¤erent
type of house has been sold. One approach to this problem is to construct a hedonic index, which
runs regressions to account for prices in terms of observable characteristics, such as the number of
rooms a house has.
The major alternative approach, taken by the Case-Shiller index, is to use a repeat-sales index.
This index examines the arms-length sale of the same single-family house at two points in time,
thus largely controlling for changes in the composition of houses sold, picking up genuine changes in
house prices. Transactions are excluded when the time between two sales is less than six months,
which likely reects substantial physical changes to the property by a developer, or a transaction
that is non-arms-length, so not reective of the true market price. Evidence of substantial physical
changes from deed records are also used to rule out certain properties. This data cleaning typically
removes less than 15% of total repeat sales transactions in a given metro area. If a long time passes
between two sales of a property, the change in its sale price could reect changes in the quality of
the neighbourhood or improvements in the quality of the house, rather than changes in the price of
a house with unchanging quality. To correct for this, a weighting procedure is applied that places
less weight on properties with a longer period between the two transactions. Finally, each pair of
sales is allocated a weight based on its rst sale price. This is done to ensure that the constructed
index is representative of the average home in the metro area (Standard and Poors 2009).
The above procedure is used to construct an aggregate house price index for a given metro area.
Additionally, within each metro area, separate repeat-sales indices are constructed for three equal-
sized price tiers: low, middle, and high. The low tier represents a price index for the cheapest third
of houses in a metro area, the middle the middle third, and the high tier the index for the most
expensive third of houses. To construct these, price breakpoints for low/middle and middle/high-
tier houses are calculated through time to ensure equal numbers in each group. A given house
is placed in the appropriate tier based on the rst of its two sale prices, with these breakpoints
smoothed through time, to rule out seasonal e¤ects.6 An example of these breakpoints for Los
Angeles and Atlanta during the recent boom and bust is given in Figure 2.1. Due to the signicant
price increases experienced, the price of a low tier house in Los Angeles in 2007 would be su¢ cient
to be a high tier house in 2001. Once repeat sales-pairs are placed into the appropriate tier, the
same weighting and cleaning procedures are used as for the construction of the aggregate index.
It is important to emphasise that the breakpoints, and thus price tiers, are specic to each
metro area. A low tier house is in the cheapest third in its metro area, not nationally. This is
clearly demonstrated in Figure 2.1, which shows that during the peak of the boom years middle
tier houses in Los Angeles (and likely several low tier houses) are expensive enough to be high tier
houses in Atlanta.
As the price cuto¤s for the di¤erent tiers di¤er across metro areas, so too will the income of those
buying the houses. A typical low-tier buyer in an expensive housing market like San Francisco will
6 It is possible for a given property to move between price tiers over time. For example, if a low-tier house
experiences a su¢ ciently large increase in price it will be part of the middle tier index. However, this will be when
it sells again, as the tier grouping is always based on the initial price of a repeat sales pair.
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Figure 2.1: Tiered Break Points: Los Angeles, Atlanta
have a higher income than the typical low-tier buyer in a cheaper market like Tampa. To examine
this we use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The HMDA was brought into
e¤ect in 1975 to identify the degree of discrimination within mortgage lending. It required most
mortgage lenders to collect data on housing loan applications along with several other attributes of
the applicants such as race and income. The coverage is near universal, being around 90 percent
of the total market during the boom years (DellAriccia et al 2008). With the HMDA data we
can isolate the loans approved for home purchase, and the income of those who took the loans out
for each of our metro areas. The HMDA data does not have information on the price paid for
the home bought, so we cannot directly split people into di¤erent price tiers. Rather, we utilise
the fact that people with higher incomes tend to buy more expensive homes.7 We assume this
association is 1-1, and within a given metro area, identify those in the 0-33 percentile of the income
distribution of those purchasing homes with the low tier buyers, 33-67 with the middle tier, and
67-100 with the high tier. We take the median of each of these groups, identifying the typical low,
middle and high tier buyers with the 16.7, 50 and 83.3 income percentiles of those buying houses.
We calculate this for each metro area at the start of the boom, in 1997, with the results given in
Table 2.7 in the appendix. We indeed see signicant variation in the income of our typical buyers
across metro areas. In Tampa, the typical middle-tier buyer has an annual income of $45,000,
whilst in San Francisco, the typical low-tier buyer has an income of $58,000. If this person moved
to Tampa with the same income they would likely own a middle-tier rather than low tier house.
7This is apparent in the American Housing Survey (AHS).
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2.2.2 Tiered Housing Patterns During Boom and Bust
Tiered Case-Shiller indexes are publicly available for 17 metro areas in the United States. Fiserv,
a data company, also compile tiered house price data using exactly the same method for a greater
range of metro areas. Combining the two data sources, we have tiered monthly house price data
for 52 US metro areas during the recent boom and bust, covering 26 states, and 41%8 of the US
population in 1997.9 In the appendix we display graphs (in real terms) for these 52 tiered house
price indexes from January 1997 (around the start of the boom) until September 2012 (2008 in
Cleveland). Within each area the graphs are normalised to 100 in January 1997. As far as I am
aware, this is the rst extensive analysis of tiered house price data during the US housing boom
and bust.
The rst thing to note from the graphs is that there is signicant dispersion in the house price
movements within metro areas, with results in Table 2.5 in the appendix.10 To take a few salient
examples, during the boom, the high-tier in Riverside "only" grew 210% in nominal terms, whilst
the low tier grew by 377%. During the bust in Atlanta, high tier homes lost 22% of their value,
whilst low tier homes lost 59%, over twice as much in percentage terms. However, more striking
than the within-city variation, is the pattern to the variation: in 51 of the 52 metro areas, the
low-tier grew more in relative terms than the high-tier during the boom (from 1997-2006).11 By
contrast, in 46 of the cities, the low tier fell by more from the peak of the boom in 2006 to the
general bottoming out of the market in 2011.12 As a result of this, in 2011, the number of cities
for which the growth from 1997 was greater for the low tier had dropped from 50 out of 51 to only
26.
2.2.3 Quantitative Measure of Tiered Pattern
Whilst low tier prices grew more than high tier prices during the boom in 51 of the 52 metro areas,
there is signicant variation in the extent of this, from a small di¤erence in Colorado Springs to a
very large di¤erence in many of the Californian cities. By exploiting this variation, we can uncover
further facts about the housing boom, and in the next section, explore the link between the tiered
pattern and other economic variables.
Here we construct a measure of the strength of tiered housing pattern to translate the qualitative
pictures into quantitative measures. We use a simple measure that looks at the di¤erence in the
percentage growth rates between the low and high tiers during the boom, from 1997, before the
start of the boom, to 2006, which is a good approximation to the peak of the housing market in
8Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Census Bureau.
9The Fiserv data is used for all but Cleveland and Las Vegas.
10This data is presented in nominal terms.
11The exception is Boulder, CO.
12The exceptions are Boulder, Fort Collins and Grand Junction in Colorado, and Rochester, Binghampton in New
York. There is no data on the bust for Cleveland.
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Figure 2.2: Tiered Pattern and Size of Boom
most of our metro areas.13
M := (low tier % price growth 1997-06)  (high tier % price growth 1997-06) (2.1)
The average value of M across the cities is 55pp., and there is signicant variation around this
with a standard deviation of 41. The maximum value is in Riverside, CA, where the low tier grew
166pp. more than the high tier during the boom. We now use this measure to introduce new facts
about the boom.
In Figure 2.2 we look at how the tiered pattern varies with the aggregate price growth in each
metro area during the boom. There is a positive and statistically signicant relationship between
the two, showing that in metros that experienced a larger overall boom, the low tier price growth
outstripped the high tier growth to a greater extent.
We now turn to tiered housing patterns in the bust, looking at the changes in prices from 2006
to 2011. In Figure 2.3 we compare this tiered measure during the bust to the tiered measure during
the boom and the size of the local collapse in the housing market. In the rst panel we see that
there is a negative relationship between tiered growth in the boom and bust. In other words, in
places where low tier growth greatly outstripped high tier growth during the boom, the low tier fell
signicantly more than the high tier in the bust. The second panel shows that in housing markets
with a greater bust, the extent to which the low tier fell more than the high tier was greater.
13A justication for the use of this measure is given in Proposition 52 below.
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Figure 2.3: Housing Patterns in Bust
2.2.4 Summary of Facts and Related Literature
Here we summarise the facts presented and discuss the prior literature looking at house price
variation within cities.
Facts
1. In the recent boom from 1997-2006, low tier house prices grew more than high tier house
prices in 51 of 52 metro areas.
2. In the recent bust from 2006-2011, the low tier fell by more than high tier in 46 of 51 metro
areas.
3. The extent to which low tier growth outstripped high tier growth in the boom was greater in
metros with greater housing booms.
4. The extent to which the collapse in the low tier was greater than the high tier was greater in
places with worse housing busts.
5. Places with particularly strong relative low tier growth in the boom, had particularly larger
relative low tier price collapses in the bust.
Overall, there was a larger boom and bust cycle in the cheapest houses in each metro area.
The pattern documented in the rst fact is new and remarkable in light of previously published
research on tiered housing. Using Case-Shiller data, Mayer (1993) documented that in the 1970s
and 80s the opposite pattern occurred with high tier house prices growing relatively more in Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas and Oakland. Poterba (1991) has similar ndings. Finally, Smith and Tesarek
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(1991) show that in the 1970s boom in Houston, high tier houses had the greatest appreciation.
Indeed such was the prevalence of this pattern, Mayer (1993) suggests a theory based on an extension
of Stein (1995) showing why its inevitable that high tier house prices will grow more than low tier
prices during a boom. A similar result to Fact 1 has been documented across a smaller range of
cities using data at the zip-code level within cities. Guerrieri et al (2011) document that during
the recent housing boom, neighbourhoods in cities with initially cheaper housing experience larger
relative booms. Landvoigt et al (2012) use repeat-sales data for San Diego from 2000-2005 and
show that capital gains over this period were signicantly greater for cheaper houses.14
The second fact presented here is entirely unique to this paper to my knowledge. The pattern
observed in previous busts was not as uniform. Mayer (1993) nds greater price crashes in the high
tier in Chicago and Oakland in the late 1970s. Smith and Tesarek (1991) nd that high-quality
properties fell at a greater rate in Houston during the 1980s following the oil bust. Case and Shiller
(1994) nd high tier properties falling at a greater rate in Los Angeles during the bust in the late
1980s, whilst low tier properties had a greater crash in Boston at the same time. Landvoigt et al
(2012) nd that from 2006-2008 in San Diego, less expensive houses depreciated relatively more.
An analogous result to the third fact is shown for their selection of cities by Guerrieri et al
(2011). They show that the larger the city-wide housing boom, the greater the di¤erence in
growth rates between low and high price neighbourhoods. As with Fact 1, we complement this
with analysis for a larger number of cities, at a more aggregated level.
To my knowledge, the fourth and fth facts have not been discussed before for this or previous
booms.
I view the new facts presented about the housing boom and bust to be of independent interest
in their own right, providing new data about this historic episode, suggesting new areas to work
on. As discussed in the introduction, the theoretical framework of the previous chapter provides
a parsimonious explanation for these facts, based on the easing then tightening of non-price credit
conditions. We next turn to testing this theory empirically.
2.3 Data and Empirical Approach
2.3.1 Credit Easing
In the previous chapter, we proved that when low tier buyers are constrained and high tier buyers
are unconstrained, the marginal relative price response to an easing of the LTV ratio is greater for
low tier prices:  dPLt ()
d

1
PLt ()
>
 dPHt ()
d

1
PHt ()
> 0
An implication of this theory is that the gap between low and high tier price growth is greater
14For example, they nd that the average house that sold for $200K in 2000 experienced average growth of 17%
per year until 2005. By constrast, for a house that sold for $500K in 2000, the average annual appreciation over
this period was only 12%. Rather than just comparing low and high tier prices, they also show there is a decreasing
monotonic relationship between the initial price and subsequent capital gains.
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the greater the credit easing, as summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 52 Let PLt (); P
H
t () be the low and high tier prices as functions of the minimum
down payment : Let 2 < 1 <  with  the original level of credit standards and 2; 1 looser
down payment requirements, with 2 the looser. Suppose the low tier buyer is constrained and the
high tier buyer is unconstrained.
Then
PLt (2)
PLt ()
PHt (2)
PHt ()
>
PLt (1)
PLt ()
PHt (1)
PHt ()
> 1
And
PLt (2)  PLt ()
PLt ()
 
 
PHt (2)  PHt ()

PHt ()
>
PLt (1)  PLt ()
PLt ()
 
 
PHt (1)  PHt ()

PHt ()
> 0
Remark 53 An identical result can be shown when the maximum LTI ratio is loosened.
The theory implies two di¤erent measures can be use to capture the di¤erence between low and
high tier price growth. The rst calculates the ratio of low and high tier price changes, whilst the
second examines the percentage point di¤erence between low and high tier price growth. Either
measure can be used to test the predicted relationship between relative price changes and credit
easing. In the paper we use (2.1), the percentage point di¤erence between growth rates, which is
perhaps easier to interpret, but we obtain very similar results when the alternative measure is used
instead.
Ideally wed like to test the link between relative price growth and both LTV and LTI easing,
to examine which is more important. From the HMDA dataset we can construct LTI measures
for each metro and changes in it over time. Unfortunately, it does not also record the value of
the home purchased, so it cannot be used to calculate LTV ratios. Instead, we use a credit easing
proxy for this, which arguably is more important for LTV than LTI easing. We begin with a
discussion of the LTI data.
From the HMDA data we construct an average LTI ratio for each metro in 1997 and 2006,
with details on this construction given in the appendix.15 We plot (2.1) against the change in
this in Figure 2.4. We see that in all 49 cities16 , there was an increase in the average LTI ratio,
but also signicant dispersion in this, from a low of 0.14 in Rochester, NY, to a maximum of
1.35 in Washington DC, where the average LTI ratio increased from 2.13 in 1997 to 3.48 in 2006.
However, most strikingly, there is a positive statistically signicant relationship between the two
variables: places with greater LTI easing experienced a greater di¤erence between low and high tier
price growth, consistent with the predictions of theory. We now turn to our second measure of
credit easing.
15The measure utilises the income distribution of those that bought a house in a given city in a given each year.
The LTI measure is the average of the LTI ratios for the buyers between the 33rd and 66th percentiles of this income
distribution. This measure is intended to rule out the impact of outliers on the calculated LTI ratio.
16There is no data on income changes in the period of interest for Gainesville, GA; Peabody, MA; Cambridge,
MA. For consistency, for the remaining variables, we also restrict the sample to the 49 cities.
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Figure 2.4: Tiered Measure and LTI Easing in Boom
As discussed, the HMDA dataset does not record the value of the home purchased so we cannot
use it to construct LTV measures for each metro area. Instead we use a proxy based on the
prevalence of junior liens at the peak of the boom in 2006. Traditional prime conforming mortgages
in the US had an LTV ratio of 80%. If a borrower wanted to make a smaller down payment and
have an LTV ratio over 80%, private mortgage insurance payments (PMI) had to be taken out
(Calhoun 2005). This cost is substantial, with PMI on a typical 95-100% LTV loan costing 1% of
the value of the loan annually (Credit Suisse 2007). Further, unlike mortgage payments, PMI was
not tax-deductible. A popular alternative to PMI became taking out two mortgages, a conforming
rst mortgage for 80% of the value of the loan (which does not need PMI payments) and a second
mortgage (or even third mortgage)-a junior lien-for a large part or all of the remainder of the value of
the house.17 Crucially, interest payments on this second mortgage were tax-deductible. Originally,
second mortgages were primarily used to circumvent PMI, however their use exploded during the
recent boom, particularly in areas with the largest house price increases (Credit Suisse 2007).
Junior liens are particularly useful for borrowers constrained by the down payment requirement
with many borrowers able to get a mortgage with zero down payment with the popular 80/20
combination. Given this, I view the increase in use of junior liens over the boom as a useful
proxy for the easing of down payment constraints. Unfortunately, the HMDA data only separately
identies senior and junior liens from 2004 onwards so we cannot track the increase in each metro
area. However, prior to the boom the use of second mortgages was small, with the fraction of
housing transactions featuring a junior lien around 5 times lower in 1998 than in 2006 (Adelino et
al 2012). I thus view the fraction of housing transactions in 2006 in each metro using a junior lien
17Popular options were 80/10/10 with an 80% LTV rst mortgage, 10% LTV second mortgage, and 10% deposit,
and the 80/20 with a 20% LTV second mortage and zero deposit.
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Figure 2.5: Tiered Measure and Credit Easing Proxy in Boom
as a useful proxy for the increase in the use of junior liens, and hence easing of LTV requirements.18
In Figure 2.5 we plot the di¤erence in low and high tier growth rates during the boom against the
fraction of home purchase loans with junior liens in 2006. The widespread use of these can be seen,
with over 50% of home purchase loans using a junior lien in Riverside, CA. Furthermore, consistent
with the theory, there is a statistically signicant positive relationship between the prevalence of
junior liens in 2006 and the di¤erence between low and high tier price growth rates during the
boom.
In summary, without other variables controlled for, we see positive signicant relationships
between both measures of credit easing and the dispersion in tiered price growth during the boom.
We next consider whether there could be confounding variables responsible for this association.
2.3.2 Other Variables
In the previous chapter we theoretically examined the response of tiered housing under a fall in
interest rates, an increase in buyer optimism and an easing of LTV and LTI ratios. We concluded
that out of those explanations, the documented pattern of greater price growth for the low tier
could not have occurred without an easing of non-price credit terms. There are other potential
18Of course, the addition of a junior lien will also enable an increased LTI ratio, by allowing the borrower a greater
total loan against their income. However, the impact on the borrower and their buying power is likely signicantly
greater through the easing of the LTV ratio. For example, suppose a borrower has a prime conforming mortgage
L and is simultaneously constrained by a LTI limit on this mortgage, and a LTV limit of 80%: With the addition
of an unsecured 10% LTV second lien they can pay 100% more for a house and still satisfy the LTV limit. This is
because their initial deposit D allowed them to pay 5D for a house at 80% LTV, but the same deposit can now pay
up to 10D and satisfy the combined LTV limit of 90%. By contrast, they can only pay 11:1% more for the house
and satisfy the combined LTI limit. To see this, with the LTI limit binding, initially the maximum house price they
could a¤ord is P: With the addition of a 2nd lien for up to 10% of the value of the house the maximum price they
can now pay is P 0 = P + 0:1P 0: Solving this gives P 0 = 1:111P; or an 11:1% increase in the price they can pay.
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explanations for this pattern. Low tier buyers having greater relative income growth, investors
primarily buying low tier houses, and builders primarily building high tier houses could all generate
greater low tier growth, else equal. Further, these variables could be positively associated with
credit easing, giving rise to the apparent association documented in the previous section. For
example, places with greater relative income growth for low tier buyers may also experience an
increase in average LTV and LTI ratios, as these borrowers are perceived to become relatively more
credit worthy. Or, perhaps in places with greater mortgage credit easing, there was greater credit
easing generally, making it easier for builders to obtain the nances to build more houses. If they
primarily built houses for the high price tier, we could observe places with greater credit easing
experiencing relatively greater low tier price increases, but this would be operating through supply
and not demand. Finally, places with greater credit easing may draw in speculators, either because
it is easier for them to obtain funding, or because they believe prices in those areas are particularly
likely to rise. If they primarily bought low tier houses, the documented link between credit easing
and greater relative low tier price growth could actually be operating through a di¤erent channel
than the one proposed. It is important to address these other explanations to be sure that the
policy of restricting the easing of non-price credit terms would actually be e¤ective in attenuating
the housing boom.
Our empirical approach to tackle these, and other alternative explanations, is to compare varia-
tion in the di¤erential growth rates during the boom given by (2.1) with variation in these variables.
As the data on the other variables is only available annually, for each city we compute (2.1), from
January 1997 to the 2006 price averages. We compare this to variation in the other cities from
1997-2006 (with exceptions noted below). Before turning to regressions, we discuss three of the
variables in detail.
2.3.3 Change in Housing Supply
The model of the previous chapter abstracts from changes in the housing supply. With equal
increases in demand for low and high tier houses, the low tier would experience a greater boom if
more high tier houses were built in response. Here we examine the link between the tiered pattern
and changes in housing supply.
Most papers looking at the housing boom have focused on the demand side and the role of
changing nancial variables in facilitating this. However, the boom was also a time of dramatic
building in many metro areas, which may have exacerbated the bust and resulted in too many
houses being built.19 Glaeser et al (2008) have examined the role of supply in the evolution of
booms. Using the Saiz (2008) proxy for local supply elasticities, they tend to nd that areas with
more elastic housing supply experienced weaker housing booms, with a few notable exceptions such
as Phoenix.
To my knowledge, there have been no papers estimating the elasticity of supply for di¤erent tiers
of housing within a metro area. Given this, my approach to test the link between the tiered pattern
19Haughwout et al (2012) calculate that the boom contributed an excess of over 3 million extra houses nationally.
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Figure 2.6: Tiered Measure and House Building in Boom
and housing supply is to compare the variation in house building during the boom with the tiered
pattern. Taking data from The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)20 , for each
of our metro areas we compute the number of permits issued for single-family house building during
the boom years 1997-2006. We then normalise this relative to the 2000 single-family housing stock
as counted in the census, giving us a measure of the amount of house building that took place
relative to the existing stock. There is signicant variation in this measure from a low of 3.8% in
San Francisco, to a high of 73.1% in Las Vegas (meaning that over 1997-2006 they built 73% of
the 2000 stock). In Figure 2.6 we plot the di¤erence between low and high tier growth during the
boom against this building data.
We note a signicant downwards sloping relationship between the two: in places with more
house building, the tiered pattern is less pronounced.21 This suggests that changes in housing
supply are not responsible for the tiered pattern. If they were, and low tier house prices grew more
than high tier house prices because more high tier houses were built, wed expect to see the opposite
pattern, namely that places with more building featured a more pronounced tiered pattern.
The above reasoning implicitly assumes that similar types of houses were built across all areas,
relative to their MSA. As against this, the pattern could arguably be generated if cities with
little building built high tier houses, whilst those with signicant building built mainly low tier
houses (both relative to their own metro). However, given that many places (several in California)
experienced large low- relative to high-tier price growth and had very little building, it does not
seem likely that their experience can be attributed to changes in supply along the lines of this
20Precisely, the data is from the State of the Cities Data Systems (SOCDS), Building Permits Database.
21 If we remover the two outliers of Greeley, CO, and Las Vegas, in each of which over 70% of the 2000 stock was
built during the boom, the relationship is still statistically signicant at the 5% level.
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argument. Further, in places with a lot of building, the low tier still grew more than the high tier,
in spite of the hypothesised low-tier house building, suggesting that something else was driving
this.22
2.3.4 Speculators
The key identication assumption in the model of the previous chapter is that house buyers are
heterogeneous: low tier buyers are credit constrained while high tier buyers are unconstrained. All
the predictions of the model follow from this critical assumption. Whilst we have shown evidence
that typical people buying low tier houses are credit constrained, the clean separation between
the two groups could be broken by the presence of speculators. Speculators may not be credit
constrained, and if they primarily bought low tier houses, this could explain the observed pattern
more so than our explication. It has been documented that there were large increases in the share of
homes bought in many metro areas by investors and second home owners (Wheaton and Nechayev
2007; Haughwout et al 2011). Using HMDA data, we examine whether this was linked to the
observed tiered pattern. With a mortgage application, the HMDA dataset requires identication
of whether the applicant intends to live primarily in the property or not. If not, they are classied
as a non-owner-occupier. Non-owner occupiers could either be speculators buying an investment
property, or people buying a second home. Using this measure we also nd a large increase in the
percentage of home loans going to non-owner occupiers. For example, in 1997 in Las Vegas 9% fell
into this category, but by the peak of the boom in 2006 this had risen to 26%.
Our approach here is to compare the strength of the tiered pattern with the percentage point
increase in non-owner occupiers from 1997-2006. The results are displayed in Figure 2.7. The
graph shows that unconditionally, there is a statistically signicant negative relationship between
the two: places with a greater increase in non-owner-occupiers saw a smaller excess of low-tier over
high-tier growth during the boom. As with house building, if the tiered pattern was driven by
an increase in speculation, wed expect the opposite pattern, namely a stronger tiered pattern in
places with more investors.
As with the housing supply case, an implicit assumption in this analysis is that investors are
buying the same types of houses in each metro area. Perhaps this does not hold, and where there
was a small increase in the number of investors they are primarily buying cheap houses, and where
there was a larger increase, they are primarily buying expensive houses. As with house building it
is hard to reconcile this explanation with the fact that most places with the strongest tiered pattern
had a very small increase in the proportion of investors.
We can test this alternative explanation using further HMDA data. Whilst the HMDA data does
22 It would of course be interesting to test this alternative hypothesis more directly. However, to my knowledge
the data to do so does not exist. HUD have microdata on construction during the boom years, including the square
footage of housing built. One could compare this with the average square footage of houses in the same areas.
Unfortunately, the smallest geographical level the data is available for is for the 9 census divisions, not the MSA
level. An alternative approach based on the change in the median number of rooms during the boom years in each
county was considered, but there is a lack of signicant variation in this over time (its generally within the estimated
margin of error).
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Figure 2.7: Tiered Measure and Increase in Non-Owner Occupiers in Boom
Figure 2.8: Income Tract and Nooc: Boom
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not record the purchase price of houses, it does record the median income of the neighbourhood it
is in relative to its MSA, and as there is a strong correlation between income and purchase price23 ,
neighbourhood income is a useful proxy for house value. To understand the measure, if the
number is 120% for a neighbourhood in San Francisco, this means that the median income of that
neighbourhood is 120% of the median income in the whole of San Francisco. Such a neighbourhood
thus has higher average income than the whole of San Francisco. For each MSA we calculate
the average neighbourhood to MSA income measure for non-owner-occupiers in 2006. In Figure
2.8 we plot this against the percentage point increase in non-owner-occupiers in each MSA from
1997-2006. The alternative explanation predicts a strong positive relationship between these two:
where investors were more prevalent, they were investing in relatively more expensive houses. The
chart shows a weak positive relationship that is not statistically signicant at standard condence
levels. Even if the positive relationship were statistically signicant, the predicted magnitude is
not economically signicant: if the increase in investors was 10 percentage points greater in a given
metro, the average neighbourhood to MSA income only increases by 5 percentage points. We
can thus reject the alternative explanation that the types of properties investors bought varied
signicantly between cities.
2.3.5 Relative Income Growth
An alternative explanation to the easing of non-price credit terms for the relative boom in low
tier housing is that income grew relatively more for low tier than high tier home-buyers. To
examine this we look at income growth over the housing boom for both groups of buyers. As
discussed in Section 2.2, we can proxy the income of those who did buy di¤erent tiers of houses
from HMDA data. We could do this every year but it is not the most appropriate measure as
it could reect a changing composition of those who buy, rather than a genuine change in income
of the would be buyers of each type of house within each metro. Instead, we take data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). This has data on
nominal income changes over time for all those in a city (not just home-buyers like HMDA) in 49
of our 52 MSAs at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.24 Within each metro area
we identify the low tier buyers with the 50th percentile group and the high tier buyers with the
90th percentile group with the following rationale.25 The US home-ownership rate is around 67%.
We assume that all owners are those above the 33rd income percentile, with higher earners buying
more expensive houses. With three equal sized tiers, the low tier buyers are between the 33rd and
56th income percentiles and the high tier buyers above the 78th income percentile. The median
low tier buyer is then at the 44.5th percentile group and the median high tier buyer at the 89th
percentile. Our identication of low tier buyers with the 50th percentile and high tier buyers with
the 90th percentile is thus reasonably accurate.
For each metro area we calculate the percentage growth in income for the 5 percentile groups
23This emerges from the American Housing Survey.
24There is no data in the period of interest for Gainesville, GA; Peabody, MA; Cambridge, MA.
25This is similar to the rationale in Mayer (1993).
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Figure 2.9: Tiered Measure and Relative Income Growth in Boom
from 1999 (the earliest available) to 2006.26 We then look at the percentage point di¤erence
between the two, i.e. low tier income growth-high tier income growth. The tiered pattern is
plotted against this in Figure 2.9. We see that unconditionally, there is a weak, statistically
insignicant, positive relationship between the two. The sign of the slope is intuitive enough: in
places in which the income growth of would-be low-tier buyers was relatively greater than for the
high-tier, the gap between low- and high-tier house price growth is greater. However, note that
in 44 of the 49 cities, income growth was lower for the low tier group. Thus, in all but 5 of the
metros, far from accounting for the tiered pattern, relative income growth actually goes against
it. In other words, had income growth over the boom been equal for would-be low and high tier
buyers, the di¤erence between low and high house price growth rates would have been greater.
2.4 Housing Boom: Results
In this section we run regressions linking the variation in low and high tier price growth during
the boom to credit easing whilst controlling for these and other variables. In Table 2.1 we present
summary statistics for the variables used in the regression.
Table 2.2 presents the results of regressing the di¤erence between low and high tier price growth
during the boom on a variety of explanatory variables. Throughout we drop the observations on Las
Vegas and Greeley, CO, the two outliers for house building, leaving us with 47 observations (this does
not signicantly a¤ect the regressions). The rst column presents the simple univariate regression
26A detailed description of how this was calculated is given in the appendix.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Boom Variables
Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Low Tier-High Tier Price Growth 97-06 (pp.) 55:14 50:35 40:82  17:37 166:32
Home Purchases Including Junior Lien 2006 (%) 31:60 31:58 9:33 9:30 51:90
Increase in LTI Ratio 97-06 0:83 0:86 0:28 0:14 1:35
Housing Building 97-06 as % of 2000 Stock 21:23 16:23 15:57 3:79 73:14
Increase in Non-Owner Occupiers (pp.) 8:03 6:70 4:71 1:35 22:01
Low Tier-High Tier Income Growth 99-06 (pp.)  4:13  3:48 3:68  13:16 3:64
Increase in Unemployment Rate 97-06 (pp.) 0:09 0:20 1:21  3:55 2:75
Immigration 2000-06 as % of 06 Population 4:02 3:91 2:09 1:21 11:28
Observations 49
of (2.1) on the credit easing proxy, showing the positive relationship between the two, signicant at
the 1% level.27 In the second column we add the three control variables discussed in the text, along
with two additional regressors; the increase in unemployment during the boom years and migration
from 2000-2006.28 The coe¢ cient on the credit easing proxy remains signicant at the 1% level,
and of similar magnitude. We note that house building, the increase in non-owner occupiers and
the relative income changes all have the same signs as they did unconditionally, pushing against the
tiered pattern, though none are signicant at the 10% condence level (though the house building
coe¢ cient almost is). The coe¢ cient on immigration is not statistically signicant, though the
increase in unemployment is, and is negative, indicating that in places in which unemployment
rose during the boom, low tier housing had relatively weaker price growth. The experience of
unemployment varied across metros, with unemployment rising during the boom in 27 of the 47
cities, and falling in the remaining 20. In the majority then, the change in unemployment does
not help explain the pattern of greater low tier growth, rather would predict greater price growth
for the high tier.
To interpret the results of this regression, we compute the estimated contribution of selected
variables to the tiered pattern. In the average city, low tier house prices grew by 55.1pp. more
than high tier prices during the boom. At the same time, in the average city, the stock of houses
built increased by 21.2%. With an estimated coe¢ cient of -1.08, house building is predicted to
result in the low tier growing by 22.9pp. less than the high tier during the boom. Similarly, for
the average city, the change in relative income is predicted to make the low tier grow 7.2pp. less,
whilst for the increase in unemployment its 1.2pp. less. These predictions thus go in the wrong
direction to explain the observed pattern. By contrast, credit easing is predicted to make low tier
prices grow 61.6pp. more than the high tier, which is reassuringly close to the 55pp. di¤erence
observed on average.
27Note that the estimated coe¢ cients di¤er from those on the graph in the text. This is due to the dropping of
Las Vegas and Greeley.
28Higher unemployment may primarily a¤ect potential low-tier buyers, as they will be in lower paying jobs which
may su¤er more during economic downturns, whilst higher immigration (from foreign countries) may primarily a¤ect
demand for low tier houses, if immigrants are poorer than the typical local resident. The unemployment data comes
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the migration data from the US Census Bureau.
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Table 2.2: Low Tier -High Tier Price Growth During Boom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Purchases With Junior Liens 2006 2:05 1:95
(3:70) (3:03)
Increase in LTI Ratio 1997-06 104:56 91:29
(7:04) (5:46)
House Building 1997-06  1:08  0:36
( 1:68) ( 0:54)
Increase in Non-Owner Occupiers 1997-06  1:00  0:97
( 0:47) ( 0:46)
Low-High Tier Income Growth 1999-06 1:75 0:36
(1:31) (0:31)
Increase in Unemployment 1997-2006  13:03  9:34
( 2:57) ( 1:68)
Immigration 2000-2006  1:85  3:04
( 0:59) ( 1:31)
R2 0:21 0:49 0:54 0:61
Observations 47 47 47 47
t-statistics in parentheses (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors used)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
The next two columns repeat the analysis using the change in the LTI ratio instead of the
credit easing proxy. The third column presents the univariate regression, with the fourth column
adding in the control variables. The estimated coe¢ cient on the LTI variable is similar across
both specications and signicant at the 1% condence level in both cases. The coe¢ cients on the
control variables retain their signs, but generally become smaller in absolute magnitude and less
signicant. The coe¢ cient on the LTI variable in column four predicts that in the average city, low
tier prices should grow by 76pp. more than high tier prices during the boom. It is again reassuring
that this is of comparable magnitude to the actual observed change.
In the previous chapter, we theoretically considered three possible explanations for the observed
pattern in tiered housing during the boom: an easing of non-price credit terms, an increase in buyer
optimism, and a fall in interest rates, concluding in favour of the rst explanation. The evidence
presented here rules out leading alternative explanations outside of the three considered, backing
up the results of the rst chapter, and presents evidence consistent with the prediction of the
theoretical model regarding the important role of the easing of non-price credit terms.
Of course, we have not shown that credit easing exogenously caused the changes in the tiered
pattern, merely an association between the two. As discussed in the rst chapter, many studies of
the housing boom have not managed to tackle the likely endogeneity between house prices and credit
easing during the boom, with both feeding o¤ each other. Endogeneity may also be an issue here,
though the exact mechanism would be di¤erent. Whereas in standard empirical housing papers,
the worry is that rising house prices cause a further easing of credit standards, here endogeneity
would arise if credit standards are eased more when the low tier grows relatively more than the
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high tier within a given metro. Its possible that a general link from aggregate house prices to
credit standards exits without a link from tiered house price changes to easing credit standards,
but we can not rule this out, and our results should be interpreted in light of that.
2.5 The Bust
We now turn to the housing bust as a second episode for testing the link between credit and relative
tiered prices. As with the boom, our approach is to compare variation in low and high tier price
growth across cities during the bust with variation in other variables. Specically, for each city we
calculate:
MB := (low tier % price growth 2006-11)  (high tier % price growth 2006-11) (2.2)
As discussed, 2006 is a good approximation for the peak of the housing boom for the vast ma-
jority of our cities. Similarly, 2011 provides a good approximation for the trough of the subsequent
bust in house prices, meaning (2.2) captures the relative price movements during the bust well.
We similarly calculate changes in the other economic variables from 2006 to 2011. We briey
discuss these variables and the unconditional relationships in the next section before turning to
econometric results.29
2.5.1 Tiered Pattern and Other Variables
There was a signicant tightening of mortgage credit during the housing bust (La Cava 2013). As
with the boom, we capture this with changes in the credit proxy and changes in the LTI ratio. The
proxy for this change in credit is the percentage point increase in the proportion of home purchase
loans including a junior lien, using HMDA data. The prevalence of junior mortgage liens decreased
dramatically during the housing bust, with the maximum proportion during the bust years being
5.1%, with the average just 1.4%, compared with an average of 31.6% in the peak in 2006. The
minimum value for our credit tightening proxy is -49.2pp. in Riverside, CA, where from a peak
of 51.9% of home purchases involving a junior lien in 2006, in 2011 only 2.7% of loans did. The
di¤erence in low and high tier price growth during the bust is plotted against the change in this
credit proxy in Figure 2.10, showing a statistically signicant positive relationship. Thus, low
tier housing did relatively worse than the high tier in places that experienced a greater tightening
in credit availability. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the previous chapter,
with the tightening of credit particularly a¤ecting the credit-constrained would-be low tier house
buyers.
The second measure of changes in credit is from changes in the LTI ratio, given in Figure 2.11.
In all but 9 of the 48 metros, the average LTI ratio decreased during the housing bust, with the
29 In this analysis we drop Cleveland as the data series nishes in 2008. This leaves us with observations on 48
metro areas.
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Figure 2.10: Tiered Measure and Credit Tightening: Bust
largest decrease in Phoenix, AZ, where the LTI ratio dropped 0.82 units from 2.95 in 2006 to
2.12 in 2011. As with the housing boom, we see that in the housing bust there is a statistically
signicant positive relationship between increase in the LTI ratio and the relative performance of
low tier prices: places with greater tightening saw the low tier prices do relatively worse than high
tier prices.
As with the housing boom, there could be confounding factors that account for these relation-
ships between relative prices and credit. We consider a few of these variables next.
In Figure 2.12 we plot the tiered pattern during the bust against the relative income growth
during the period, noting a statistically signicant positive relationship between the two. Thus,
as in the boom, places in which income growth was relatively greater for would-be low rather than
high tier buyers, low tier prices grew relatively more than high tier ones. Further, as with the
boom, in the vast majority of places (44 out of 48 here), low tier buyers had relatively lower income
growth than for the high tier. Whereas during the boom income pushed against low tier growth,
here it pushes in the same direction as it.
The bust in the US housing market was followed by a nancial crisis and a recession, and
reecting this, unemployment rose substantially in all 48 metros during the bust, from a minimum
increase of 2pp. in Manchester-Nashua, NH, to a maximum of 9.3pp. in Las Vegas, NV. As with
the boom, in Figure 2.13 we see a negative relationship between the two, with low tier housing
doing particularly bad in places with a large increase in unemployment. This may be because
greater unemployment particularly a¤ects the lower income workers-the natural buyers of low tier
houses. Or it may reect the local economy doing particularly badly in places in which the low
tier housing market had a particularly large crash.
In Figure 2.14 we plot the di¤erential low and high tier growth rates during the bust against
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Figure 2.11: Tiered Measure and LTI Tightening: Bust
Figure 2.12: Tiered Measure and Relative Income Growth: Bust
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Figure 2.13: Tiered Measure and Increase in Unemployment: Bust
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Bust Variables: 2006-11
Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Low Tier-High Tier Price Growth (pp.)  13:79  15:40 11:20  38:2 17:95
Increase in use of Junior Liens (pp.)  30:46  30:64 9:00  49:19  8:93
Increase in LTI ratio  0:22  0:24 0:22  0:82 0:18
Increase in Non-Owner Occupiers (pp.)  2:04  1:78 5:37  15:04 8:64
Low Tier-High Tier Income Growth (pp.)  3:68  3:63 2:30  7:97 2:21
Increase in Unemployment Rate (pp.) 4:83 4:57 1:68 2:00 9:30
Observations 48
house building during the boom. This relationship can be used as a further test of the role of house
building in generating the tiered pattern during the boom. If primarily high tier houses were built
during the boom, wed expect the low tier to do relatively better in the bust in places that had
more building during the boom (due to less excess supply). The gure shows there is essentially
no relationship between the two, with a p-value of 0.68. Further, if the two house-building outliers
of Las Vegas, NV and Greeley, CO are removed (where over 70% of each citys 2000 housing stock
was built during the boom), the p-value rises to 0.99.
A summary table of the variables used in the regressions is presented in Table 2.3.
2.5.2 The Bust: Results
Table 2.4 presents the results of regressing (2.2) on various explanatory variables.30 The rst
column shows that, without controlling for other variables, the coe¢ cient on the change in the
credit proxy is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. In column 2 we add in the
30As with the boom regressions, we drop the two house building outliers, Las Vegas and Greeley. This leaves us
with 46 observations.
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Figure 2.14: Tiered Measure During Bust and Building During Boom
other explanatory variables, and whilst the signicance of the credit proxy drops slightly, its still
signicant at the 5% level, and of comparable magnitude. The only other explanatory variable
thats statistically signicant is the relative income growth variable. Using the results from this
regression we can calculate the relative contributions of the two signicant explanatory variables.
In the average city, during the bust low tier prices fell 13.8pp. more than high tier prices. Further,
would-be low tier buyer income growth was on average -3.7pp. lower than for the high tier, so
combined with an estimated coe¢ cient of 1.93, low tier house prices would be predicted to fall by
7.1pp. more than high tier prices. The coe¢ cient on credit tightening predicts low tier prices to
fall by 13.1pp. more than high tier prices in the average city during the bust, close the observed
mean of 13.8pp. The third and fourth column repeat the regressions with the alternative measure
of the change in credit. In both cases, the coe¢ cient on the change in average LTI ratios is positive
and statistically signicant at the 1% level. As with the prior regressions, the only other signicant
explanatory variable is the relative income change variable. At the mean, the results in column 4
predict low tier prices to fall 5.6pp. and 4.7pp. more than high tier prices, for credit and income
respectively, during the bust.
In summary, from both sets of regression results, in places with greater credit easing during the
housing boom, low tier prices grew more than high tier prices to a greater extent, with low tier
prices crashing more during the bust where there was greater credit tightening. This is consistent
with the theory developed in the last chapter regarding the tiered price responses to a change in
non-price credit terms.
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Table 2.4: Low Tier-High Tier Price Growth During Bust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Increase in use of Junior Liens 2006-11 0:63 0:43
(3:66) (2:11)
Increase in LTI ratio 2006-11 32:73 25:43
(4:30) (4:15)
Low T-High T Price Growth 1997-06  0:00  0:01
( 0:06) ( 0:12)
House Building 1997-06 0:14 0:14
(0:82) (0:80)
Increase in Non-Owner Occupiers 2006-11 0:01  0:00
(0:04) ( 0:02)
Low-High Tier Income Growth 2006-11 1:93 1:28
(3:43) (2:15)
Increase in Unemployment 2006-11  0:65  1:37
( 0:59) ( 1:24)
R2 0:24 0:40 0:38 0:50
Observations 46 46 46 46
t-statistics in parentheses (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors used)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
2.6 Conclusion
Despite the huge amount of research into the recent US housing boom and bust, the exact causes
of it are still not well understood. An easing of non-price credit terms is generally thought to have
been a key culprit, but formal econometric attempts to establish this have not succeeded, giving
policy-makers less condence in the e¢ cacy of using macroprudential tools to attempt to dampen
future booms. A key technical di¢ culty is the likely endogeneity between the rise in house prices
and credit easing, with both likely feeding o¤ each other. Whilst there have been some papers to
approach this with instruments for credit changes (Adelino et al 2012, Favara and Imbs 2011), the
specic changes in credit regulations they examine account for less than 3pp. of house price growth
during the boom.
The last two chapters have tackled this problem in a new way using tiered housing data. In the
rst chapter we showed theoretically that if there had been no easing of credit standards during the
boom, and only either a fall in interest rates or optimism on the part of house-buyers, we would
observe high tier houses having had the greatest price growth during the boom. The fact that the
opposite happened in 51 of 52 metros studied suggests there was an easing of credit standards.
The work of this chapter complements this by addressing alternative explanations of the ob-
served tiered pattern beyond the three considered theoretically. These include an increase in the
proportion of houses bought by non-owner occupiers, di¤erential income growth, and changes in
housing supply. The empirical results show that these alternative explanations cannot account
for the observed pattern, instead predicting greater growth for high tier prices. Further, consistent
with the theory of the rst chapter, two separate measures of credit easing can, predicting the low
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tier to grow, respectively 62 and 76pp. more than the high tier in the average metro, compared
to the 55pp. observed in the data. Taken together, the results strongly suggest that the tiered
pattern observed could not have occurred without the easing of non-price credit terms. If correct,
this implies substantial e¤ectiveness for mortgage product regulation, such as LTV and LTI caps,
reducing low tier growth by at least 55pp. in the average city during the US boom (the reduction
in low tier price growth required for it to be less than high tier price growth).
This chapter also uncovered additional housing facts regarding tiered patterns during the boom
and bust and performed empirical analysis of the housing bust, nding credit tightening largely
responsible. I believe the use of tiered data can bring new insights to the housing market, and
in future work it would be interesting to extend the empirical work here with more detailed loan
level data. In particular, it would be interesting to use loan-level LTV data (instead of our credit
easing proxy) and mortgage interest rate data, which would allow further testing of the theoretical
predictions of the rst chapter. Further, with data on both LTV and LTI easing, we could test
which of the two contributed most to the tiered pattern during the boom, and thus which it would
be most e¤ective to target to attenuate future housing booms.
2.A Proof of Proposition 52
Here we prove the proposition linking the theoretical predictions of the model of Chapter 1 with
empirically observable implications.
Proof. From the tiered model we have dPLt (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From this it clearly follows that
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We now show that under both measures, the gap between the tiers increases the greater is the
credit easing.
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Where the last line follows as, 2 < 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> 1 (high tier prices are higher with looser
credit). This completes the proof for the L% H% measure, completing the proof.
2.B Tiered Housing Pictures
Source: S&P/Case-Shiller, Fiserv, Inc.
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2.C Variable Construction
The geographical regions covered by the house price data are based on MSA denitions after
denitional changes that were brought in in 2003. The key challenge when constructing the other
variables is to ensure a consistent geographical area is covered throughout time, so changes in the
variables over time reect genuine change, and not simply that the area covered has changed. For
many of our MSAs, the geographical area changes, and for example the Atlanta, GA (0520) MSA
pre- 2003 is not the same (although there is much overlap) as the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta,
GA (12060) MSA which was created in 2003.32 For the construction of variables covering the
housing boom, we compare their value in 1997 and in the peak of the boom in 2006.33 Except in
the case of relative income data where this was not possible, our approach for the construction of
32 Information on the MSA denitions comes from the Census Bureau.
33Geographical denitional changes did not a¤ect the construction of variables for the housing bust.
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Table 2.5: Facts About Tiered House Price Movements
Nominal Price Growth During Boom and Bust (%)
Boom: 1997-2006 Bust: 2006-2011
Metro Area Low T. High T. Agg. Low T. High T. Agg.
Tucson, AZ 139:13 124:68 126:88  55:31  36:87  42:79
Phoenix, AZ 190:80 166:73 168:86  67:57  49:32  55:32
Los Angeles, CA 324:38 214:22 258:40  54:70  28:80  40:41
Santa Ana, CA 315:30 224:49 253:59  42:73  29:99  34:87
San Diego, CA 303:38 197:91 231:69  46:77  30:77  37:32
Santa Rosa, CA 248:07 174:04 206:97  53:42  36:89  44:88
Oxnard, CA 287:28 192:97 227:17  47:92  34:11  40:10
San Jose, CA 237:57 149:60 183:46  46:20  19:53  31:32
Oakland, CA 312:45 166:10 212:91  62:27  29:76  43:59
Riverside, CA 376:75 210:44 262:75  66:36  49:01  55:48
San Francisco, CA 256:56 147:38 184:53  39:09  14:84  24:49
Sacramento, CA 274:05 174:92 208:06  63:17  45:48  51:92
Boulder, CO 72:71 90:08 84:59  4:59  4:88  2:93
Fort Collins, CO 71:55 59:11 62:42  1:64  3:89  2:72
Grand Junction, CO 130:01 95:37 103:33  17:74  18:34  17:39
Greeley, CO 66:22 51:33 54:97  19:98  14:25  14:92
Denver, CO 92:81 79:53 82:16  16:14  10:42  10:53
Colorado Springs, CO 71:81 63:58 64:15  14:56  14:34  13:39
Bridgeport, CT 166:72 120:47 128:63  31:08  15:26  17:84
Washington, DC 201:87 148:53 175:44  42:51  16:52  26:39
Palm Bay, FL 205:71 156:56 172:71  63:43  46:01  50:80
Fort Lauderdale, FL 257:80 182:55 204:26  64:02  42:34  48:37
Miami, FL 281:21 219:14 233:89  63:61  45:21  51:03
Orlando, FL 202:47 142:76 163:39  62:92  48:22  53:08
Tampa, FL 228:90 143:58 165:76  60:70  41:40  46:49
Gainesville, GA 73:21 63:76 65:00  51:69  27:83  30:62
Atlanta, GA 69:92 59:75 59:01  58:84  22:06  27:51
Chicago, IL 111:76 85:88 95:31  50:16  26:42  32:55
Peabody, MA 182:26 103:82 123:50  28:58  12:63  16:82
Cambridge, MA 162:48 99:59 117:38  20:53  6:15  10:01
Worcester, MA 165:95 106:60 123:31  32:22  17:40  21:81
Boston, MA 212:56 120:18 145:16  26:13  7:30  13:75
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Table 2.6: Facts About Tiered House Price Movements Cntd.
Nominal Price Growth During Boom and Bust (%)
Boom: 1997-2006 Bust: 2006-2011
Metro Area Low T. High T. Agg. Low T. High T. Agg.
Warren, MI 69:07 38:12 47:39  68:86  30:04  37:85
Minneapolis, MN- 154:44 97:59 113:29  50:65  28:15  34:21
Manchester, NH 206:33 107:28 136:62  23:51  21:88  24:00
Edison, NJ 210:81 136:42 162:64  29:47  17:67  23:01
Newark, NJ-PA 207:41 127:98 156:96  42:52  16:69  24:76
Rochester, NY 43:06 30:22 33:23 8:44  0:15 1:77
Binghamton, NY 80:75 70:45 72:71 15:18  2:77 2:58
New York, NY 223:79 143:76 173:46  32:43  16:98  23:41
Poughkeepsie, NY 244:52 117:82 152:77  29:01  26:09  27:90
Cincinnati, OH 61:26 42:31 45:93  19:43  13:54  14:28
Columbus, OH 56:94 39:05 42:06  21:68  10:68  11:77
Cleveland, OH 59:75 32:64 38:69 NA31 NA NA
Portland, OR 119:61 91:70 97:39  27:86  23:43  24:70
Philadelphia, PA 128:81 114:64 118:82  14:85  11:40  11:47
Providence, RI 204:35 135:73 153:53  32:46  20:46  24:67
Charleston, SC 156:04 141:46 135:14  23:29  20:38  19:73
Tacoma, WA 136:82 97:42 108:93  34:59  28:99  30:59
Seattle, WA 152:30 126:95 135:73  35:25  19:89  23:79
Milwaukee, WI 122:15 71:80 84:15  31:67  11:57  14:75
Las Vegas, NV 170:28 150:43 156:89  67:80  54:99  59:21
Mean 175:04 120:18 136:85  38:01  23:96  28:18
Median 168:50 120:33 135:44  35:25  20:46  24:76
Standard Dev. 83:30 51:17 61:75 20:61 13:66 15:73
Min 43:06 30:22 33:23  68:86  54:99  59:21
Max 376:75 224:49 262:75 15:18  0:15 2:58
Source: Fiserv, Inc., S&P/Case-Shiller
150
Table 2.7: Income Estimates for Low and High Tier Buyers
Est. Median Income
1997 ($000s)
Metro Area Low T. Middle T. High T.
Tucson, AZ 27 45 81
Phoenix, AZ 30 50 92
Los Angeles, CA 39 63 123
Santa Ana, CA 45 76 133
San Diego, CA 38 64 115
Santa Rosa, CA 42 67 112
Oxnard, CA 45 72 120
San Jose, CA 55 87 144
Oakland, CA 45 76 128
Riverside, CA 29 49 86
San Francisco, CA 58 97 180
Sacramento, CA 32 55 96
Boulder, CO 39 65 115
Fort Collins, CO 32 53 89
Grand Junction, CO 24 39 67
Greeley, CO 29 44 74
Denver, CO 32 53 91
Colorado Springs, CO 31 49 80
Bridgeport, CT 47 86 174
Washington, DC 40 67 115
Palm Bay, FL 26 45 79
Fort Lauderdale, FL 31 52 94
Miami, FL 31 49 96
Orlando, FL 28 48 86
Tampa, FL 26 45 84
Gainesville, GA 28 44 78
Atlanta, GA 33 54 95
Chicago, IL 36 57 97
Peabody, MA 37 62 110
Cambridge, MA 42 71 121
Worcester, MA 35 55 90
Boston, MA 38 63 111
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Table 2.8: Income Estimates for Low and High Tier Buyers Cntd.
Est. Median Income
1997 ($000s)
Metro Area Low T. Middle T. High T.
Warren, MI 35 57 95
Minneapolis, MN- 31 51 86
Manchester, NH 37 57 92
Edison, NJ 41 67 115
Newark, NJ-PA 43 71 125
Rochester, NY 30 49 82
Binghamton, NY 24 41 71
New York, NY 38 65 114
Poughkeepsie, NY 39 60 95
Cincinnati, OH 28 48 81
Columbus, OH 30 50 84
Cleveland, OH 30 49 83
Portland, OR 35 55 93
Philadelphia, PA 30 56 102
Providence, RI 30 49 82
Charleston, SC 25 46 91
Tacoma, WA 33 51 80
Seattle, WA 38 60 100
Milwaukee, WI 34 55 88
Las Vegas, NV 31 49 86
Mean 34:85 57:46 100:03
Median 33:00 55:00 93:50
Standard Dev. 7:33 12:20 23:12
Min 24 39 67
Max 58 97 180
Source: HMDA data
The estimated median income for the low, middle and high tiers are
given by the 16.7th, 50th and 83.3 percentiles of income for those
approved for a mortgage for home purchase in 1997 in each city.
This is based on the assumption of a 1-1 mapping between
income and the price of the house purchased in each metro.
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these has been to construct 2006-consistent geographical areas in 1997 based on county-level data.
For the relative income data we aimed for as close a geographical match as possible, discussed in
detail below.
2.C.1 HMDA Variables
For the HMDA data in 2006 we compiled data for 49 MSAs. In 1997 we used MSA level data
for the MSAs such as Phoenix, AZ where the denition was the same in 1997 and 2006. For the
remainder, we constructed 1997 data based on the counties that comprised the 2006 MSA denition.
For example the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA (41940) MSA in 2006 contains San Benito
and Santa Clara counties. The San Jose, CA (7400) MSA that prevailed in 1997 only contains
Santa Clara county. Thus, to ensure consistency over time, in 1997 we constructed HMDA data
for San Benito and Santa Clara counties.
In both years we restricted attention to loans which were for home purchase (not for home
improvement or renancing), were for one to four-family housing (excluding manufactured housing),
and where the loan was actually originated. For the 2006 data the non-owner occupancy percentage
was based on rst lien loans. This allows better comparison with 1997, where the use of junior liens
was limited. First lien data was also used when looking at the census tract income that non-owner
occupiers bought houses in in 2006.
Our measure of the LTI ratio is based on the buyers between the 33 and 66th percentiles of the
income distribution of those that bought in each year, giving a measure of the average LTI ratio in
each city in each year. In 2006 and 2011 we calculate the LTI ratio based on rst and junior liens
combined, thus arriving at a combined LTI ratio. On the assumption that everyone buying a house
using a junior lien also has a senior lien on the same property, we calculate the average LTI ratio
as the sum of the value of senior and junior liens divided by the total income of those associated
with rst liens only. This avoids double counting, which would lead to an articially low LTI ratio.
In 1997 we do not have separate data for senior and junior liens, so calculate the LTI ratio in the
same way based on all home purchase loans. As the use of junior liens was limited during this
period, this calculation should be reasonably accurate. To calculate the average low tier and high
tier LTI ratios for Table 1.3 we separately calculate LTI ratios based on the di¤erent percentiles of
income. The high tier LTI ratio is based on the buyers in the 67-100 income percentile bracket,
whilst the low tier is based on the 0-33 bracket, for those with an income of at least $10,000 (this
reduces the impact of outliers and buyers who may not be low tier buyers, having low income but
high wealth. An example of this would be retirees).
2.C.2 Relative Income Changes
The construction of this variable for 1999-2006 presented two challenges.34 The rst was the MSA
denitional changes in 2003, and the fact that the data was only available at the MSA (and not also
34These challenges were not an issue for constructing this variable during the bust years.
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the county) level. The second was that the percentile data was only available across all industries
for each MSA from 2001 onwards. Percentile data for each major industry group was however
available from 1999 onwards.
Regarding the rst challenge, we tried to match the geographical regions at the MSA level
as well as possible. In 26 of the 49 cases, the MSA denition did not change. In many other
cases, whilst there was a change, it was small so should not lead to much error. For example, the
Atlanta MSA in 2001 was a subset of the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta MSA used for data in
2006, however, based on county-level data, in 2001, its population was 96.8% of the larger area so
any errors should be small. A few remaining cases required something di¤erent. For example,
the Edison-New Brunswick, NJ MSA from 2006 is comprised of Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean
and Somerset counties from New Jersey. In 2001 this is split between Monmouth-Ocean, NJ and
Middlesex-Somerest-Hunterdon, NJ, the latter also containing Hunterdon county. Thus, combining
the two MSAs in 2001 leads to a superset of the 2006 denition, but a close match with 105.6%
of the population in 2001. To combine the wage data in 2001, we weight the date for each MSA
based on the population of each in the 2006-consistent geographical denition. Using the process,
we obtain wage growth rates from 2001-2006 for our 49 MSAs for each of the 10th,25th,50th,75th
and 90th income percentiles.
To extend the series back to 1999, we require estimates from 1999-2001. Fortunately there
were no geographical changes during this period, however wage percentile data was only available
for 23 broad industry groups, and not for an average across all industries (it is available for both
from 2001 onwards). Our approach here was to combine these industry groups together with
weighting based on the number of people employed in each group in each MSA. We did this for
both years to estimate income percentiles for the whole MSA, then took the change in these from
1999-2001. In many MSAs however, the 90th percentile data was censored for Management and
Legal Occupations. To ensure consistency across MSAs we removed these occupations from the
estimated data for both 1999 and 2001. Having obtained estimated percentile growth rates at the
MSA level for 1999-2001 and 2001-2006, we combined them to produce an estimate from 1999-2006.
The estimated data from 2001-2006 is likely of higher quality, and a as a robustness check we re-ran
our regressions using this income measure instead. This produced similar results to those in the
text.
2.C.3 Other Variables
The remaining variables could all be constructed at the county level, so ensuring geographical
consistency over time was straightforward. Two variables deserve further mention. To calculate
the migration data, we rst took the estimated number of residents living in the MSA that were
foreign born and moved in the year 2000 or later. We then expressed this as a percentage of the
population in 2006. For the house permit data, we focused on permits issued for single-family
house building as our price series are for single-family housing. As a robustness check we also ran
the regressions looking at permits issued for all residential house building during the period and
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obtained similar results.
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Chapter 3
Credit Traps1
This paper develops an overlapping generations model with credit frictions that can be used to
analyse macroprudential policy options for avoiding and getting out of a credit trap. The model
has multiple steady states, and following a negative shock to the nancial sector, it can fall into a
credit trap: a steady state featuring permanently low output, bank lending, and nancial sector
net worth. In our model, banksborrowing constraints depend on the health of the whole banking
system. A large, unexpected negative shock to banksnet worth makes them unable to nance
productive investments, which in turn causes the economy to become stuck in a badequilibrium
characterised by low investment and output. We show that a leverage ratio cap can reduce the risk
of an economy falling into a credit trap, and that countercyclical leverage policy can facilitate a
faster recovery after small negative shocks. Once the economy is in a credit trap, however, relaxing
the leverage ratio cap is ine¤ective. Here we consider the unconventional credit policies of direct
lending, discount window lending, and an equity injection, obtaining clear predictions about their
relative e¢ cacy.
3.1 Introduction
After an initial recovery following the nancial crisis, the UK economy has stagnated, with little
growth in real GDP in recent years, leaving the economy far below its pre-crisis growth trend (Figure
3.1). At the same time, there has been a signicant contraction in lending to the real economy, with
net nominal lending to non-nancial rms shrinking every year since the crisis (Figure 3.2). This
occurrence of a stagnant economy with signicantly reduced lending has led to real concerns that
the recovery could be signicantly di¤erent this time, due to the possibility of a credit trap. In this
paper we explore the idea that the recovery from a nancial crisis can be signicantly di¤erent from
a normal recovery.2 In particular, we consider how credit traps can arise; that is, how an economy
1This chapter is joint work with Benjamin Nelson and Misa Tanaka from the Bank of England.
2As Claessens et al (2008) show, with data on 21 OECD countries from 1960-2007, recessions tend to be longer
and deeper when accompanied by a credit crunch.
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Figure 3.1: UK Real GDP: Actual vs Prior Trend
can become trapped" following a nancial crisis, with a prolonged period of weak levels of real
activity, low bank lending, and an impaired nancial sector. This characterizes the experience
of Japan during its lost decade, and economists are beginning to worry that several advanced
economies today could be in a similar situation for years to come.3
The possibility of a credit trap can have profound implications for policy. If the economy can
become trapped at a permanently lower level of output following a nancial crisis, there is a strong
argument for using macroprudential policy to attenuate nancial booms, limiting the fallout from
any bust. Further, the appropriate policy response to a recession could be signicantly di¤erent
if it was or wasnt preceded by a severe nancial crisis. Policies that work well in the former case
could be ine¤ective if the economy has fallen into a trap. Here instead a range of unconventional
policies may be required.
The main contribution of this paper is to build a tractable overlapping generation model (OLG)
with credit frictions that can be used to analyse policy options for avoiding and getting out of
credit traps. In our model, banks combine their net worth and deposits collected from households
to invest in one of two projects. The amount that households are willing to deposit at banks
depends both on the type of project that banks invest in as well as on the amount of equity capital
that banks hold. There are two types of projects that banks can invest in Project A (corporate
loans) and Project B (government bonds) these di¤er in their returns and their pledgeability
to creditors. Project A yields higher total returns than Project B, but creditorswillingness to
lend against Project A depends positively on the health of the banking system. This is because
the liquidation value of Project A depends on the nancial capacity of other banks to purchase and
3We have, of course, not established that the UK and other countries are currently in a credit trap. Rather, here
we consider the appropriateness of various policy tools if credit traps do occur.
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Figure 3.2: Collaspe in UK Credit
operate it, as they are the only institutions capable of managing productive projects. Project B
yields lower total returns, but creditorswillingness to nance it is independent of nancial system
health. Project B could be interpreted as liquid assetsor government bonds that could be easily
seized by creditors so that their returns cannot easily be diverted by bankers.
We show that such an economy is characterized by two steady states: goodand bad. When
banksnet worth is high, creditors are willing to nance productive projects, such that the economy
converges to a good equilibrium characterized by high levels of output, physical capital, bank net
worth and credit. However, a large, unexpected negative shock to banksnet worth can make
them unable to nance productive investments. As poorly capitalized banks are forced by their
creditors to invest in low-return, highly pledgeable assets, the economy can become stuck in a bad
equilibrium a credit trap characterized by low output, low physical capital, impaired bank net
worth, and low credit. Thus, even a temporary negative shock to banksnet worth can permanently
trap the economy in a bad equilibrium.
Given the negative consequences of a credit trap, we rst consider what policy can do to mitigate
the chances of the economy falling into one. We focus on regulatory leverage policy, a new macro-
prudential policy tool that many central banks are due to implement in future.4 This tool leans
against nancial booms, reducing permitted leverage, rst with the goal of reducing the magnitude
of the boom, and second with the aim of making banks more resilient in the face of a negative shock.
One key challenge for the policymaker using this tool is the trade-o¤ between output and resilience.
Reducing leverage may increase the resilience of the nancial sector at the cost of reducing the level
of output, with less lending to the real economy. We show in our model that under mild conditions
there is no trade-o¤ between the two for low levels of leverage: resilience against falling into the
4The UK government intends to provide the Bank of England with a time-varying leverage ratio tool some time
from 2018 onwards (Bank of England 2013).
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trap is maximised for a level of leverage greater than 1. The intuition for this is that at very low
levels of leverage the nancial system will be repressed with low banking system net worth, bringing
banks closer to the critical level of net worth at which their creditors force them to invest in the
highly pledgeable unproductive sector. A greater weight will then be placed upon improving the
health of the banking system by allowing more leverage. Any policymaker focused on both output
and resilience will then allow at least a moderate level of leverage.
It has been suggested that, in addition to leaning against banking sector booms, leverage limits
should be relaxed after a crash, enabling a swifter recovery of the nancial sector and the economy.
In other words, leverage policy should be countercyclical. We show that the level of leverage
that maximises the resilience of the economy is countercyclical, being higher following a negative
shock. Further following a small shock (one for which the economy does not fall into the
trap), countercyclical leverage policy facilitates a faster recovery. This contrasts with the response
following a largeshock when the economy has fallen into a trap: here relaxing the leverage ratio
will be ine¤ective and alternative policies are needed.
Relaxing the leverage cap does not help the economy escape a credit trap, as the leverage on
loans to the unproductive sector must be greater in the trap (this has to be the case for it to
o¤er higher returns). Consequently, relaxing permitted leverage either does nothing (if it does
not bind), or only makes unproductive loans relatively more attractive. A necessary condition for
escaping the trap must then involve changing the relative attractiveness of investment in the two
sectors, directing investment back to the productive sector A. This could be achieved by altering
macroprudential sectoral risk weights, either making sector A more attractive or sector B less
attractive. Whilst necessary, this may or may not be su¢ cient for the economy to recover to its
good steady state. This depends on the strength of the feedback between the health of the economy
and the banking system. Intuitively, the question is, if we force banks to make loans to the real
economy, will the economy recover su¢ ciently, paying high returns to the banking system, helping
them repair their balance sheets and extending more loans? If there is a virtuous feedback loop
here, addressing the sectoral misallocation will be enough. Otherwise, if this is not su¢ cient, more
direct action needs to be taken.
Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) we consider three unconventional credit policies for use in
extreme times: direct lending by the government, discount window lending, and an equity injection.
Whilst these policies can be used to escape a credit trap, they can also help the economy recover
faster in the absence of a trap, so the results we present on these apply in a more general setting.5
In our simple setting we obtain clear predictions about the e¢ cacy of the policies in raising future
output. When the three policies face similar ine¢ ciency costs of implementation, direct lending
is more e¤ective than discount window lending, as the funds raised are directly invested in the
economy, and dont have to pass through the banking system, subject to its friction. Further,
an equity injection is more e¤ective than direct lending, as it has the additional positive e¤ect of
5These policies are not a panacea and we show that all three can be e¤ective when the banking system is weak,
but detrimental, reducing future output, when the banking system is healthy. Thus, the model still captures genuine
trade-o¤s when these policies are available.
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relaxing the nancial friction, crowding in depositors. By contrast, if discount window lending is
inherently more e¢ cient than the other two policies (with a lower ine¢ ciency cost of implementation
reecting this being closer to the core activities of a central bank), it can be more e¤ective following
a milder banking crisis, but less e¤ective than the other two policies in a severe banking collapse.
These results are helpful for thinking about the most appropriate policy to employ following a
nancial crisis.
This paper is most closely related to Matsuyama (2007), which develops an OLG model with
multiple steady states. As in Matsuyama (2007), a credit trap in our model arises when invest-
ment starts owing into unproductive projects. Our paper introduces a banking sector into this
framework to enable us to analyse the impact of regulatory policies in avoiding and getting out of
a credit trap. This paper is also related to a range of papers that use Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models to analyse the macroeconomic impact of bank capital requirements
and leverage ratio caps, such as Angelini et al (2011) and Christensen et al. (2011). Contrary to
these papers, which focus on the role of capital requirements in reducing macroeconomic volatility,
our work can explicitly analyse the role that these policy instruments could play in preventing
nancial crises. Our paper is also related to Benmelech and Bergman (2012), which considers the
role of monetary policy in stimulating the economy out of a credit trap. Contrary to their analysis,
our focus is on macroprudential policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the OLG model and shows
why multiple steady states may arise. Section 3.3 shows how an unexpected hit to bank capital
induced by a negative productivity shock can tip the economy into a credit trap. Section 3.4
considers policy options for avoiding credit traps, with Section 3.5 considering the e¤ectiveness of
relaxing leverage limits and altering sectoral risk weights for getting out of a trap. Section 3.6
considers the use of unconventional credit policies, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Introduction
We begin with a brief overview of the model, with a timeline of the economy shown in Figure 3.3.
Mass 1 of identical households are born each period. The life of a household is divided into two
subperiods: 1, when the household is young (in period t), and 2, when the household is old (in period
t+1). In the rst period, each younghousehold receives a labour endowment of unity, which they
sell in return for wage income wt denominated in nal consumption goods. At the end of period
1, fraction 1    of households become depositors, whilst exogenous fraction  become bankers.
Thus, households divide (1  )wt between period 1 consumption and saving via deposits, whereas
nt  wt is used as bank equity to start a household bank. Banks combine their net worth with
deposits, taking these output goods and invest in one of two physical capital producing technologies.
In the following period, the physical capital the banks hold is combined with the labour endowment
of the next generation, producing output goods. Out of their return on this, the banks pay back
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Figure 3.3: Timeline of events: benchmark model
depositors before returning any prots lump-sum to the now old households and then die. The new
young workers, having received their wage, form their own set of banks (which have no direct link
to the previous banks) and the whole process repeats itself.
The use of the OLG structure is done purely for tractability, helping us obtain analytic expres-
sions throughout. It should not be inferred that the intended model period is thus a generation,
or around 30 years as is often the case with OLG models. Whilst we do not match this model to
the data, the intended model length throughout is of the order of one year.
In the following sub-sections we describe the model in more detail.
3.2.2 Households
Lifetime utility for households is given by
Ut = log c1t +  log c2t; (3.1)
where   1 is the households discount factor, and cjt denotes consumption in period j = 1; 2 of
the household born in period t. The budget constraints facing the household in each period are
c1t + di;t  (1  )wt; c2t  Rdi;t+1di;t + Vi;t+1 (3.2)
where di;t denotes the households saving via bank deposits, Rdi;t+1denotes gross return on deposits
6 ,
and Vi;t+1 denotes the prots obtained from banking activities. The subscript i = fA;Bg represents
the sector the bank invests in.
6The rate paid on deposits, Rdi;t+1, is agreed at time t; and is not state contingent. This rate is dated t + 1 to
reect when deposits are repaid.
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3.2.3 Banking and output production
Part of the households initial wealth is used to capitalise a bank, with net worth nt  wt. The
bank takes deposits from households and combines these with its own net worth to invest in capital-
producing projects. There are two sectors that banks can invest in, i = fA;Bg. The di¤erences
between these two sectors are described in detail in section 3.2.4 below.
If the bank invests in sector i, then its balance sheet reads:
si;t = nt + di;t;
where si;t denotes the stock of loans in sector i. If nt + di;t nal goods are invested in period t,
physical capital produced in period t+ 1 is
kt+1 = xi (nt + di;t) ; i = fA;Bg; (3.3)
where xi denotes the productivity of investment in sector i:7
In each period, nal goods are produced using physical capital (nanced by bank capital and
deposits of the old) and labour provided by the young, using Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy:
yt+1 = f(lt+1; kt+1) = l
1 
t+1 k

t+1 = k

t+1; 0   < 1: (3.4)
Labour and capital receive their respective marginal product, such that the wage of the youngis
given by wt+1 = (1   )kt+1 while the marginal product of capital is given by f 0(kt+1) = k 1t+1 .
This implies that the banks net worth in t+ 1 is given by:
nt+1 = (1  )kt+1 (3.5)
For simplicity, we assume that capital stock depreciates fully after each period. Thus, banks
investment in sector i at t generates gross return Ri;t+1in terms of nal output. This is expected
to yield:
Ri;t+1 = xif
0(kt+1) = xik 1t+1
Bank prots from investing in sector i, after repaying depositors gross interest rate Rdi;t+1, are
expected to be:
Vi;t+1 = Ri;t+1 (nt + di;t) Rdi;t+1di;t (3.6)
3.2.4 Credit market frictions
Banks are subject to a borrowing constraint that depends on the project they invest in. This
constraint arises because bankers can abscond with a fraction 1   i of gross project returns (e.g.
by paying an unwarranted bonus to themselves). As a result, only a fraction i of the gross return
from investment in sector i is pledgeable to creditors. Thus, i can be interpreted as a borrowing
7There is only one type of capital, but there are two technologies, A and B, for producing it from output goods.
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constraint imposed by the market (with lower i implying a tighter borrowing constraint). In
order to guarantee repayment of Rdi;t+1di;t, depositors demand that:
iRi;t+1 (nt + di;t)  Rdi;t+1di;t (3.7)
so that total pledgeable returns are at least the amount owed to depositors.
We can also interpret i in terms of leverage. Leverage L (mark-to-market) is given by
L =
Ri;t+1 (nt + di;t)
Ri;t+1 (nt + di;t) Rdi;t+1di;t
From (3.7),
L  Ri;t+1 (nt + di;t)
Ri;t+1 (nt + di;t) (1  i) =
1
1  i (3.8)
Thus, 11 i is the maximum leverage the market allows when investing in sector i:
The two sectors that banks can invest in di¤er in both their productivity and pledgeability. We
make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Project Productivity): xA > xB8
Assumption 2 (Pledgeability): A = A(nt); 0A > 0, limnt!1 A = A, limnt!0 A = A,
0B(nt) = 0; B > A.
Assumption 1 says that for a given input of nal goods in period t, more capital is produced in
period t + 1 from investing in sector A than in sector B. Sector A is thus more productive than
sector B. We interpret sector A as loans to the real economy, whilst sector B is an alternative
use of bank funds such as holding cash, or buying government bonds, which does not contribute as
much to output.
Assumption 2 says that whilst the market leverage limit permitted in sector B is independent
of the net worth of the banking system, the leverage permitted when investing in sector A increases
in banking system health. This matches the procyclicality of bank leverage documented by Adrian
et al (2012). Our intuition for this assumption is based on an application of Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) to the nancial system, as has recently also been done by Benmelech & Bergman (2012).
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show how the collateral value of assets can depend on the health of
the entire sector being invested in. For example, a loan to an airline company may be secured
against an aircraft to protect the creditor in case of default. If default occurs, the creditor seizes
the aircraft and sells it to cover their losses. The key insight is that the natural buyers of the
aircraft are other airline companies, so the price it will sell for depends on the health of the whole
airline industry. In particular, the collateral value of the aircraft would be greatly di¤erent if
8 In this section, deposit contracts are signed with both banks and depositors assuming that xA and xB are
non-stochastic. We will later consider in Section 3.3 what happens when the economy is hit by an unanticipated
productivity shock.
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the airline defaults because of an idiosyncratic shock or an aggregate negative shock to the airline
industry. We apply this insight to nancial assets: the natural buyers of these are other banks,
so their collateral value depends on the health of the banking system. When the banking system
is healthy and liquid, these assets can be resold easily, allowing banks to take on greater leverage,
with the reverse being true in a crisis. Investments in sector A depend on the health of the banking
system in this way.9 By contrast, the low return sector B assets are una¤ected by the health of
the banking system. This will be true for highly liquid claims such as cash or government bonds,
which have many buyers beyond the banking system.
In summary, loans to sector A are more productive but sensitive to the state of the nancial
system, whilst loans to sector B are less productive but resilient to nancial system stress.10
3.2.5 Credit market equilibrium
To derive the credit market equilibrium, we rst derive households supply of deposits. The
households optimal consumption-saving decision is governed by the rst-order condition using
(3.1) and (3.2):

Rdi;t+1
c2t
=
1
c1t
;
which gives optimal saving:
dt =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
Vi;t+1
Rdi;t+1
: (3.9)
The following series of events determines deposit market equilibrium. First, depositors deter-
mine their deposit supply schedules, taking into account the di¤erent levels of pledgeable returns
delivered by banksportfolios. Second, conditional on these deposit supply schedules, banks choose
their debt issuance and total asset holdings.
We begin with the banks optimisation problem. For banks that invest in sector i, raising
deposits to invest will be protable as long as
Ri;t+1 > R
d
i;t+1 (3.10)
When this is the case, the bank will borrow up until the point at which its borrowing constraint
(3.7) binds. Thus, banksdemand for funds for investing in sector i are given by:
di;t =
iRi;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1nt (3.11)
9An example would be Mortgage Backed Securities. The collateral value of these will be greater when the natural
buyers of these-nancial institutions-are healthy.
10For our results its not crucial that 0B(nt) = 0: Rather, all we need is 
0
A(nt) > 
0
B(nt) so the leverage permitted
for investing in sector A is more sensitive to the health of the banking system.
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Using (3.6) and (3.11), bank prot from investing in sector i is given by:
Vi;t+1 =
 
Ri;t+1  Rdi;t+1

di;t +Ri;t+1nt
=
1  i
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
Rdi;t+1Ri;t+1nt: (3.12)
These prots are returned lump-sum to households at the end of their life. Thus, the deposit supply
of households to sector i is given by:
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
1  i
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
Ri;t+1nt: (3.13)
In equilibrium, deposit supply (3.13) must equal deposit demand (3.11). Using nt = wt, the
equilibrium deposit quantity when the bank invests in sector i is given by:
di;t =
i
1 + i
(1  )wt (3.14)
Equilibrium deposits are increasing in i, the pledgeability of bank returns. Alleviating the nancial
friction then raises the amount of saving and investment in the economy. The reason for this is
that a greater degree of asset pledgeability reassures bank creditors that their deposits will be safe,
so they are willing to expand the equilibrium quantity of saving.
Given (3.3) and (3.14), capital produced at t+ 1 when the bank invests in sector i is given by:
ki;t+1 = xi

wt +
i
1 + i
(1  )wt

= xi
(1  )kt
1 + i
( + i) (3.15)
In equilibrium, the (expected) return on the banks investment in sector i is given by (see
appendix):
Ri;t+1 =
xih
+i
1+i
(1  )kt
i1  (3.16)
Using the equilibrium condition that deposit supply (3.13) must equal deposit demand (3.11),
the equilibrium deposit rate11 , given that the bank invests in sector i, is given by:
Rdi;t+1 = iRi;t+1
 
1 +
nt
di;t
!
=
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
(3.17)
11We note again that the deposit rate is agreed at time t and is not state contingent.
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The deposit rate paid within a given sector is increasing in the productivity of that sector and its
pledgeability. The pledgeability and productivity of the two sectors are thus crucial in determining
the sector that yields better returns for depositors. It can be shown that condition (3.10) holds in
equilibrium as long as:
(1  ) >  + i (3.18)
In what follows, we assume that (3.18) holds for both sectors. It can also been shown that
Rdi;t+1 > iR

i;t+1 so the nancial constraint binds in equilibrium.
3.2.6 Credit trap
Given that the borrowing constraint (3.7) binds on banks in equilibrium and banks compete with
each other for deposits, households choose to deposit in banks that can o¤er the highest deposit
rate. In the appendix, we show that, given (3.18) holds, banks will invest in the sector that pays
depositors the highest return as long as:
xB(1  B) + B
1 + B
 xA (3.19)
Given this, from (3.17), RdA;t+1 < R
d
B;t+1 and banks invest in sector B when:
xA(1 + A(n))
1 ( + A(n))  xB(1 + B)1 ( + B)
From this it follows that investment will ow to sector B when the net worth of the banking system
falls below a critical threshold.
Lemma 54 Under conditions 3.18 and 3.19, banks invest in sector B at time t when nt < ~n, where
~n solves:
xA(1 + A(~n))
1 ( + A(~n)) = xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B) (3.20)
Thus, banks invest in sector A and the credit market equilibrium is given by (dA;t; R
d
A:t+1) when
nt > ~n; they invest in sector B and the credit market equilibrium is given by (dB:t; R
d
B:t+1) when
nt  ~n.
Proof. See appendix.
This establishes that the supply of deposits to the banking system features a critical threshold
at which point creditors become unwilling and banks become unable to invest in one sector in
favour of another. This is because as banking sector net worth changes, so does the pledgeability of
investments in sector A relative to sector B. In particular, for su¢ ciently low banking system net
worth, the pledgeability of A is so low that creditors demand that investment be channelled to B:
Put di¤erently, because sector A is inherently more productive than sector B; a higher return on
sector B can only arise if there is more investment in it, i.e. a greater amount of leverage. When
the banking system is healthy, high leverage when investing in sector A will be possible, making it
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more attractive. Only when the banking system-and then this leverage-is su¢ ciently impaired will
investment ow to B: We next establish the aggregate consequences of these investment decisions.
In the general equilibrium of the economy, the capital stock evolves according to equation (3.3)
in the absence of any unanticipated shock to the capital producing technology. Using equilibrium
deposits and bank capital, the law of motion for physical capital can be expressed as:
kt+1 = xi
 + i
1 + i
(1  ) kt ; i = fA;Bg: (3.21)
Tomorrows capital stock will be larger the less severe the nancial friction (higher i), and larger
bank capital is relative to debt (higher ). We can then establish:
Lemma 55 Conditional on bank portfolios being allocated to Sector B, the steady state level of
physical capital converges to
kB =

xB
 + B
1 + B
(1  )
 1
1 
(3.22)
which is the unique, stable steady state under investment in sector B. Conditional on bank
portfolios being allocated to sector A, the steady states of A (possibly multiple) satisfy
kA =

xA
 + A ((1  )kA )
1 + A ((1  )kA )
(1  )
 1
1 
(3.23)
Proof. It is straightforward to demonstrate this using (3.5) and (3.21).
In the following analysis we assume that sector A has a unique stable steady state when nt > ~n:12
This ensures that if banks invest in sector A, the economy will converge to kA absent any shocks.
We now establish a proposition under which the economy features a credit trap.
Proposition 56 Suppose (3.18), (3.19) hold. Let nB be the steady state level of banker net worth
when sector B is invested in:
nB = (1  )

xB
 + B
1 + B
(1  )
 
1 
Then the economy features a credit trap if
xA(1 + A(n

B))
1 ( + A(nB))
 < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B) (3.24)
Proof. Given (3.18) and (3.19), banks invest in sector B rather than sector A i¤
xA(1 + A(nt))
1 ( + A(nt)) < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
Hence if
xA(1 + A(n

B))
1 ( + A(nB))
 < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
12The shape of A(nt) is relevant for this. Conditions on this functional form can be given that ensure there is a
unique stable state in sector A for nt > en:
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate law of motion in an economy with a credit trap
the banks will invest in sector B when nt = nB : i.e. they invest in sector B in the steady state of
B: This is thus a steady state equilibrium: without shocks the economy will invest in sector B for
the rest of time, so is stuck in a credit trap.
An economy with a credit trap is shown in Figure 3.4.13 The critical value of banking system
net worth at which investment ows to A is given by en: Above this level of banking system health,
the economy invests exclusively in sector A, and the economy converges to the goodsteady state
(nA), featuring high levels of capital, output and income. If the banking system is su¢ ciently
impaired with nt < en; sector B is invested in, and the economy converges to the badsteady state
(nB), featuring low levels of capital, output and bank lending. This is indeed a steady state when
banks invest in sector B when nt = nB , for which we require n

B < en; which is ensured by (3.24).
When the banking system is healthy, the collateral value of nancial assets is high, allowing
banks high leverage when investing in sector A, making it more attractive than sector B (by
allowing them to pay higher returns to depositors). A is productive and so delivers high returns
ensuring high banking system net worth in the next period, which keeps investment owing to A.
Conversely, when the nancial system is severely impaired, sector B is more attractive than sector
13Note that there will always be a jump in the law of motion at en: To see this, at the trap threshold, the return
paid on deposits in A and B is the same, so after rearranging
xA

 + A(en)
1 + A(en)

= xB

 + B
1 + B
  1 + B
1 + A(en)

> xB

 + B
1 + B

The last part follows as we must have B > A(en); given xA > xB : Applying (3.21) its clear that at en; kt+1 (and
so nt+1) is greater when A is invested in.
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A due to the low leverage permitted on nancial assets. Crucially, because the banks invest in the
unproductive sector B, bank net worth remains low in future periods, keeping them investing in
B.
As the economy enters the credit trap there is a discrete decrease in the gross rate of return banks
receive on their investments, Ri;t+1; as they switch from investing in the productive sector A to the
unproductive sector B: Recall their return from investing in sector i is given by Ri;t+1 = xik
 1
t+1 :
Whilst the decrease in output14 the economy experiences as investment is switched to sector B
decreases kt+1; pushing up the return, this e¤ect is dominated by the reduction in productivity,
xi:
15 By contrast, there is no change in the interest rate paid on deposits as the credit trap is
entered. This is because at the trap threshold, en; the deposit rate is the same regardless of the
sector the banks invest in (as given by (3.20)). Thus, on entering the credit trap, the spread
between Ri;t+1 and Rdi;t+1 narrows.
3.3 A Financial Crisis
We now illustrate how a large negative shock to banksnet worth can send the economy from the
good to the bad steady state. A revised timeline for the economy is shown is Figure 3.5.
Suppose that in period t, the economy is in the good equilibrium in which banks invest in
sector A. Suppose that, after deposits have been collected and investment in sector A is made,
an unexpected negative productivity shock hits at the start of period t + 1, such that the realised
productivity, x^A, is less than what was initially expected: x^A < xA, where x^A 2 [xA; xA]. Given
the realised shock, the actual capital produced is less than the initially expected amount (3.3), and
is given by:
k^t+1 = x^A
 
nt + d

A;t

This implies that bankers will default on deposits at the end of period t + 1 if left to themselves,
14See footnote 13 above.
15Formally we can write
Ri;t+1 =
xih
+i
1+i
(1  )kt
i1  = xi (1 + i)1 ( + i)( + i)((1  )kt )1 
Thus, at the trap threshold en; RB;t+1(en) < RA;t+1(en) i¤
xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
( + B)((1  )kt )1 
<
xA(1 + A(en))1 ( + A(en))
( + A(en))((1  )kt )1 
Applying (3.20) this holds i¤
1
( + B)
<
1
( + A(en))
This follows as given (3.20) and xA > xB we must have A(en) < B :
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Figure 3.5: Timeline of events: case of nancial shock
since (3.7) no longer holds under the realised return
R^A;t+1 =
x^Ah
+A(nt)
1+A(nt)
(1  )kt
i1  < RA;t+1
When deposit contracts were signed, households did not think bank asset returns RA;t+1 were
stochastic.16 When asset returns are at the level households expected, banks have exactly17 the
required level of pledgeable assets to repay depositors fully. However, following the reduction in
the value of their assets, banks no longer have enough pledgeable assets to do this and (3.7) is
violated. Realising this, depositors will withdraw their funds until (3.7) holds again, as we discuss
in the next sub-section.
Intuitively, following the shock, the value of the banksassets has dropped, but their liabilities
(what they promised to depositors) are unchanged. Without an adjustment to their balance sheet,
their leverage will then increase. However, at the expected level of asset returns, (3.8) holds
with equality and bank leverage is just low enough that they can pledge the required amount to
depositors. Thus, following the negative shock, bank leverage is too high to fully repay depositors.
3.3.1 Depositor run and asset liquidation
Realising that they will not be repaid fully if they wait till the end of period t + 1, depositors
withdraw their funds, forcing partial liquidation of the project, by seizing capital kLt+1  k^t+1 from
banks at the start of t+ 1. Here we are simply capturing the idea that following a negative shock
16See footnote 8.
17Given our assumption (3.18), the pledgeability constraint (3.7) binds.
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to asset values, deleveraging is required to bring leverage back to its original level. Unlike the
standard output-producing technology (3.4), the interim liquidation technology uses only capital
to produce output: oldhouseholds (depositors) seize physical capital from banks before banks can
use it to produce nal output, but since oldhouseholds do not have labour endowment, they use
their own unproductive cottagetechnology to turn the capital seized from banks into nal output
goods. The liquidation technology has the following form:
y^Lt+1 = L(k^t+1; k
L
t+1) (3.25)
where kLt+1 is the amount of capital being liquidated by the depositors and L(k^t+1; 0) = 0. We
allow that the technology may depend on the aggregate amount of capital in the economy, k^t+1.
The aggregate output produced after the negative productivity shock and liquidation, y^t+1, is given
by the sum of the output produced by oldhouseholds using liquidation technology (3.25), y^Lt+1,
and the output produced by bankers with the remaining capital using the standard technology
(3.4), y^Pt+1:
y^t+1 = y^
P
t+1 + y^
L
t+1 = (k^t+1   kLt+1) + L(k^t+1; kLt+1)
Once the unexpected productivity shock is realised, depositors will withdraw capital from the
bank and invest the proceeds into the liquidation technology until bank leverage falls to the point
where they can credibly promise to repay the remaining deposit liabilities. Thus, the equilibrium
liquidation kLt+1 following a negative shock x^A is given by the solution to the following equality:
RdA;t+1d

A;t   L(k^t+1; kLt+1) = A(nt)(k^t+1   kLt+1)
The above expression can be rewritten as:
A(nt)(kt+1)
   L(k^t+1; kLt+1) = A(nt)(k^t+1   kLt+1) (3.26)
where kt+1 is the level of capital that was expected to be produced before the shock took place
(given by (3.21), where xi = xA).
3.3.2 Benchmark case
Consider now a benchmark case in which the total nal output available for consumption of the
oldis invariant to the size of liquidation, kLt+1.
18 It can be shown that the liquidation technology
that ensures this has the following form (see appendix):
L(k^t+1; k
L
t+1) = k^

t+1   (k^t+1   kLt+1) (3.27)
18Alternatively we can interpret this as the absence of resale costs: under this specication, the current banks
prots are invariant to the amount of deleveraging done. The benchmark case then provides a conservative estimate
of the damage done to the economy by deleveraging.
171
Note that even in this benchmark case, liquidation by the olddepositors imposes costs on the
young, who faces lower wages as they have less physical capital to work with and hence see their
marginal product of labour reduced:
w^t+1 = (1  )y^Pt+1 = (1  )(k^t+1   kLt+1)
This in turn implies that liquidation by the olddepositors also reduces bank capital in the next
period:
n^t+1 = (1  )y^Pt+1 = (1  )(k^t+1   kLt+1) (3.28)
Thus, in this benchmark case, the burden of liquidation by the old is imposed entirely on the
youngand the subsequent generations, who need to work with less capital and thus face lower
wages and consumption. Thus, liquidation gives rise to negative intergenerational externalities.
Substituting (3.27) into (3.26), we can derive the equilibrium output produced using the stan-
dard technology:
y^Pt+1 = (k^t+1   kLt+1) =
k^t+1   A(nt)(kt+1)
(1  A(nt))
From (3.21), we know that k^t+1 = x^A
+i
1+i
(1  ) kt , so that
y^Pt+1 =
(bxA   A(nt)xA)
(1  A(nt))

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
(1  )kt

(3.29)
Clearly, y^Pt+1 < yt+1, where yt+1(given by (3.4)) is the level of output that was originally expected
before the negative productivity shock took place.
A crucial question is whether an economy falls into a credit trap following a negative productivity
shock. We know from Lemma 54 that this crucially depends on the size of the reduction in bank
capital following the shock. Specically, if bank capital only experiences a relatively small shock,
such that n^t+1 remains above ~n (given by (3.20)), then the economy converges back to the good
steady state kA following a one-o¤ negative productivity shock. However, if the shock to bank
capital is su¢ ciently large such that n^t+1  ~n, then the economy will converge to the credit trap
equilibrium and remain stuck at kB . In the next section we consider what leverage policy can do
to help banks avoid falling into credit traps.
3.4 Policy Options To Avoid Credit Traps
3.4.1 Leverage ratio cap
We consider how a leverage ratio cap could be set to reduce the probability of the economy falling
into a credit trap. Consider a leverage ratio cap, r19 , which limits the amount of bank borrowing
19 In equilibrium bank leverage = 1
1  ; so by choosing , the regulator also chooses the banking leverage ratio.
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as follows:
rRi;t+1 (nt + di;t)  Rdi;t+1di;t
Assume that the economy at t starts with physical capital kt > ~k20 , such that banks invest in sector
A. Suppose that the regulator imposes a leverage cap, r < A(nA), where n

A is the level of bank
capital in a goodsteady state. We assume that the regulatory leverage ratio does not bind on
sector B: r > B . This ensures that the leverage requirement does not alter the threshold ~n for
bank capital below which the economy falls into a credit trap.
Dene xTA(r) to be the threshold productivity realisation that results in banks investing in
sector B next period, sending the economy into a credit trap. This threshold is a function of the
regulatory leverage ratio cap (see appendix for derivation):
xTA(r) :=
24rxA + en(1  r)
(1  )
h
+r
1+r
(1  )kt
i
35 1 (3.30)
The economy falls into a credit trap whenever x^A  xTA(r). Thus, xTA(r) is a measure of the
resilience of the nancial system: the lower xTA(r), the more resilient the nancial system, in the
sense that the economy avoids the credit trap for a larger range of low productivity realisations.
It can be shown that, under certain conditions, xTA(r) is U-shaped, reaching its minimum at
r = ^ 2 (0; 1). This is demonstrated in Figure 3.6. Formally, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 57 Suppose
(1  )xA

 + 
1 + 
(1  )kt

> en
And
xA <
en
(1  )((1  )kt )

(1  ) + 
1+

Where en is given by (3.20)
Then
9b 2 (0; 1) : dxTA(r)
dr
8><>:
< 0 for r 2 [0; b)
= 0 for r = b
> 0 for r 2 (b; 1]
9>=>;
Further, b is unique and xTA(r) reaches a unique minimum at r = b
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 58 The rst condition states that when there are no shocks (bxA = xA) and r = 1;
the economy avoids the credit trap. The second condition ensures that dx
T
A(0)
dr
< 0; that is, when
r = 0; increasing leverage increases resilience.
20ek corresponds to en; the threshold above which banks invest in sector A: Specically, en = (1  )ek:
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Figure 3.6: Resilience and leverage: the scale e¤ect and the liquidation e¤ect
The U-shape reects the two opposing e¤ects of leverage on resilience. On the one hand, for
any productivity realisation x^A, more capital is produced at t+1 the higher leverage was at t (r is
high). This puts the economy farther away from the credit trap threshold ~k; increasing resilience
(scale e¤ect). On the other hand, for any given negative shock to asset returns, the reduction in
net worth is greater when leverage is high. Thus, depositors liquidate a greater proportion of the
capital produced following the shock at t + 1 the greater leverage at t. This makes it more likely
that the economy falls into a credit trap, reducing resilience (liquidation e¤ect). When leverage
is low (r < ^), the scale e¤ect dominates, and allowing banks to increase leverage will increase
resilience. Over this range, there is no trade-o¤ between expected output and resilience: increasing
leverage increases both. However, when leverage is high (r > ^), the liquidation e¤ect dominates,
and allowing banks to increase leverage will reduce resilience. Under the conditions given, ^ > 0;
implying that the leverage ratio that maximises resilience is greater than 1. Due to the scale e¤ect,
even a policy-maker who focused only on the resilience of the nancial system would allow some
leverage.
It is interesting to examine how the desirability of leverage policy varies with the state of the
economy. First, it is clear that following a small negative shock to the nancial system, the economy
will recover to its steady state faster if leverage policy is relaxed (it can then be tightened again
once the steady state is reached). This is because doing so allows more deposits to ow into the
banking system, raising the amount of investment and future output. It may be thought that this
comes at the cost of lowering resilience, by letting weaker banks take on higher leverage. However,
the proposition below shows that, on the contrary, the leverage ratio that maximises resilience is
countercyclical.
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Proposition 59 Suppose the conditions of Proposition (57) hold.
Then
db
dkt
< 0
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition shows that when the state of the economy becomes worse-a decrease in kt-the
r that maximises resilience increases. Thus, the policy-maker who only cares about resilience
would allow greater leverage in a downturn. This is because the scale e¤ect becomes relatively
more important when kt is lower. With nt closer to the trap threshold en; it is desirable to allow
more investment to help banks improve their balance sheets. Thus, if a policymaker cared only
about resilience, they would conduct counter-cyclical leverage policy.
3.4.2 Summary of Policies for Avoiding the Trap
In summary, leverage policy can be e¤ective in reducing the chance of the economy falling into a
credit trap. In particular, if the privately determined leverage ratio is greater than b; resilience
could be improved by implementing this as a leverage cap (and in this case it would bind too).
After a small negative shock that does not result in the economy falling into the trap, and at which
the original leverage ratio still binds, relaxing the leverage limit would be desirable. Doing so helps
the economy recover faster and will increase the economys resilience against falling into the trap
following a further negative shock.
3.5 Policies to Get Out of the Credit Trap
We now consider what policy can do to get the economy out of a trap, rst showing that counter-
cyclical leverage policy will be ine¤ective, in contrast to the case of a small shock.
3.5.1 Relaxing the leverage ratio cap
Proposition 60 Suppose (3.18), (3.19) hold. Suppose with regulatory leverage ratio r in place
the economy is stuck investing in sector B: Then relaxing r will not help the economy escape from
the credit trap.
Proof. Given (3.18) and (3.19), banks invest in sector B rather than sector A i¤
xA(1 + A(nt))
1 ( + A(nt)) < xB(1 + )
1 ( + ) (3.31)
Where  = minfr; Bg: As were in the trap, with banks investing in sector B; (3.31) must
hold. As xA > xB ; it must be that  > A(nt): In other words, permitted leverage when investing
in B must exceed permitted leverage when investing in A. If r  B ; the regulator permits higher
leverage than the market, thus relaxing the regulatory constraint will not alter equilibrium. If
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B > r; the regulatory constraint binds, and relaxing it permits higher leverage in B: But this
only enhances the attractiveness of investing in B rather then A: Thus, in both cases, relaxing r
will not direct investment towards A:
The logic of the proof is intuitive. As sector A is inherently more productive, a higher rate on
deposits can only be paid when investing in B (making it more attractive) if the volume of lending
in B is greater. Thus, with policy in place, more leverage is possible in sector B than in A; and
relaxing the policy constraint either has no e¤ect (if not binding) or allows an even greater volume
of investment in B; thereby making it more attractive. Neither of these help with reallocation
towards the more productive sector.
Thus, whilst countercyclical leverage policy can be benecial in facilitating recovery after a
small shock, it is not helpful if the shock is su¢ ciently large to result in a credit trap.
3.5.2 Policies that change the relative attractiveness of A and B
We now consider policies that can direct investment to sector A: In a credit trap, banks invest in
sector B rather than sector A with the following inequality holding:
xA(1 + A(nt))
1 ( + A(nt)) < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
As the economy features a credit trap, when this holds, banks will invest in B forevermore and nt
will converge to nB : Thus, a necessary condition for getting the economy out of the credit trap is to
redirect investment to sector A: One way of doing this is by altering the regulatory risk weight on
each sector, a macroprudential tool that some central banks will have in the future. In particular,
suppose sectoral risk weights AA(nt), BB are in place. Then, as the economy is in a credit
trap in this position:
xA(1 + AA(nt))
1 ( + AA(nt)) < xB(1 + BB)
1 ( + BB)
By changing these risk weights, say relaxing the risk weight on A (increasing A) the critical net
worth threshold required for investment in A decreases. If this decrease is su¢ cient, investment
will be directed towards A:21
This is only a necessary condition, and we must consider when it is also su¢ cient for the economy
to escape the credit trap. The key to this is whether the law of motion for sector A has multiple
positive steady states. Until now, all we have assumed about sector A is that it has a unique
steady state above the trap threshold en: Here we consider the law of motion for the whole of sector
A: Figure 3.7 shows an example in which A; considered in isolation, has a unique positive steady
state.
Following the negative shock, the net worth of the banking system is given by n0. As this is
21Under the interpretation of sector A being real economy lending and sector B being government bonds, quanti-
tative easing has a similar e¤ect, by altering the relative attractiveness of the two.
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Figure 3.7: Unique steady state conditional on investing in sector A
less than the critical threshold en; the economy invests in sector B: Following policy action such
as the change in sectoral risk weights, the critical net worth threshold decreases to en0 : This is less
than n0 so the economy invests in A: Because A has a unique positive steady state, the economy
converges to the good equilibrium, nA: Thus, under these circumstances the policy is su¢ cient to
lift the economy out of the credit trap.
3.5.3 Credit trap in sector A alone
An alternative case is shown in Figure 3.8. Here sector A has multiple positive steady states. As
in the prior case, the policy action decreases en to en0 resulting in investment owing to sector A:
However, there is no virtuous feedback loop between the real economy and the nancial sector, and
the economy will not recover to nA: Rather, nt will decrease, and left alone the economy would
converge to nA : In fact, as drawn, after a few periods nt < en0 and the economy will start investing
in sector B again.
Form of A(nt)
To understand how sector A can have multiple positive steady states, as shown in Figure 3.8, we
need to consider the shape of A(nt): Our key assumption throughout has been that banking sector
leverage is higher when the banking system is healthier: 0A(nt) > 0: However, several paths for
A(nt) can match this broad pattern. It may be that the leverage permitted increases in nt at a
decreasing rate, or it may be that leverage is relatively unresponsive to banking system health until
some minimum level is reached, after which it becomes very responsive, increasing at a high rate.
This latter case may be due to increasing returns to scale for the banking system as a whole, over
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Figure 3.8: Multiple steady states conditional on investing in sector A
some critical range.
We now introduce a parsimonious functional form to illustrate how a convexity can be generated
in the law of motion for sector A.
Lemma 61 Let
A(nt) :=
 
A   A
 nt
nt + c

+ A
Where ; c > 0 and A > A:
Then
lim
nt!0
A(nt) = A
lim
nt!1
A(nt) = A
0A(nt) > 0

00
A(nt) > 0 i¤ n

t < c
(   1)
(1 + )
The lemma shows that A(nt) is always increasing in banker net worth, hits its upper and lower
values for very low and very high net worth, and may or may not have a convex region depending
on the size of : On the point regarding convexity, if  < 1 then 
00
A(nt) < 0 8nt  0: Whilst if
 > 1; then 
00
A(nt) > 0 for nt 2

0;

c ( 1)(1+)
 1


: In this case, A has a convex region for small
nt and is concave thereafter. This functional form is thus very general and captures a wide range
of possible shapes for A(nt): A selection of these and how they vary with  is shown in Figure
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Figure 3.9: Functional Form for A(nt)
3.9.22 We see that for low  the function is concave throughout, whilst when  > 1, the function
has a convex region followed by a concave one.
The convexity in A(nt) is the key to the potential convexity in kAt+1: Indeed, it can be shown
that if  is su¢ ciently large, then kAt+1(kt) will have a convex region. This is quite intuitive as when
 ! 1, A(nt) tends to a step function where at a crucial tipping point of banking system net
worth, the leverage the private sector permits jumps from A to A: Then, at this tipping point,
there will be a large increase in the deposits taken, and so also the amount of capital produced in
the next period.
Credit trap in sector A alone: summary
The credit trap in this model is based on banks having two sectors to invest in and only relies on
0A(nt) > 0: Further properties of A(nt) beyond this are important when considering whether
addressing sector misallocation will be su¢ cient to escape a credit trap. Policies that shift the
relative demand between investment in sector A and B will be enough if sector A has a unique
positive steady state. Intuitively, the di¤erence turns on whether when in a credit trap the economy
would recover to the good steady state nA if investment was channelled to the productive sector.
This depends on whether lending to the real economy is su¢ cient to repair the banksbalance sheets,
leading to a virtuous feedback loop between nt and A(nt): If it is, and we simply have sectoral
misallocation, policies that alter the relative attractiveness of the two sectors will be su¢ cient.
However, if it is not, di¤erent policies are needed, and we consider these next.
22 In the picture we have set A = 0:7; A = 0:3 and c = 5:
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3.6 Unconventional Credit Policies
In this section we suppose another policy has been successful in directing investment to sector A
(such as sectoral risk weights). However, there is a credit trap in sector A alone, so alternative
policies are required.23 Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) we consider three unconventional
credit policies: direct lending by the government; discount window lending; an equity injection to
the banking system. All three policies were employed during the nancial crisis in the US.
The governments source of funding in each case is provided by issuing government bonds, which
are perfect substitutes for bank deposits, paying the same return. Thus with dg;t government bonds
issued, the household supply of funds for deposits is given by
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   (1  xg)
1 + 
Vi;t+1
Rdi;t+1
  dg;t (3.32)
where xg 2 [0; 1] represents the equity stake in banks following any equity injection (xg = 0
if there is no equity injection). We note how this this contrasts to (3.9), the case of no policy
intervention.
In each case we assume the total extent of implementation of policy j is given by
(1 +  j)sj;t = dg;t  Rdt dg;t 1 +Rjsg;t 1
where  j > 0 represents the governments ine¢ ciency cost of implementing the policy, Rdt dg;t 1
is the total paid out on government bonds issued in the previous period and Rjsg;t 1 is the return
made on implementing the policy in the previous period. For simplicity we assume that the
government has no outstanding debt, and did not conduct any policies previously, reducing the
budget constraint to
sj;t =
dg;t
(1 +  j)
(3.33)
Equation (3.33) demonstrates clearly the impact of the ine¢ ciency cost of policy: the greater
 j; the less policy can be implemented for a given amount of bonds raised.
We now consider implementing each policy separately.
3.6.1 Direct lending
In the case of direct lending, the funds the government raised are invested directly into sector A;
contributing directly to the capital stock in the following period:
kt+1 = xA(nt + dA;t) + xA(sg;t) (3.34)
The amount of output goods the government invests in capital production, sg;t; augments the
23Alternatively, if there is no credit trap in sector A alone, these policies could still be benecial in speeding up the
recovery of the economy back to the high output steady state. Thus, nothing in this section relies on any assumption
about A beyond 0A(nt) > 0:
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amount invested by the banking sector, nt + dA;t: However, the supply of deposits, dA;t is a¤ected
by the amount of government bonds issued, from (3.32). Following similar analysis to the basic
model, it can be shown that the equilibrium amount of deposits supplied is given by
dA;t =
A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
(1  )wt   dg;t (1 + )A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
(3.35)
Comparing (3.35) with (3.14) we see that government policy partially crowds-out private sector
deposits (i.e. deposits are smaller with policy). However, the crowding out is not full, and the
total level of bonds and deposits rises following policy:
dg;t

1  (1 + )A(nt)
1 + A(nt)

= dg;t

1  A(nt)
1 + A(nt)

> 0
It is then possible for policy to have a positive e¤ect on kt+1: To derive the law of motion for
kt+1 we combine (3.34) and (3.35), giving (where g is in the ine¢ ciency cost on direct government
lending)
kt+1 = xA

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)

(1  )kt

+ xAdg;t

1
1 + g
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

(3.36)
This clearly reduces to (3.21), the case of no policy, when dg;t = 0: The second term represents
the impact of policy, and direct lending is e¤ective in raising kt+1 i¤
g <
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
(3.37)
We note that the RHS of (3.37) is decreasing in A : that is, direct lending is less e¤ective when
the economy is healthier. Further, it can be that direct lending raises kt+1 following a nancial
crash, but lowers it when the economy is healthy. These points are formalised in the following
lemma.
Lemma 62 The e¤ectiveness of the direct lending policy is decreasing in A :
@2kt+1
@A@dg;t
< 0
Further, suppose that following a crash, nt = n whilst, in the high output steady state of A
nt = n > n: Suppose further that
1  A(n)
(1 + )A (n)
< g <
1  A (n)
(1 + )A (n)
Then policy is e¤ective in raising kt+1 following the crash, but lowers kt+1 in the good state of
the economy.
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Proof. The proof of the second part is immediate from (3.37). For the rst part note that
@kt+1
@dg;t
= xA

1
1 + g
  A(1 + )
1 + A

So
@2kt+1
@A@dg;t
=  xA(1 + )
"
(1 + A)  A
(1 + A)
2
#
=  xA
"
1
(1 + A)
2
#
< 0
Direct government intervention always has a positive impact on the economy, directly boosting
kt+1: However, this is paid for by government bonds which displace deposits (the crowding out
e¤ect), thereby reducing the funding of the banking system. This is further exacerbated by the
ine¢ ciency of government intervention (g > 0), requiring extra deposits to be displaced to fund a
given level of direct lending. When the nancial friction is very tight (A low), deposit levels are
low,24 thus there is little deposit displacement, and the direct benet to the economy outweighs
the negative crowding out e¤ect. However, with a looser nancial friction in a stronger economy
(A high), deposit levels are higher and there is a larger cost from crowding out, which can then
dominate the positive e¤ect (whose size does not change with A): Thus, whilst this policy may be
very e¤ective during a credit-crunch, it does not follow that it would be desirable for the government
to entirely displace the nancial sector when the economy is healthy.
3.6.2 Discount window lending
With discount window lending, the government instead lends directly to the banks. Let mt be the
amount lent to the banking sector (where with ine¢ ciency cost of m we have mt =
dg;t
(1+m)
); then
the total amount invested by the banking system is given by
nt + dA;t +mt
The government can enforce repayment of its loans better than the private sector, so with
discount window lending mt; the credit constraint facing the banking system is
ARA;t+1(nt + dA;t + !mt)  RdA;t+1dA;t +Rmt+1mt
where Rmt+1 is the rate paid on loans from the government and ! > 1 represents the greater
pledgeability of these loans. The total pledgeability on loans from the government is given by
!A; which as it is a fraction of total project returns must be less than 1: A parsimonious way of
24Without policy, dA;t =
A(1 )wt
1+A
; which is increasing in A:
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ensuring this is given by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) where the fraction that banks can divert on
government lending is given by
(1  A)(1  !g)
with the constant !g 2 (0; 1): When !g = 0 the government faces no advantage over the private
sector in the pledgeability of its loans, whilst when !g = 1; the lending friction disappears. With
this specication, ! = 1 + !g(1 A)A > 1:
Faced with two sources of funding (deposits and the discount window), the banks have a portfolio
choice problem, maximising prots
VA;t+1 = RA;t+1(nt + dA;t + !mt) RdA;t+1dA;t  Rmt+1mt
subject to the leverage constraint.25 As greater leverage is allowed when borrowing from the
government, an endogenous penalty wedgearises on discount window lending: Rmt+1 > R
d
t+1: The
result of this portfolio choice problem is the following wedge (with a positive spread when ! > 1):
Rmt+1 = R
d
A;t+1 +
A
1  A (!   1)(RA;t+1  R
d
A;t+1)
Following the usual steps in the derivation, equilibrium deposit supply is given by
dA;t =
A
1 + A
(1  )wt   (1  A)
1 + A
 
RA;t+1  Rmt+1
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
!
mt   A(1 + )dg;t
1 + A
We show in the appendix that in equilibrium
RA;t+1 Rmt+1
RA;t+1 RdA;t+1
= 1 !A1 A ; which combined with the
law of motion for capital kt+1 = xA(nt + dA;t +mt) gives
kt+1 = xA

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)

(1  )kt

+ xAdg;t
241  (1  !g)

1 A(nt)
1+A(nt)

1 + m
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)
35
(3.38)
Policy is e¤ective in raising kt+1 in the discount window case i¤
m < wg
(1  A(nt))
A(nt)(1 + )
(3.39)
On comparison with (3.37) we see that this expression is identical, save for the ine¢ ciency m
and the wg 2 (0; 1) term, representing the nancial friction the central bank faces on its loans to
the private sector banks. Thus, as with direct lending, policy can be e¤ective when the economy
is in a credit crunch, but ine¤ective, reducing kt+1 when the economy is healthy. We introduce an
analogous lemma.
25A full derivation of the results in this section is given in the appendix.
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Lemma 63 The e¤ectiveness of the policy is decreasing in A :
@2kt+1
@A@dg;t
< 0
Further, suppose that following a crash, nt = n whilst, in the high output steady state of A
nt = n > n: Suppose further that
!g
(1  A(n))
(1 + )A (n)
< m < !g
(1  A (n))
(1 + )A (n)
Then policy is e¤ective in raising kt+1 following the crash, but lowers kt+1 in the good state of
the economy.
Proof. The proof of the second part is immediate from (3.39). For the rst part note that
@kt+1
@dg;t
= xA
241  (1  !g)

(1 A)
(1+A)

(1 + m)
  A(1 + )
1 + A
35
So
@2kt+1
@A@dg;t
= xA
"
  (1  !g)
(1 + m)
"
  (1 + A)  (1  A)
(1 + A)
2
#
  (1 + ) [(1 + A)  A]
(1 + A)
2
#
= xA
"
  (1  !g)
(1 + m)
"
 (1 + )
(1 + A)
2
#
  [(1 + )]
(1 + A)
2
#
= xA
"
(1 + )
(1 + A)
2

(1  !g)
(1 + m)
  1
#
< 0
As with the direct lending case, when A is higher, the negative e¤ect on kt+1 from the crowding
out of deposits becomes larger, as there are more deposits made when the banking system is
healthier. With direct lending, the positive e¤ect on kt+1 is independent of A: In contrast, with
discount window lending, the positive e¤ect of policy is increasing in the health of the banking
system (this can be seen in the rst term of the derivative in the proof immediately above). Unlike
direct lending, which goes round the banking system, discount window lending has to work through
the banking system. Thus, after a severe banking crisis, o¤ering a di¤erent source of funding to
the banking system wont be very e¤ective as the banks ability to borrow is still greatly reduced.26
As the banks recover, the benet from an alternative source of funding that allows greater leverage
increases. Whilst-as with the lemma-the overall e¤ectiveness of policy decreases as the economy
recovers, this decrease can happen at a di¤erent rate as with the direct lending policy. As we
26 In terms of the model, this is because the central bank has a constant relative advantage over the private sector
in preventing loans being diverted. Thus, when the leverage prevailing in the banking sector is low, the leverage the
central bank permits will also be low.
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discuss below, this can result in direct lending being more e¤ective following a very severe credit
crunch, with discount window lending more e¤ective for less severe crunches.
We now outline the equity injection policy before comparing all three.
3.6.3 Equity injection
As with the other two policy interventions, the government is ine¢ cient in investing in equity, with
ine¢ ciency cost gn: Thus the amount of equity invested by the government, ng;t; satises:
ng;t =
dg;t
(1 + gn)
In return for its injection of resources to the banking system, the government obtains xg fraction
of bank equity, resulting in optimal household saving given by (3.32), with the equity share in the
bank watered down to 1  xg.
An important direct e¤ect of the equity injection is that A increases, as it is now based on
nt + ng;t : A(nt + ng;t) > A(nt): This direct e¤ect of the injection, else equal, crowds in
depositors: with the nancial friction reduced, theyre willing to supply more deposits, raising
investment. This goes beyond the usual e¤ect of higher net worth allowing more deposits to be
taken at a xed leverage ratio. Here the leverage ratio rises too.
To derive the equilibrium law of motion for kt+1 we follow the usual steps, rst determining
equilibrium in the banking sector.
With the banksleverage constraints binding they demand deposits,27
di;t =
[A (nt + ng;t)]RA;t+1(nt + ng;t)
RdA;t+1   [A (nt + ng;t)]RA;t+1
Bank prots are given by28
VA;t+1 =
 
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1

dA;t +RA;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Following the usual steps, equilibrium deposits are given by
dA;t =
A(nt + ng;t)(1  )wt
(1 + )A(nt + ng;t) + (1  xg)(1  A(nt + ng;t))
  (1 + )dg;tA(nt + ng;t)
(1 + )A(nt + ng;t) + (1  xg)(1  A(nt + ng;t))
The impact of policy is notably di¤erent to the other two cases, as the rise in A; and watering
down through the xg > 0 term, increase the fraction of rst period resources saved,
(1 )wt
1+ :
29
27Note the addition of ng;t which is absent with no equity injection.
28The formula (save for the ng;t term) for bank prots has not changed here. What changes is who gets them
once theyre realised, i.e. the split between households and the government.
29The watering down e¤ect occurs through households anticipating lower dividends from the banking system when
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To determine the overall e¤ect of an equity injection on dA;t we need to specify the relationship
between xg and ng;t, i.e. how much equity the government gets in return for its investment. We
consider the general form weighting the bankscurrent equity with factor  > 0 :
xg =
ng;t
ng;t + nt
(3.40)
We give two examples of .
1. The fraction the government obtains reects the bankscurrent equity ( = 1)
xg =
ngt
ngt + nt
For example, if the net worth of the banking system at time t is 100 units of output goods and
the government invests 100 units, it ends up owning half the equity of the banking system.
2. The fraction the government obtains reects the pdv of the banking system
xg =
ngt
ngt +
VA;t+1
RdA;t+1
From (3.49) in the appendix without government intervention, VA;t+1
RdA;t+1
= nt(1 A)(1 )(1+A)
So
xg =
ngt
ngt + nt
h
(1 A)(1 )
(1+A)
i
and  = (1 A(nt))(1 )(1+A(nt)) :
In this case, the share is not based on the net worth the bank currently has, but the discounted
value of what their lifetime prots. This is the value households place on the bank. Under
this scheme, if the bank has current net worth of 100, but discounted prots of 400, and the
government invests 100, they end up owning 20% of the banking system.
With this general form (3.40), we can re-write equilibrium deposits (with details in the appendix)
in a way to make the e¤ect of policy comparable to direct and discount window lending. Combined
old, inducing them to save more to better spread consumption.
186
with the law of motion for capital kt+1 = xA(nt + ng;t + dA;t); this gives
kt+1 = xA

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
wt

+ xAdg;t

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

(3.41)
+xA
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A (nt))
[wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + )]
+
xAdg;tA

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

1  A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

(1 + gn)

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

 [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]h
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

+

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

nt
i
Written in this form, we can see the separate e¤ects of the equity injection. As usual, the
rst term captures what kt+1 would have been absent policy, with the second term capturing the
trade o¤ between the crowding out e¤ect and direct investment in the economy (the extra equity
is automatically invested). The third term is new, capturing the crowding in of depositors,
representing the fact that the equity injection increases A; which induces more deposits to ow
into the banking system. As wt(1 )  dg;t(1 +) > 0 this term is positive. Finally, the fourth
term captures the impact of watering down depositors, which also draws resources into the banking
system.
With direct and discount window lending, the e¤ect of policy is linear in the amount of govern-
ment borrowing dg;t: This is not the case here, making it more di¢ cult to establish when policy is
e¤ective. Rather, we focus on the marginal impact when dg;t = 0; i.e.
n
dkt+1
d(dg;t)
o
dg;t=0
: We have
the following lemma (with proof in the appendix).
Lemma 64 With an equity injection, the marginal e¤ect of policy at dg;t = 0 is positive (i.e.n
dkt+1
d(dg;t)
o
dg;t=0
> 0) i¤
gn <
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
241 +
h
nt
0
A (nt) +
A(nt)(1 A(nt))

i
[wt(1  )]
(1  A(nt))(1 + A(nt))nt
35
We note this is of a similar form to (3.37) and (3.39) with the addition of two positive terms,
the rst due to 0A (nt) > 0; representing the crowding in of depositors, the second the watering
down of shareholders (this second e¤ect disappears when xg = 0 (which can be seen as  !1); in
which case households are not watered down).
In contrast to the prior two policies, the e¤ectiveness of an equity injection need not be uniformly
decreasing in A: In particular, if A(:) has a steep convex region-for example a large  in Figure
3.9-an equity injection will be particularly e¤ective in this region, resulting in a large increase in
bank leverage. However from Lemma 61, for a su¢ ciently healthy economy (large enough nt)
00A(nt) < 0 and 
0
A(nt) decreases as the economy recovers further. It can be shown that if A(nt)
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is su¢ ciently large, dkt+1d(dg;t) is decreasing in dg;t: Hence, if the marginal impact is negative when
dg;t = 0; policy will reduce kt+1 for all positive dg;t: This is summarised in the following lemma
(with proof in the appendix).
Lemma 65 Let net worth in the good steady state of the economy be n: Suppose
00A (n) <
2

0A (n)
2
(1 + A (n))
(3.42)
and
A(n) >
 1 +p1 + (2 + )
(2 + )
(3.43)
Then dkt+1d(dg;t) is maximised at dg;t = 0:
Further, if
gn >
1  A(n)
A(n)(1 + )
241 +
h
nt
0
A (n) +
A(n)(1 A(n))

i
[wt(1  )]
(1  A(n))(1 + A(n))n
35
Then, in the good steady state, an equity injection lowers kt+1 for all dg;t > 0:
Remark 66  1+
p
1+((2+))
(2+) <
1
2
Remark 67 A su¢ cient condition for 3.42 holding is 00A (n) < 0; that is, in the good steady state
of the economy, the increase of A in banking system net worth happens at a decreasing rate, as
seems likely.
In summary, for the equity injection, as with the other two policies, it can be e¤ective in raising
kt+1 when the economy is in bad health, but ine¤ective (lowering kt+1) when the economy recovers.
3.6.4 Comparison of Policies
We have shown that all three policies can be e¤ective in raising kt+1 during a banking crisis. Here
we compare the e¤ectiveness of these, questioning which deliveries the largest increase in kt+1 for
a given amount of spending dg;t:30
Case (i) m  g  gn
We rst suppose that the ine¢ ciencies in direct lending are at least as great as those with an equity
injection, and those with discount window lending are at least as great as those with direct lending.
Here we have a clear prediction about the relative e¤ectiveness of the policies.
30 In doing so we abstract from other relevant features such as which policy pays the highest return to the goverment
in the future. We focus on the increase in kt+1 as raising this is the most important thing during a banking crisis,
either helping escape from a trap, or speeding up the recovery.
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Proposition 68 Suppose m  g  gn; then for common dg;t31
kequityt+1 > k
direct
t+1 > k
discount
t+1
Further, if discount window lending raises kt+1 then so does direct lending, though the reverse
is not true. If direct lending raises kt+1; then so too does an equity injection, though the reverse
is not true.
Proof. For the rst part of the proof, from the above formulas its clear we need to establish that
1
(1 + gn)
+
A(1  A) [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]
(1 + gn)(1 + A)
h
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )A + (1 + A) nt
i
+
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A (nt))
[wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + )]
>
1
1 + g
>
1  (1  !g)

(1 i)
(1+i)

(1 + m)
The rst inequality clearly follows from (1   )wt > (1 + )dg;t; A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

> A(nt)
and g  gn: The second inequality follows from m  g and !g < 1:
For the second part of the proof, we rst need to establish that
m < wg
(1  A)
A(1 + )
) g < 1  A
A(1 + )
This is clear as then g  m < wg (1 A)A(1+) <
(1 A)
A(1+)
: Its clear that the reverse implication
does not hold as wg < 1:
For the second, suppose that direct lending is e¤ective:
g <
1  A
A(1 + )
Then gn  g < 1 AA(1+) so
h
1
(1+gn)
  A(nt)(1+)1+A(nt)
i
> 0: From (3.41) its clear that, as the
other two terms are positive, kt+1 is raised with an equity injection. Its clear that the reverse
implication does not hold. This completes the proof.
Weve shown that if the ine¢ ciencies are the same for the three policies, an equity injection will
raise kt+1 the most, with discount window lending raising it the least. Further, the equity injection
will be e¤ective in raising kt+1 for the largest range of states of the economy (i.e. the largest range
of A) and discount window lending the smallest range of states of the economy. Thus, in a mild
banking crisis, it may be that discount window and direct lending are ine¤ective, but the equity
31This is for feasible dg;t i.e. those less than the total amount households want save via deposits and government
bonds. Note that the result does not depend on the specic  used in the equity pricing rule.
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injection is still e¤ective.
The reason for these di¤erences is intuitive. All three policies crowd out deposits in a similar
way through the issuance of government bonds. With direct lending, the money raised is invested
directly into the economy without any frictions. This is more e¤ective than discount window
lending when !g < 1 because then the central bank still faces a friction when lending to banks,
resulting in a smaller increase in investment than the amount lent. Thus, if discount window
lending is at least as ine¢ cient as direct lending (m  g); direct lending will be more e¤ective.
The equity injection resembles direct lending in that the amount invested directly adds to the
capital stock. This is because it shows up as bank equity, so unlike with discount window lending,
no nancial friction is faced by the government. In addition, by raising A directly, depositors are
crowded in. A further positive impact from the equity injection arises from the watering down of
householdsbank equity. These last two e¤ects both result in more deposits and a higher kt+1:
Thus, when direct lending is at least as ine¢ cient as an equity injection (g  gn) kt+1 will be
higher with the equity injection.
We next show that when the ine¢ ciencies do not follow the order m  g  gn; the most
e¤ective policy can depend on the state of the economy.
Case (ii) Discount Window Lending Most E¢ cient g; gn > m
We rst consider an interesting trade-o¤when discount window lending is more e¢ cient than direct
lending, i.e. m < g: This could be the case because this is closer in line with the specialities of
a central bank/government.
Proposition 69 Suppose
m < g   (1 + g)(1  !g) (1  A)
(1 + A)
Then discount window lending is more e¤ective in raising kt+1 than direct lending.
Proof. Discount window lending is more e¤ective in raising kt+1 than direct lending when
1  (1  !g)

(1 A)
(1+A)

(1 + m)
>
1
1 + g
i¤
g   (1 + g) (1  !g)

(1  A)
(1 + A)

> m
We note that the LHS of this is increasing in A; so this could hold for a large A and fail for
a small A: We thus have a corollary.
Corollary 70 Consider two credit crunches with associated banking system net worth n1; n2 with
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n1 > n2; so n2 is the more severe credit crunch. Suppose
g   (1 + g) (1  !g)

(1  A(n1))
(1 + A(n1))

> m
g   (1 + g) (1  !g)

(1  A(n2))
(1 + A(n2))

< m
Then direct lending is more e¤ective in raising kt+1 in the more severe credit crunch (n2), whilst
discount window lending is more e¤ective in the milder credit event (n1).
Proof. Immediate.
The corollary highlights an interesting trade-o¤ that can arise. With a mild shock to the
banking system, discount window lending can be more e¤ective due to the lower inherent ine¢ ciency
it involves (resulting in fewer crowded-out deposits). However, with a su¢ ciently severe shock to
the banking system, A will be su¢ ciently low that this policy will be less e¤ective. This is
because discount window lending must work through the banking system, and when the banks are
severely impaired, the central bank also faces a large credit friction when lending to them. Here,
circumventing the banking system, and lending directly to the economy can be more e¤ective.
We now consider a similar case in which discount window lending is inherently more e¢ cient
than equity injections, i.e. m < gn: Here we also note that discount window lending can be more
e¤ective in a mild downturn, while an equity injection is more e¤ective in a more severe banking
crisis.
Proposition 71 Suppose !g < 1+2+ and we have the second equity pricing rule.
32 Consider two
credit crunches with associated banking system net worth n1;n2 with n1 > n2; so n2 is the more
severe crunch. Suppose (3.42) and (3.43) hold for n1 and its su¢ ciently large that 
00
A(n1) < 0
and further that
(1 + gn) [(1 + A (n1))  (1  !g)(1  A(n1))]h
1 + (1 + )A (n1) +
0A(n1)wt(1 )
(1+A(n1))
i   1 > m
(1 + gn) [(1 + A (n2))  (1  !g)(1  A(n2))]h
1 + (1 + )A (n2) +
0A(n2)wt(1 )
(1+A(n2))
i   1 < m
Then an equity injection is more e¤ective in raising kt+1 in the more severe credit crunch (n2);
for a range of dg;t > 0; whilst discount window lending is more e¤ective in the milder credit event
(n1) for all dg;t > 0:
Remark 72 The !g < 1+2+ condition is required so that the impact of discount window lending
closely follows the health of the economy.
32That is,  = (1 A)(1 )
(1+A)
: The exact form of  does not matter for the result, only simplies the exposition.
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Proof. See appendix.
In the more severe crunch, discount window lending is less e¤ective as it has to work through
the banking system, and with low A; the fraction of government lending that makes it through to
the real economy is limited. By contrast, the equity injection directly boosts output as the equity
is directly invested in sector A: Further, the increase in A can have a large positive impact on
kt+1, crowding in depositors. This e¤ect is particularly near any convex region of A. These large
positive benets outweigh the greater inherent ine¢ ciency associated with an equity injection. In a
less severe crunch, the benet from increasing A will not be as large, and with higher A; discount
window lending will become relatively more e¤ective. Consequently, the lower ine¢ ciency of this
policy can result in it being more e¤ective overall.
3.6.5 Summary
The work here shows how to compare the three considered unconventional credit policies. We have
seen that for all of them, e¤ectiveness depends on the state of the economy. Whilst they can be
highly e¤ective in a credit crunch, under given parameter restrictions they will actually make the
economy worse if applied when the economy is healthy. We can thus resist the conclusion that it is
always desirable for the government to fully replace the banking sector in this model.
When the ine¢ ciencies of the three policies are equal, we have a clear ranking in terms of the
e¤ectiveness of raising kt+1; with equity injections being the most e¤ective and discount window
lending the least e¤ective. We have also seen that when discount window lending is more e¢ cient
than the other two policies, it can be more e¤ective in a milder banking crisis but less e¤ective than
the other two policies in a severe banking crisis.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple, tractable OLG model for analysing credit traps. We have
analysed the e¤ectiveness of policy both at preventing the occurrence of a credit trap as well as in
helping the economy to escape a trap if it falls into one (which becomes necessary as it will not
recover without intervention). Our analysis shows that a leverage ratio cap is e¤ective in increasing
the resilience of the economy against shocks and reducing the probability of a nancial crisis.
Further, relaxing the cap is e¤ective in encouraging faster recovery after a negative productivity
shock, provided that the shock is su¢ ciently small. However, if the shock is large enough to tip the
economy into a credit trap, then relaxing the leverage cap will not help the economy get out of it.
Policies that a¤ect the relative attractiveness of investment in sectors A and B, such as changing
sectoral risk weights, will work if there is pure sectoral misallocation. If there is not, other policies
are needed and we consider direct lending, equity injections, and discount window lending. These
policies present rich, realistic trade-o¤s, and their e¤ectiveness depends on the state of the economy,
with each one being more e¤ective when the economy is weaker.
In future work, it would be interesting to analyse the optimal leverage ratio that would be set by
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a policymaker in advance of a trap. The optimal leverage ratio would have to address the trade-o¤
between resilience and output: in the absence of shocks, output will be higher when leverage is
higher. We have shown that the level of leverage that maximises resilience is countercyclical: it
would be interesting to assess numerically if the same holds true for the optimal level of leverage,
and whether this would vary with the state of the economy in a non-linear way. This would be
particularly interesting when the economy is just at the trap threshold, and the policymaker has
to trade-o¤ rebuilding the health of the banking system and the economy against the possibility of
further negative shocks.
3.A Proof from Section 3.2: Model
3.A.1 Households
Lemma 73 Households optimal saving is given by
dt =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
Vt+1
Rd;t+1
(3.44)
Proof. The household problem is
max
c1t;c2t
log c1t +  log c2t : c1t + dt  (1  )wt
c2t  Rd;t+1dt + Vt+1
Optimally both constraints will bind so the problem can be rewritten as
max
dt
log((1  )wt   dt) +  log (Rd;t+1dt + Vt+1)
With a strictly concave objective function, the FOC is su¢ cient for a global maximum.
FOC :
 1
(1  )wt   dt +
Rd;t+1
Rd;t+1dt + Vt+1
= 0
This is just the standard Euler equation:

Rd;t+1
c2t
=
1
c1t
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From the FOC we isolate the optimal deposits dt :
Rd;t+1
Rd;t+1dt + Vt+1
=
1
(1  )wt   dt so
Rd;t+1 ((1  )wt   dt) = Rd;t+1dt + Vt+1 so
Rd;t+1dt (1 + ) = Rd;t+1(1  )wt   Vt+1 so
dt =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
Vt+1
Rd;t+1
This completes the proof of the lemma.
3.A.2 Deposit market equilibrium
We consider di¤erent cases here, beginning with a positive spread in equilibrium followed by zero
spread. We then summarise the results.
Positive Spread: Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
Lemma 74 Suppose sector i is invested in. If Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 then the equilibrium
supply of deposits from households is given by
di;t =
i
1 + i
(1  )wt
Proof. When Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 the pledgeability constraint holds with equality.33 Thus
iRi;t+1(nt + di;t) = Rd;t+1di;t (3.45)
Rearranging this gives
di;t(Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1) = iRi;t+1nt and so (3.46)
di;t =
iRi;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1
This gives the deposit demand of banks.
33Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 ensures the bank takes as many deposits as they can. Rd ;t+1 > iRi;t+1 ensures that they
are constrained by the pledgability constraint.
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To calculate the deposit supply of households we must look at the lump sum transfer households
receive from banks:
Vi;t+1 : = (Ri;t+1  Rd t+1)di;t +Ri;t+1nt
= (Ri;t+1  Rd t+1) iRi;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 +Ri;t+1nt
=
Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 (i(Ri;t+1  Rd t+1) +Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1)
=
Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1Rd;t+1(1  i)
Thus, from (3.44) deposit supply is given by
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
Vi;t+1
Rd;t+1
(3.47)
=

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
(1  i)Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1
In equilibrium of the deposit market, deposit supply (3.46) equals deposit demand (3.47), so
iRi;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
(1  i)Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1
Now nt = wt so
iRi;t+1wt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
(1  i)Ri;t+1wt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 i¤
iRi;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 =

1 + 
(1  )  1
1 + 
(1  i)Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 i¤
(1  ) = (1 + )iRi;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 +
(1  i)Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1
=
Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 ((1 + )i + (1  i))
=
Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 (i + 1)
Thus
Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 =
(1  )
 (i + 1)
(3.48)
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Hence, in equilibrium, when sector i is invested in
Vi;t+1 =
Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1Rd;t+1(1  i) (3.49)
= Rd;t+1(1  i)nt (1  )
 (i + 1)
= Rd;t+1(1  i)wt (1  )
(i + 1)
The equilibrium amount of deposits can be found by substituting (3.48) into (3.47):
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
(1  i)Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1
=

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
(1  i)wt (1  )
 (i + 1)
=

1 + 
(1  )wt

1  (1  i)
(i + 1)

=

1 + 
(1  )wt
(i + 1)
[(i + 1)  (1  i)]
=

1 + 
(1  )wt
(i + 1)
[i(1 + )]
=
iwt(1  )
1 + i
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 75 In equilibrium with sector i invested in and Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
Rd;t+1 = Ri;t+1
 + i
(1  )
Proof. Given Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1;(3.45) holds so:
Rd;t+1 = iRi;t+1

nt
di;t
+ 1

From the prior lemma, using nt = wt :
di;t =
i
1 + i
(1  )nt

so
nt
di;t
=
(1 + i)
i(1  )
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Thus
Rd;t+1 = iRi;t+1
 
nt
di;t
+ 1
!
= iRi;t+1

(1 + i)
i(1  ) + 1

=
Ri;t+1
(1  ) ((1 + i) + i(1  ))
=
Ri;t+1
(1  ) ( + i)
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 76 The above equilibrium indeed satises Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 (so is consistent)
if (1  ) >  + i
Proof. The condition ensures that +i(1 ) < 1 and so R

d;t+1 < Ri;t+1:
For the second inequality
Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 i¤
Ri;t+1
(1  ) ( + i) > iRi;t+1 i¤
( + i)
(1  ) > i i¤
( + i) > (1  )i i¤
(1 + i) > i   i = 0
This clearly holds regardless of the condition. This completes the proof of the corollary.
Lemma 77 If Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1, and sector i is invested in, then
kt+1 = bxi + i
1 + i
(1  )kt
where bxi represents the realised (as opposed to expected) level of capital produced per unit of
output goods invested.
Proof. The amount of capital produced next period is given by the product of the amount of
output goods invested and the realised level of technology bxi :
kt+1 = bxi(nt + di;t)
When Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1;
di;t =
i
1 + i
(1  )wt
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Thus
kt+1 = bxi(wt + i
1 + i
(1  )wt)
= bxi wt
1 + i
( (1 + i) + i(1  ))
= bxi (1  )kt
1 + i
( + i)
Where we have used wt = (1   )kt which follows from the use of Cobb-Douglas technology.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 78 If Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 and sector i is invested in then
bRi;t+1 = bxih
+i
1+i
(1  )kt
i1 
Rd;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
where xi is the expected level of capital produced per unit of output goods invested. Note thatbRi;t+1 is the actual realised return on investment in sector i: The above deposit market clearing
conditions are all based on the expected realised return Ri;t+1; that is, the return when bxi = xi:
Proof. We assume full depreciation of capital during output production for tractability so
bRi;t+1 = bxif 0(kt+1)
=
 bxi
k1 t+1
This is expression gives the gross return on output goods invested in sector i: Each unit of
output goods invested produces bxi units of capital goods next period, each of which earns the
return to capital from output, which is the marginal product of capital.
Using the prior lemma:
bRi;t+1 =  bxihbxi (1 )kt1+i ( + i)i1 
=
 bxih
(+i)
1+i
(1  )kt
i1 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For the deposit rate expression, note that from a prior lemma, given Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
we have34
Rd;t+1 = Ri;t+1
 + i
(1  )
=
xih
(+i)
1+i
(1  )kt
i1    + i(1  )

=
xi
(1  )
( + i) ( + i)
 1
(1 + i)
1 
[(1  )kt ]1 
=
xi ( + i)

(1 + i)
1 
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Zero Spread: Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
We establish an analogous series of results to the positive spread case.
Lemma 79 Suppose sector i is invested in. If Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 then the equilibrium
supply of deposits from households is given by
di;t =
wt
1 + 
((1  )  )
Thus in this case, di;t > 0 i¤ (1   ) > : We note that in this case the nancial friction
i has no e¤ect on the level of deposits and the pledgeability constraint does not bind.
Proof. When Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1; Vi;t+1 = Ri;t+1nt = Rd;t+1nt: Thus, from (3.44)
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
Rd;t+1nt
Rd;t+1
=

1 + 
(1  )wt   wt
1 + 
=
wt
1 + 
((1  )  )
This completes the proof.
Lemma 80 The above equilibrium indeed satises Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 (so is consistent) if
(1  )  + i: We note that the positive spread and zero spread equilibria can not both occur
at once.
Proof. The pledgeability constraint requires that
iRi;t+1(nt + di;t)  Rd;t+1di;t
34Note that this is based on the expected return from investment in sector i:
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When there is zero spread, this equation simplies to
i(nt + di;t)  di;t or
int  di;t(1  i)
From the prior lemma, we must have
int  wt
1 + 
((1  )  ) (1  i) this holds i¤
i  1
1 + 
((1  )  ) (1  i) i¤
i (1 + ) + (1  i)  (1  )(1  i) i¤
 (i (1 + ) + (1  i))  (1  )(1  i) i¤
 (i + 1)   (1 + i      i) i¤
   (1     i) i¤
 + i   (1  )
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 81 If Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1, and sector i is invested in, then
kt+1 =
bxi
1 + 
(1  )kt
where bxi represents the realised (as opposed to expected) level of capital produced per unit of
output goods invested.
Proof. The amount of capital produced next period is given by the product of the amount of
output goods invested and the realised level of technology bxi :
kt+1 = bxi(nt + di;t)
When Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1;
di;t =
wt
1 + 
((1  )  )
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Thus
kt+1 = bxi(wt + wt
1 + 
((1  )  ))
=
bxiwt
1 + 
((1 + ) + ((1  )  ))
=
bxiwt
1 + 
( +  +       )
=
bxiwt
1 + 
=
bxi
1 + 
(1  )kt
Where we have used wt = (1   )kt which follows from the use of Cobb-Douglas technology.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 82 If Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 and sector i is invested in then
bRi;t+1 = bxih

1+ (1  )kt
i1 
Rd;t+1 = Ri;t+1 =
xih

1+ (1  )kt
i1 
where xi is the expected level of capital produced per unit of output goods invested.
Proof. We assume full depreciation of capital during output production for tractability so
bRi;t+1 = bxif 0(kt+1)
=
 bxi
k1 t+1
Using the prior lemma:
bRi;t+1 =  bxih bxi
1+ (1  )kt
i1 
=
 bxih

1+ (1  )kt
i1 
This is the actual realised gross return from investment in sector i: As there is zero spread, the
expected gross return from investment in sector i is equal to the deposit rate and so
Rd;t+1 = Ri;t+1 =
xih

1+ (1  )kt
i1 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This completes the proof of the lemma.
Other Potential Cases
So far we have considered two mutually exclusive cases
Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
We now consider other possible cases.
Lemma 83 In any equilibrium we must have Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
Proof. Suppose this doesnt hold, then we have
Ri;t+1 > iRi;t+1  Rd;t+1
The pledgeability constraint requires that
iRi;t+1(nt + di;t)  Rd;t+1di;t
This always holds here as
iRi;t+1(nt + di;t)  Rd;t+1(nt + di;t)  Rd;t+1di;t
This follows as Rd;t+1 > 0 and nt  0:
Hence, in this case the constraint is satised for all di;t: Further, as 0 < i < 1 there is a
positive spread and so the bank wants to take as many deposits as possible. Thus, optimally it
sets di;t =1; which cannot be an equilibrium as there is a nite amount of potential deposits from
households.
Lemma 84 Suppose (1  )  : Then in any equilibrium we must have
Ri;t+1  Rd;t+1
The condition is the same condition that ensures that in the case of zero spreads, the households
want to make non-negative deposits. This is not trivial in the model as the households can consume
in the second period even if they dont make deposits, due to their equity stake in the bank which
is paid out in the second period of their life.
Proof. Suppose this condition does not hold. Then Ri;t+1 < Rd;t+1 and the banks lose money on
every unit of deposits taken. Optimally they thus set di;t = 0: This fails to be an equilibrium if
the households want to make deposits at these prices.
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Given the banks set di;t = 0; it follows that Vi;t = ntRi;t+1 with bank returns just coming from
them trading on their own account.
From (3.44) we then have
di;t =

1 + 
(1  )wt   1
1 + 
wtRi;t+1
Rd;t+1
=
wt
1 + 

(1  )  Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1

>
wt
1 + 
((1  )  )
 0 so
di;t > 0
In the derivation we used:
Ri;t+1 < Rd;t+1 so
Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1
< 1 so
 Ri;t+1
Rd;t+1
>  1
Under these conditions we do not have an equilibrium as deposit supply is greater than deposit
demand. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Summary For Sector i
We now establish a summary proposition for the deposit market equilibrium.
Proposition 85 Suppose (1  )  : Then in equilibrium in the deposit market we have
Ri;t+1  Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1
There are two cases:
(i) If (1   ) >  + i then Ri;t+1 > Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 and the unique equilibrium is given
by
di;t =
i
1 + i
(1  )wt
Ri;t+1 =
xih
+i
1+i
(1  )kt
i1 
Rd;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
kt+1 = bxi + i
1 + i
(1  )kt
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(ii) If (1  )   + i then Ri;t+1 = Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1 and the unique equilibrium is given
by
di;t =
wt
1 + 
((1  )  )
Rd;t+1 = Ri;t+1 =
xih

1+ (1  )kt
i1 
kt+1 =
bxi
1 + 
(1  )kt
Proof. From the prior lemmas with (1  )   we have Ri;t+1  Rd;t+1 > iRi;t+1: As shown
above, when (1  ) > + i we have an equilibrium with a positive spread and no equilibrium
with a zero spread. Further, when (1   )   + i we have an equilibrium with zero spread
and no equilibrium with a positive spread. This completes the proof.
Corollary 86 We have a positive spread in sector i if
i <
(1  )  

In particular, we are guaranteed a positive spread in both sectors in all states of the economy if
B <
(1  )  

A <
(1  )  

where A is the maximum value A(nt) takes.
Proof. This is immediate from the previous proposition.
3.A.3 Sector Invested In
In our specication, depositors dictate the sector that is invested in, based on which will pay a
higher return to them. For this to be an equilibrium we require that bankers prefer to do this than
take no deposits and invest in the other sector. Here we examine conditions that ensure the banks
have no incentive to deviate from the derived equilibrium.35
Lemma 87 Suppose (1  ) >  + i (i = A;B) so that there would be positive spreads in both
sectors were they invested in. Further, suppose that
xB(1  B)

 + B
1 + B

 xA
35Note: given (1 ) >  so that households always wish to make deposits, the cases of banks not taking deposits
are not equilibria. The work here veries that our proposed equilibria are indeed equilibria.
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Then the banks invest in sector A i¤ RAd;t+1 > R
B
d;t+1:
Here the banks always take deposits and invest in the sector the depositors want rather than
taking no deposits and investing by themselves.
Proof. Under the given conditions, there is a positive spread when both sectors are invested in.
Thus
Vi;t+1 = Rd;t+1(1  i)wt (1  )
(i + 1)
and
Rd;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
Combining these gives equilibrium bank prots when sector i is invested in and deposits are
taken:
V i;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
(1  i)wt (1  )
(i + 1)
V i;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
[(1  )kt ]1 
(1  i) (1  )k

t
(i + 1)
V i;t+1 = x

i (1  i)

( + i)
(1 + i)

((1  )kt )
Consider the bank prots that one deviating bank would make if they switched to investment
in sector j 6= i; taking no deposits:
V ndj;t+1 = Rj;t+1nt
=
xjnt
k1 t+1
Crucially as the deviating bank is innitesimal, the total capital next period is unaltered: it is
the level of investment in capital from sector i that determines returns next period. Now expected
capital next period is given by
kt+1 = xi
 + i
1 + i
(1  )kt
Thus
V ndj;t+1 =
xj(1  )kt
xi
+i
1+i
(1  )kt
1 
V ndj;t+1 =
xj ((1  )kt )
xi
+i
1+i
1 
We consider two cases:
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(i) RAd;t+1 > R
B
d;t+1 Then a potential deviating bank chooses not to deviate i¤
V A;t+1  V ndB;t+1 i¤
xA(1  A)

( + A
1 + A

((1  )kt ) 
xB ((1  )kt )
xA
+A
1+A
1  i¤
xA(1  A)

( + A
1 + A

xA
 + A
1 + A
1 
 xB i¤
xA(1  A) + A
1 + A
 xB
Now as (1  ) >  + A we have
(1  A) + A
1 + A
> 
To see this:
(1  A) + A
1 + A
>  i¤
(1  A) ( + A) >  (1 + A) i¤
   A + A   2A >  + A i¤
 A + A   2A > A i¤
  +  >  + A i¤
(1  ) >  + A
Thus we have that
xA(1  A) + A
1 + A
> xA > xB
Hence V A;t+1 > V
nd
B;t+1
Note we do not need the condition for this to hold. The intuition in this case is simple: when
investing in sector A there are higher gross returns on each unit (given that xA > xB and there
is the same amount of capital next period in both cases) and more units are invested as deposits
are taken. Further, there is a positive spread, so prot is made on each extra deposit taken and
invested.
We now consider the other case:
(ii) RAd;t+1 < R
B
d;t+1 Here depositors want the bank to invest in sector B: It is optimal for a
bank to not deviate from this i¤
V B;t+1  V ndA;t+1 i¤
xB(1  B) + B
1 + B
 xA
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which holds given the condition in the lemma.
In this case we need a condition as there is a trade o¤ for the banks: they get a higher gross
return on each unit when investing in A; but they invest a greater volume when investing in B: If
this volume is great enough and the prot margin is too, it is optimal for the bank to take deposits
and invest in B:
This completes the proof.
Lemma 88 Suppose (1  ) >  + i (i = A;B), then RAd;t+1 > RBd;t+1 i¤
xA(1 + A)
1 ( + A) > xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
Proof. Given the above conditions both sectors will have positive spreads were they invested in.
Thus
Rid;t+1 =
xi (1 + i)
1 ( + i)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
Hence
RAd;t+1 > R
B
d;t+1 i¤
xA(1 + A)
1 ( + A)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
>
xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]1 
i¤
xA(1 + A)
1 ( + A) > xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
This completes the proof.
Lemma 89 Suppose xB(1   B)

+B
1+B

 xA and (1   ) >  + i (i = A;B): Further,
suppose that
0A(nt) > 0 8nt  0;
xA > xB ;
A(0) = A 2 [0; B);
lim
nt!1
A(nt) = A 2 (A; 1);
xA(1 + A)
1 ( + A)
 < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B);
xA(1 + A)
1 ( + A) > xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
Then there exists a unique level of banker net worth en :bankers invest in A i¤ nt > en36 : This
is dened implicitly by
xA(1 + A(en))1 ( + A(en)) = xB(1 + B)1 ( + B)
36This en is time-invariant so long as the expected level of technology in sector A is constant:xA is constant over
time.
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Proof. With the given conditions Rid;t+1 =
xi (1+i)
1 (+i)
(1 )[(1 )kt ]1 
; and banks invest in sector A
rather than sector B iff RAd;t+1 > R
B
d;t+1:
Let
g(nt) := x

A(1 + A(nt))
1 ( + A(nt))   xB(1 + B)1 ( + B)
Then banks invest in sector A i¤ g(nt) > 0:
By the above conditions, g(0) < 0: Further, lim
nt!1
g(nt) > 0: Thus, for su¢ ciently large nt;
g(nt) > 0: As A(:) is di¤erentiable on [0;1), it is continuous on the same interval and hence so
too is g(:): Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, 9en : g(en) = 0: Further, as 0A(nt) > 0
8nt  0; g0(nt) > 0 8nt  0: Hence, en is unique, and g(nt) > 0 i¤ nt > en: This completes the
proof.
Corollary 90 Suppose xB(1   B)

+B
1+B

 xA and (1   ) >  + i (i = A;B): Let nB
be the steady state value of banker net worth when sector B is invested in. The economy features
a credit trap if
xA(1 + A(n

B))
1 ( + A(nB))
 < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
Proof. From the above lemmas, banks invest in sector B rather than sector A i¤
xA(1 + A(nt))
1 ( + A(nt)) < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
Hence if
xA(1 + A(n

B))
1 ( + A(nB))
 < xB(1 + B)
1 ( + B)
the banks will invest in sector B when nt = nB : i.e. they invest in the B in the steady state of B:
This is thus a steady state equilibrium and without shocks the economy will invest in sector B for
the rest of time, so is stuck in a credit trap. This completes the proof of the corollary.
3.B Proofs from Section 3.3: Financial Crisis
3.B.1 Deleveraging
In terms of the impact on the macroeconomy of deleveraging, we are interested in the output
produced by the standard productive technology as this links to the wages of the next generation.
This is given by
yPt+1 = (kt+1   kLt+1)
This is the quantity we focus on when examining how the leverage of the banking sector a¤ects the
resilience of the economy: the resilience is higher the higher this quantity.
The leverage limit will hold for the expected level of capital next period, ket+1;. Capital kt+1
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has value V (kt+1) in terms of output where V (kt+1) = kt+1: Given that they owe depositors
Rd;t+1d units of output goods, their net worth, in terms of output goods, is kt+1  Rd;t+1d: We
thus have the following relationship holding for the expected amount of capital next period37 :
(ket+1)

(ket+1)
  Rd;t+1d
=
1
1  A (3.50)
If kt+1 < ket+1 then the leverage limit will be exceeded and depositors will withdraw deposits
until it holds. To consider how much the bank may have to deleverage, it is useful to consider
their net worth as a function of initial capital holdings kt+1 and the amount of capital liquidation
they do kLt+1 :
NW (kt+1; k
L
t+1) = (kt+1   kLt+1) + L(kt+1; kLt+1) Rd;t+1d
with L(kt+1; 0) = 0
To emphasise, if the bankers initially hold kt+1 units of capital and liquidate kLt+1 units, then
the value of their remaining capital holdings in terms of output is (kt+1   kLt+1):
In general, if less capital is produced than expected, we require that
(kt+1   kLt+1)
(kt+1   kLt+1) + L(kt+1; kLt+1) Rd;t+1d
=
1
1  A
This implies that
(kt+1   kLt+1)(1  A) = (kt+1   kLt+1) + L(kt+1; kLt+1) Rd;t+1d so
Rd;t+1d  L(kt+1; kLt+1) = A(kt+1   kLt+1)
This condition states that the amount owed to depositors after deleveraging is equal to the
pledgeable return bankers can promise with their remaining capital.
To further analyse this expression, we note that from (3.50) we have that
(ket+1)
(1  A) = (ket+1)  Rd;t+1d so
Rd;t+1d = A(k
e
t+1)

Substituting this into the above expression gives
A(k
e
t+1)
   L(kt+1; kLt+1) = A(kt+1   kLt+1) (3.51)
We note that, of course, if kt+1 = ket+1 then this has solution k
L
t+1 = 0, i.e. no deleveraging.
For general L(:; :) there will be no analytic solution to this. Below we consider a special case in
which net worth is constant as the bank deleverages.
37That is the amount produced when the capital producing technology has its expected value: bxA = xA
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3.B.2 Benchmark case: net worth constant with deleveraging
This is a natural benchmark as it isolates the impact of deleveraging per se, without re salecosts.
Using the above expressions
NW (kt+1; k
L
t+1) = (kt+1   kLt+1) + L(kt+1; kLt+1)  A(ket+1)
Net worth is constant with deleveraging i¤
@L(kt+1; k
L
t+1)
@kLt+1
=
2
(kt+1   kLt+1)1 
This requires that
L(kt+1; k
L
t+1) =  (kt+1   kLt+1) + C
where C is a constant. Given L(kt+1; 0) = 0; C = kt+1: Thus our liquidation technology that
gives constant net worth is given by
eL(kt+1; kLt+1) = kt+1   (kt+1   kLt+1)
With this,
NW (kt+1; k
L
t+1) = k

t+1   A(ket+1)
Further, (3.51) becomes
A(k
e
t+1)
    kt+1   (kt+1   kLt+1) = A(kt+1   kLt+1) so
(1  A)(kt+1   kLt+1) = kt+1   A(ket+1) so
(kt+1   kLt+1) =
kt+1   A(ket+1)
(1  A)
Now
kt+1 = bxA + A
1 + A
(1  )kt
Hence the output of productive technology, yPt+1 is given by:
yPt+1 =
(bxA   AxA)
(1  A)

 + A
1 + A
(1  )kt

Proposition 91 With the benchmark liquidation technology and sector A invested in
nt+1 = (1  ) (bxA   A(nt)xA)
(1  A(nt))

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
(1  )kt

if bxA < xA
nt+1 = (1  )bxA  + A(nt)1 + A(nt) (1  )kt

if bxA  xA
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Proof. The next generation wages are based on the amount of productive output:
nt+1 = (1  )yPt+1
If bxA < xA then liquidation takes place and yPt+1 = (bxA AxA)(1 A) h+A1+A (1  )kt i
If bxA  xA then no liquidation takes place (as the leverage limit is not violated) and yPt+1 =bxA h+A1+A (1  )kt i
This completes the proof of the proposition.
3.C Proofs from Section 3.4: Policy Options to Avoid Credit
Traps
Derivation of xTA()
When the regulatory requirement  is imposed, we know that the economy will fall into a credit
trap whenever bank equity falls below ~n. This condition is given by:
n^t+1 = (1  ) (bxA   xA)
(1  )

 + 
1 + 
(1  )kt

 ~n
We now solve the above for x^A.
bxA   xA  ~n 1  (1  )

 + 
1 + 
(1  )kt
 
bxA  xA + ~n (1  )
(1  )
h
+
1+ (1  )kt
i
Hence the threshold productivity shock below which the economy falls into a credit trap in the
next period is given by:
xTA() :=
24xA + en(1  )
(1  )
h
+
1+ (1  )kt
i
35 1
We now demonstrate the "u-shaped" resilience proposition from the text.
Proof of Propostion 57. We rst introduce some notation to simplify the exposition of the
proof.
Let
z() := xA +
en(1  )
(1  )
h
+
1+ (1  )kt
i
Then
xTA()  (z())
1
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Now
dxTA()
d
=
1

(z())
1
 1 z0()
> 0 i¤ z0() > 0
Further,
d2xTA()
d2
=
1

(
1

  1) (z()) 1 2 (z0())2 + 1

(z())
1
 1z00()
Hence, if z00(_) > 0 then d
2xTA()
d2
> 0:
Given these results, in the following steps of the proof we can work with z():
We introduce further notation: let
h() :=
(1  )h
+
1+
i
Then
z() = xA +
enh()
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]
The proof now proceeds via a series of steps.
(i) dx
T
A()
d > 0 for  close to 1:
We show z0() > 0 for  close to 1:
z0() = xA +
enh0()
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]
We turn to h0() :
h() = (1  )(1 + )( + ) 
Thus
h0()
=  (1 + )( + )  + (1  )(1 + ) 1( + )    (1  )(1 + )( + )  1
=  (1 + )( + )    (1  )(1  )(1 + ) 1( + )  1
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Thus
lim
!1
z0() = xA  
en
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]

1 + 
 + 

> 0 iff
xA >
en
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]

1 + 
 + 

iff
xA(1  ) [(1  )kt ]

 + 
1 + 

> en
Thus, given our assumed condition lim
!1
z0() > 0
However, z0() is continuous so 9 < 1 : z0() > 0 8 2 [; 1):
Thus dx
T
A()
d > 0 8 2 [; 1):
(ii)d
2xTA()
d2
> 0 8 2 [0; 1]
It is su¢ cient to show that
z00(_) > 0 8 2 [0; 1]
z00() =
enh00()
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]
From step (i)
h0() =  (1 + )( + )    (1  )(1  )(1 + ) 1( + )  1
Thus
h00() =  (1 + ) 1( + )  + (1 + )( + )  1
  (1  )
"
 (1 + ) 1( + )  1 + (1  )(  1)(1 + ) 2( + )  1
 (+ 1)(1  )(1 + ) 1( + )  2
#
So
h00()

=

1 + 
 + 
   1
1 + 
+
1
 + 

+ (1  )

1 + 
 + 

1
(1 + )( + )
+
(1  )(1  )
(1 + )2( + )
+
(1  )(1 + )
(1 + )( + )2

> 0
Where we note that the rst term is positive as 1 > 
Hence
z00() > 0 8 2 [0; 1]
(iii) We now use steps (i), (ii) to prove the proposition.
The second condition in the proposition gives dx
T
A(0)
d < 0: From step (i) 9 < 1 : dx
T
A(
)
d > 0:
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Now we must have  > 0; for otherwise, given d
2xTA()
d2
> 0;wed have dx
T
A(0)
d > 0; a contradiction.
As dx
T
A()
d is continuous, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, 9b : dxTA(b)d = 0: Further, as d2xTA()d2 >
0 b is unique. The following then holds
dxTA()
d
8><>:
< 0 for  2 [0; b)
= 0 for  = b
> 0 for  2 (b; 1]
9>=>;
And so dx
T
A()
d reaches a unique minimum at  =
b:
This completes the proof of the proposition.
3.C.1 Countercyclical Maximum Resilience Policy
Proof of Proposition 59.
Using the above notation:
dxTA()
d
= 0 i¤ z0() = 0 i¤
xA +
enh0()
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]
= 0 i¤
xA =  
enh0()
(1  ) [(1  )kt ]
i¤
xA =
en 1++ [(1 + )( + ) + (1  )(1  )]
(1  ) [(1  )kt ] (1 + )( + )
i¤
xA(1  ) [(1  )kt ]en =

1+
+

[(1 + )( + ) + (1  )(1  )]
(1 + )( + )
i¤
xA(1  ) [(1  )kt ]en =

1 + 
 + 
 
1 +
(1  )(1  )
(1 + )( + )

This equation implicitly denes b: The RHS is decreasing in : Increasing en decreases the
LHS, so decreases the RHS, so increases e (which maintains equality between the two sides of the
the equation). Thus d
b
den > 0: By a similar argument dbdkt < 0: This completes the proof of the
proposition.
3.D Proofs from Section 3.6: Unconventional Credit Policy
We derive the laws of motion for kt+1 for each of the three policies separately.
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3.D.1 Direct Lending
With dg;t government bonds issued, householdssaving is given by
di;t =

1 + 
[(1  )(1  )kt ] 
1
1 + 
Vi;t+1
Rdi;t+1
  dg;t (3.52)
With a positive spread, the banksborrowing constraint will bind giving di;t =
iRi;t+1nt
Rdi;t+1 iRi;t+1
and following the prior proofs in the appendix, we have
Vi;t+1
Rd;t+1
=
Ri;t+1nt
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1 (1  i)
In banking system equilibrium, deposit demand is equal to deposit supply giving
iRi;t+1nt
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
=

1 + 
[(1  )(1  )kt ] 
1
1 + 
Ri;t+1nt(1  i)
Rd;t+1   iRi;t+1   dg;t
After rearranging,this gives (3.35) in the text. Following the steps given there results in (3.36).
3.D.2 Discount Window Lending
The bank has two sources of funding: deposits and government loans, and maximises its prots with
respect to these subject to its combined leverage constraint. We have the following Lagrangian:
L = RA;t+1(nt + dA;t +mt) RdA;t+1dA;t  Rmt+1mt
+

ARA;t+1(nt + dA;t + !mt) RdA;t+1dA;t  Rmt+1mt

FOCs:
dA;t :  =
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
mt :  =
RA;t+1  RmA;t+1
RmA;t+1   !ARA;t+1
Combining the two gives
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
=
RA;t+1  RmA;t+1
RmA;t+1   !ARA;t+1
(3.53)
We proceed to derive equilibrium through the usual series of steps.
BanksDemand for Deposits
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With a binding borrowing constraint, we have, after rearranging
dA;t =
ARA;t+1
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
nt  
(Rmt+1   !ARA;t+1)
(RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1)
mt
Applying (3.53) we have
dA;t =
ARA;t+1
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
nt  
(RA;t+1  RmA;t+1)
(RA;t+1  RdA;t+1)
mt
Bank Prots
The prots for the bank are given by
VA;t+1 = (RA;t+1  RdA;t+1)dA;t +RA;t+1nt + (RA;t+1  RmA;t+1)mt
Substituting in the expression for deposits and rearranging gives
VA;t+1 =
RA;t+1R
d
A;t+1(1  A)nt
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
Household Deposit Demand
The equation for this is also given by (3.52), thus substituting in bank prots, we have household
deposit demand given by
dA;t =

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  1
1 + 
RA;t+1(1  A)nt
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
  dg;t
Deposit Market Equilibrium
To determine we equate the supply and demand for deposits:
ARA;t+1
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
nt  
(RA;t+1  RmA;t+1)
(RA;t+1  RdA;t+1)
mt
=

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  1
1 + 
RA;t+1(1  A)nt
RdA;t+1   ARA;t+1
  dg;t
Solving, and rearranging gives
dA;t =
A
1 + A
(1  )wt   A(1 + )
1 + A
dg;t   (1  A)
1 + A
 
RA;t+1  Rmt+1
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
!
mt (3.54)
Lemma 92 In equilibrium
RA;t+1  Rmt+1
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
=
1  !A
1  A
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Proof. We rst show that, in equilibrium,
RdA;t+1 =  
d
tARA;t+1
Rmt+1 =
 
(1  !A) dt + !   1
1  A
!
ARA;t+1
Where
 dt :=

nt
dA;t
+ 1 + 1 !A1 A
mt
dA;t


1 + 1 !A1 A
mt
dA;t

To show this, rst not that from the binding borrowing constraint
RdA;t+1 = ARA;t+1

nt
dA;t
+ 1

   Rmt+1   !ARA;t+1 mtdA;t
Rearranging (3.53) gives
Rmt+1 =
(1  !A)
1  A R
d
A;t+1 +
(!   1)ARA;t+1
1  A
Thus, the deposit rate satises
RdA;t+1 = ARA;t+1

nt
dA;t
+ 1 + !
mt
dA;t

 

(1  !A)
1  A R
d
A;t+1 +
(!   1)ARA;t+1
1  A

mt
dA;t
Solving for RdA;t+1 :
RdA;t+1 = ARA;t+1

nt
dA;t
+ 1 +
(1  !A)mt
(1  A)dA;t

1  1  !A
1  A
mt
dA;t
 1
=  dtARA;t+1
Further,
Rmt+1 =
(1  !A)
1  A  
d
tARA;t+1 +
(!   1)ARA;t+1
1  A
= ARA;t+1
 
(1  !A) dt + !   1
1  A
!
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We now use these two results to establish the lemma:
RA;t+1  Rmt+1
RA;t+1  RdA;t+1
=
1  !A
1  A i¤h
1  A1 A

(1  !A) dt + !   1
i
h
1   dtA
i = 1  !A
1  A i¤
(1  A)  A

(1  !A) dt + !   1

=
h
1   dtA
i
(1  !A) i¤
1  A
h
(1  !A) dt + !
i
=
h
1   dtA
i
(1  !A)
But the LHS can be written
1  A
h
(1  !A) dt + !
i
=  (1  !A)A dt + (1  !A)
= (1  !A)(1  A dt )
= RHS
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Given this (3.54) becomes
dA;t =
A
1 + A
(1  )wt   A(1 + )
1 + A
dg;t   (1  !A)mt
1 + A
Now,
kt+1 = xA(nt + dA;t) + xAmt
Thus we can write the law of motion for kt+1 as (noting mt =
dg;t
1+m
)
kt+1 = xA

nt +
A
1 + A
(1  )wt

+ xAdg;t
0@
h
1  (1 !A)1+A
i
1 + m
  A(1 + )
1 + A
1A
The rst term simplies to kt+1 absent policy, in the usual way.
Further, given that ! = 1 + !g(1 A)A we can write
1  !A = 1  A

1 +
!g(1  A)
A

= 1  A   !g(1  A)
= (1  A)(1  !g)
Substituting this in results in the expression for kt+1 in the text.
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3.D.3 Equity Injection
Derivation of Law of Motion
When the government obtains xg fraction of bank equity, optimal household saving is then given
by
di;t =

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  (1  xg)
(1 + )
Vi;t+1
Rdi;t+1
  dg;t (3.55)
To derive the equilibrium law of motion for kt+1 we follow the usual steps, rst determining
equilibrium in the banking sector.
With the banksleverage constraints binding they demand deposits,38
di;t =
iRi;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
Bank prots are given by39
Vi;t+1 =
 
Ri;t+1  Rdi;t+1

di;t +Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Following the usual steps, with the binding constraint
Vi;t+1 =
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
Rdi;t+1(1  i)
Then, from (3.55) deposit supply is given by
di;t =

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  (1  xg)(1  i)
(1 + )
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
  dg;t
In deposit market equilibrium the supply and demand for deposits are equal
iRi;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
=

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  (1  xg)(1  i)
(1 + )
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
  dg;t
Rearranging
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1

i +
(1  xg)(1  i)
(1 + )

=

1 + 
[(1  )wt]  dg;t
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
[(1 + )i + (1  xg)(1  i)] =  [(1  )wt]  (1 + )dg;t
Ri;t+1(nt + ng;t)
Rdi;t+1   iRi;t+1
=
 [(1  )wt]  (1 + )dg;t
(1 + )i + (1  xg)(1  i)
38Note the addition of ng;t which is absent with no equity injection.
39The formula (save for the ng;t term) for bank prots has not changed here. What changes is who gets them
once theyre realised, i,e, the split between households and the government.
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Then from the banksdeposit demand equation, equilibrium deposits are given by
di;t =
i(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;ti
(1 + )i + (1  xg)(1  i)
This reduces to the no-policy equilibrium level of deposits when dg;t = 0 and xg = 0:
Finally, kt+1 = xi (nt + ng;t + di;t), so using
dg;t
(1+gn)
= ng;t we have
kt+1 = xi

nt +
i(1  )wt
(1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)

+ dg;txi

1
1 + gn
  (1 + )i
(1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)

(3.56)
The presence of the policy term xg on the denominator makes this expression harder to compare
to the other two policy cases, so we re-write it to put it into a comparable form.
Note that
1
(1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg) =
1
1 + i
+

(1  i)xg
((1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)) (1 + i)

Thus, we can write
kt+1 = xi

nt +
i(1  )wt
(1 + i)

+
xi(1  i)xgi(1  )wt
((1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)) (1 + i)
+dg;txi

1
1 + gn
  (1 + )i
(1 + i)

  dg;txi(1  i)xg(1 + )i
((1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)) (1 + i)
After simplications, this can be written as
kt+1 = xi

 + i
1 + i

(1  )kt

+ xidg;t

1
(1 + gn)
  i(1 + )
1 + i

(3.57)
+xg
xii(1  i) [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]
[(1 + )i + (1  i)(1  xg)] (1 + i)
An additional e¤ect of equity is directly raising A; it being a function of nt + ng;t :
A(nt + ng;t)
Then, the impact of an equity injection (with investment in sector A) can be written as
kt+1 = xA

 + A(nt + ng;t)
1 + A(nt + ng;t)

(1  )kt

+xAdg;t

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt + ng;t)(1 + )
1 + A(nt + ng;t)

+
xAdg;tA(nt + ng;t)(1  A(nt + ng;t)) [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]
(1 + gn)(1 + A(nt + ng;t))
h
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )A(nt + ng;t) + (1 + A(nt + ng;t)) nt
i
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We note that policy directly a¤ects the rst term, "crowding in" depositors. We re-write the
expression to make it comparable to the baseline case.
After some algebra, we can show that:
 + A(nt + ng;t)
1 + A(nt + ng;t)
=
 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
+
(1  ) [A(nt + ng;t)  A(nt)]
(1 + A(nt + ng;t)) (1 + A(nt))
Further
A(nt + ng;t)
1 + A(nt + ng;t)
=
A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
+
A(nt + ng;t)  A(nt)
[1 + A(nt + ng;t)] [1 + A(nt)]
Thus, we can write
xA

 + A(nt + ng;t)
1 + A(nt + ng;t)

wt   xAdg;tA(nt + ng;t)(1 + )
1 + A(nt + ng;t)
= xA
 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
wt   xAdg;tA(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)
+xA
[A(nt + ng;t)  A(nt)]
(1 + A(nt + ng;t)) (1 + A(nt))
(wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + ))
Thus, in full we can write
kt+1 = xA

 + A(nt)
1 + A(nt)
wt

+ xAdg;t

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

+xA
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A (nt))
[wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + )]
+xAdg;t
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

1  A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

(1 + gn)

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

 [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]h
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

+

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

nt
i
This gives expression (3.41) in the text.
Other Results
We rst establish an expression for the impact of policy:
dkt+1
d(dg;t)
We go through the various components of (3.41) step by step.
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The rst term is straightforward with derivative
xA

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

The derivative for the second term is given by
xA
0A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

[wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + )]
(1 + gn)

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn


2   xA
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i
(1 + )
1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A(nt))
To ease notation, let
f(dg;t) : =
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

1  A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

(1 + gn)

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

 [(1  )wt   (1 + )dg;t]h
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

+

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

nt
i
Then the third term can be written as xAdg;tf(dg;t):
It has derivative
xAf(dg;t) + xAdg;tf
0(dg;t)
Thus, we have
dkt+1
d (dg;t)
= xA

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

+ xA
0A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

[wt(1  )  dg;t(1 + )]
(1 + gn)

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn


2(3.58)
 xA
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i
(1 + )
1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A(nt))
+ xAf(dg;t) + xAdg;tf
0(dg;t)
Corollary 93
dkt+1
d (dg;t)

dg;t=0
= xA

1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)

+ xA
0A (nt)wt(1  )
(1 + gn) (1 + A (nt))
2
+xA
A (nt) (1  A (nt))(1  )wt
(1 + gn) (1 + A (nt)) [(1 + A (nt)) nt]
We now prove Lemma (64).
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Proof. From the preceding line,
dkt+1
d (dg;t)

dg;t=0
< 0
i¤
1
(1 + gn)
  A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)
+
0A (nt) [wt(1  )]
(1 + gn) (1 + A (nt))
2
+
A (nt) (1  A(nt))(1  )wt
(1 + gn) (1 + A (nt))
2
nt
< 0
This holds i¤
1
(1 + gn)
"
1 +
0A (nt) [wt(1  )]
(1 + A (nt))
2 +
A (nt) (1  A(nt))(1  )wt
(1 + A (nt))
2
nt
#
<
A(nt)(1 + )
1 + A(nt)
i¤
1 + A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
"
1 +

nt
0
A (nt) + A (nt) (1  A(nt))

[wt(1  )]
(1 + A (nt))
2
nt
#
  1 < gn i¤
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
+

nt
0
A (nt) + A (nt) (1  A(nt))

[(1  )]
A(nt)(1 + ) (1 + A (nt)) 
< gn
This condition can be written:
gn >
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
"
1 +

nt
0
A (nt) + A (nt) (1  A(nt))

[(1  )]
(1  A(nt))(1 + A(nt))
#
This completes the proof of the Lemma (64)
We now establish the su¢ cient conditions for the maximum marginal impact of an equity
injection to be at dg;t = 0; rst establishing a useful lemma.
Lemma 94 Suppose A(nt) >
 1+
p
1+((2+))
(2+)
Then
f 0(dg;t) < 0
Proof. It is clear that, treating A as a constant, increasing dg;t decreases f(dg;t): Now dg;t
increases A; so its enough to show that f(dg;t) is decreasing in A: We write the relevant part as
(1  )
(1 + ) [(+ (1 + )nt]
=
  2
(1 + ) [ [+ nt] + nt]
where  := dg;t(1+gn) (1 + )
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Then, taking the derivative wrt  :
(1  2) (1 + ) [ [+ nt] + nt]  (1  ) [ [ [+ nt] + nt] + [+ nt] (1 + )]
(1 + )2 [ [+ nt] + nt]
2
=  
"
2 ((1 + ) + nt(2 + )) + 2nt   nt
(1 + )2 [ [+ nt] + nt]
2
#
This expression is then negative i¤  >
 2nt+
p
42n2t+4nt((1+)+nt(2+))
2((1+)+nt(2+))
i¤
 >
 2nt +
r
42n2t + 4nt

dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )2 + nt(2 + )

2(
dg;t
(1+gn)
(1 + )2 + nt(2 + ))
Note that the RHS is decreasing in dg;t hence its su¢ cient that  is greater than the expression
when dg;t = 0
Evaluated at dg;t = 0; we require
 >
 2nt +
p
42n2t + 4nt (nt(2 + ))
2nt(2 + )
=
 1 +p1 + ((2 + ))
(2 + )
Note the required  < 12
Proposition 95 Suppose.
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gn

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2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nt +
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1+gn
i2

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



and
A(nt) >
 1 +p1 + (2 + )
(2 + )
then
dkt+1
d (dg;t)
is maximised at dg;t = 0
Further, if
gn >
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
"
1 +

nt
0
A (nt) + A (nt) (1  A(nt))

[wt(1  )]
(1  A(nt))(1 + A(nt))nt
#
Then an equity injection lowers kt+1 for all dg;t > 0:
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Proof. 40First consider the following term:
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
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gn


2
Its derivative is negative i¤
00A

nt +
dg;t
1 + gn

1
1 + gn

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1 + gn

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gn



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

1 + gn
i¤
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1 + gn

<
2
h
0A

nt +
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
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
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


We now show the following term is increasing in dg;t :h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i

1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



Its derivative is positive i¤
0A

nt +
dg;t
1 + gn
 1 + A nt + dg;t1+gn
1 + gn
>

A

nt +
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gn

  A(nt)

0A

nt +
dg;t
1 + gn


1 + gn
i¤
1 + A(nt) > 0
Thus, it follows that the following term is decreasing in dg;t:
 xA
h
A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn

  A(nt)
i
(1 + )
1 + A

nt +
dg;t
1+gn



(1 + A(nt))
Consider (3.58). Under the given conditions the rst three terms are all decreasing in dg;t: This
leaves xAf(dg;t) + xAdg;tf 0(dg;t): As f 0(dg;t) < 0 under the given conditions, the rst term is also
decreasing in dg;t: Finally, as f 0(dg;t) < 0; xAdg;tf 0(dg;t) takes its maximum value for non-negative
dg;t at dg;t = 0:
40This is the proof of Lemma 65
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From Lemma (64) given
gn >
1  A(nt)
A(nt)(1 + )
"
1 +

nt
0
A (nt) + A (nt) (1  A(nt))

[wt(1  )]
(1  A(nt))(1 + A(nt))nt
#
(3.59)
n
dkt+1
d(dg;t)
o
dg;t=0
< 0 which implies that
n
dkt+1
d(dg;t)
o
dg;t=0
< 0 for all dg;t > 0 under the conditions
given here.
This completes the proof.
3.D.4 Comparison of Policies
Here we prove Proposition 71, comparing the e¢ cacy of an equity injection and discount window
lending.
Proposition 96 Suppose !g < 1+2+ and we have the second equity pricing rule. Consider two
credit crunches with associated banking system net worth n1;n2 with n1 > n2; so n2 is the more
severe crunch. Suppose (3.42) and (3.43) hold for n1 and further that
(1 + gn) [(1 + A (n1))  (1  !g)(1  A(n1))]h
1 + (1 + )A (n1) +
0A(n1)wt(1 )
(1+A(n1))
i   1 > m
(1 + gn) [(1 + A (n2))  (1  !g)(1  A(n2))]h
1 + (1 + )A (n2) +
0A(n2)wt(1 )
(1+A(n2))
i   1 < m
Then an equity injection is more e¤ective in raising kt+1 in the more severe credit crunch (n2);
for a range of dg;t > 0; whilst discount window lending is more e¤ective in the milder credit event
(n1) for all dg;t > 0:
Proof. Under the given conditions, the marginal impact of an equity injection on kt+1 is greatest
at dg;t = 0: As the impact of discount window lending is linear in dg;t it is more e¤ective in raising
kt+1 for all dg;t than an equity injection if the marginal impact is greater at dg;t = 0 :
1  (1  !g)

(1 A(nt))
(1+A(nt))

(1 + m)
>
1
(1 + gn)
+
0A (nt)wt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)
2
+
A (nt) (1  A (nt))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2
nt
With the second equity pricing rule this reduces to
1  (1  !g)

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)
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>
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gn)
"
1 + (1 + )A (nt)
(1 + 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#
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Rearranging this condition gives
(1 + gn)

1  (1  !g)

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
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1 + (1 + 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(1 )
(1+A(nt)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i
> (1 + m)
We look for conditions under which the RHS is increasing in A; so whether this holds or not can
vary with the state of the economy. It will be increasing i¤
[ + 1  !g]

1 + (1 + )A (nt) +
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(1  )
(1 + A (nt)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d
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
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Given !g <
1+
2+ ; !g < 1 + : Suppose nt is su¢ ciently large that 
00
A(nt) < 0; then a su¢ cient
condition for the RHS increasing in A is
[ + 1  !g] (1 + (1 + )A (nt)) > [1 + A (nt) ( + (1  !g))  (1  !g)] (1 + )
This reduces to the condition we assume:
!g <
1 + 
2 + 
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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